946.223.3
Liechtensteinisches Landesgesetzblatt
Jahrgang 2016 Nr. 10 ausgegeben am 19. Januar 2016
Verordnung
vom 19. Januar 2016
über Massnahmen gegenüber der Islamischen Republik Iran
Aufgrund von Art. 2 und 14a des Gesetzes vom 10. Dezember 2008 über die Durchsetzung internationaler Sanktionen (ISG), LGBl. 2009 Nr. 41, in der Fassung des Gesetzes vom 9. Juni 2017, LGBl. 2017 Nr. 203, unter Einbezug der aufgrund des Zollvertrages anwendbaren schweizerischen Rechtsvorschriften und der Beschlüsse des Rates der Europäischen Union vom 26. Juli 2010 (2010/413/GASP), 12. April 2011 (2011/235/GASP) und 20. Juli 2023 (GASP) 2023/1532 sowie in Ausführung der Resolutionen 2231 (2015) vom 20. Juli 2015 und 2664 (2022) vom 9. Dezember 2022 des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen1 verordnet die Regierung:2
I. Zwangsmassnahmen
Art. 1
Begriffe
In dieser Verordnung bedeuten:
a) Gelder: finanzielle Vermögenswerte, einschliesslich Bargeld, Schecks, Geldforderungen, Wechsel, Geldanweisungen oder anderer Zahlungsmittel, Guthaben, Schulden und Schuldverpflichtungen, Wertpapieren und Schuldtiteln, Wertpapierzertifikaten, Obligationen, Schuldscheinen, Optionsscheinen, Pfandbriefen, Derivaten; Zinserträge, Dividenden oder andere Einkünfte oder Wertzuwächse aus Vermögenswerten; Kredite, Rechte auf Verrechnung, Bürgschaften, Vertragserfüllungsgarantien oder andere finanzielle Zusagen; Akkreditive, Konnossemente, Sicherungsübereignungen, Dokumente zur Verbriefung von Anteilen an Fondsvermögen oder anderen Finanzressourcen und jedes andere Finanzierungsinstrument für Exporte;
b) Sperrung von Geldern: die Verhinderung jeder Handlung, welche die Verwaltung oder die Nutzung von Geldern ermöglicht, mit Ausnahme von normalen Verwaltungshandlungen von Banken und Wertpapierfirmen;
c) iranische Person oder Organisation:
1. der iranische Staat sowie jede Behörde dieses Staates,
2. jede natürliche Person mit Aufenthaltsort oder Wohnsitz im Iran, ausgenommen diplomatisches Personal der Schweiz und von Drittstaaten, das in offizieller Funktion im Iran tätig ist,
3. jede juristische Person oder Organisation mit Sitz im Iran,
4. jede juristische Person oder Organisation innerhalb oder ausserhalb des Iran, die sich im Eigentum oder unter der direkten oder indirekten Kontrolle einer oder mehrerer der vorgenannten Personen oder Organisationen befindet;
d) wirtschaftliche Ressourcen: Vermögenswerte jeder Art, unabhängig davon, ob sie materiell oder immateriell, beweglich oder unbeweglich sind, insbesondere Immobilien und Luxusgüter, mit Ausnahme von Geldern nach Bst. a;
e) Sperrung wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen: die Verhinderung ihrer Verwendung zum Erwerb von Geldern, Waren oder Dienstleistungen, einschliesslich des Verkaufs, des Vermietens oder des Verpfändens solcher Ressourcen.
Art. 2
Vorbehaltenes Recht
Die Bestimmungen der in Liechtenstein anwendbaren schweizerischen Güterkontroll-, Kriegsmaterial- und Embargogesetzgebung bleiben vorbehalten.
II. Beschränkungen des Handels
Art. 3
Verbote betreffend Güter, Technologie und Software für Trägersysteme
1) Der Verkauf, die Lieferung, die Ausfuhr und die Durchfuhr von Gütern, Technologie und Software für Trägersysteme an iranische Personen oder Organisationen oder zur Verwendung im Iran sind verboten. Die betreffenden Güter sowie die betreffende Technologie und Software sind in Anhang 1 aufgeführt.
2) Dienstleistungen jeder Art, einschliesslich Finanzdienstleistungen, Vermittlungsdiensten und technischer Beratung, der Gewährung von Finanzmitteln sowie Investitionen, Beteiligungen und Joint Ventures, im Zusammenhang mit dem Verkauf, der Lieferung, der Ausfuhr, der Durchfuhr, der Bereitstellung, der Instandhaltung, der Herstellung oder der Verwendung von Gütern, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 1 sind verboten.
3) Die Verbote nach den Abs. 1 und 2 gelten auch für andere Güter, die ganz oder teilweise für die Entwicklung von Trägersystemen für Kernwaffen im Iran bestimmt sein könnten.
4) Die Beschaffung, die Einfuhr, die Durchfuhr, die Beförderung und die Vermittlung von Gütern, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 1 aus dem Iran sind verboten.
Art. 3a 3
Verbote betreffend Güter und Technologie für unbemannte Luftfahrzeuge
1) Der Verkauf, die Lieferung, die Ausfuhr und die Durchfuhr von Gütern und Technologie für unbemannte Luftfahrzeuge nach Anhang 1a an iranische Personen oder Organisationen oder zur Verwendung im Iran sind verboten.
2) Dienstleistungen jeder Art, einschliesslich Finanzdienstleistungen, Vermittlungsdiensten und technischer Beratung, der Gewährung von Finanzmitteln sowie Investitionen, Beteiligungen und Joint Ventures, im Zusammenhang mit dem Verkauf, der Lieferung, der Ausfuhr, der Durchfuhr, der Bereitstellung, der Instandhaltung, der Herstellung oder der Verwendung von Gütern und Technologie nach Anhang 1a sind verboten.
3) Die Beschaffung, die Einfuhr, die Durchfuhr, die Beförderung und die Vermittlung von Gütern und Technologie nach Anhang 1a aus dem Iran sind verboten.
4) Die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das Staatsekretariat für Wirtschaft (SECO) kann den Verkauf, die Lieferung, die Weitergabe, die Durchfuhr oder die Ausfuhr von Gütern und Technologien nach Anhang 1a oder die damit verbundene Bereitstellung von technischer und finanzieller Hilfe für nichtmilitärische Zwecke und für nichtmilitärische Endnutzer bewilligen, wenn die Güter oder Technologien oder die damit verbundene technische oder finanzielle Hilfe erforderlich sind für:
a) medizinische oder pharmazeutische Zwecke;
b) humanitäre Zwecke, gesundheitliche Notlagen, die dringende Abwendung oder Eindämmung eines Ereignisses, das voraussichtlich schwerwiegende und weitreichende Auswirkungen auf die Gesundheit und Sicherheit von Menschen oder auf die Umwelt haben wird, oder die Bewältigung von Naturkatastrophen.
5) Gesuche um Ausnahmebewilligungen sind vorbehaltlich der Zuständigkeit des SECO bei der Stabsstelle FIU einzureichen.
Art. 4
Bewilligungspflicht betreffend Nukleargüter und doppelt verwendbare Güter
1) Bewilligungspflichtig sind:
a) der Verkauf, die Lieferung, die Ausfuhr und die Durchfuhr von Nukleargütern, doppelt verwendbaren Gütern, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 2 an iranische Personen oder Organisationen oder zur Verwendung im Iran;
b) Dienstleistungen jeder Art, einschliesslich Finanzdienstleistungen, Vermittlungsdiensten und technischer Beratung, der Gewährung von Finanzmitteln sowie Investitionen, Beteiligungen und Joint Ventures, im Zusammenhang mit dem Verkauf, der Lieferung, der Ausfuhr, der Durchfuhr, der Bereitstellung, der Instandhaltung, der Herstellung oder der Verwendung von Gütern, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 2;
c) die Beschaffung, die Einfuhr, die Durchfuhr, die Beförderung und die Vermittlung von Nukleargütern, doppelt verwendbaren Gütern, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 2 aus dem Iran.
2) Abs. 1 gilt auch für andere Güter, die ganz oder teilweise für die Aktivitäten des Iran im Bereich der Anreicherung von Uran, der Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen und des Schweren Wassers bestimmt sein könnten, die nicht mit dem Gemeinsamen umfassenden Aktionsplan vom 14. Juli 20154 zur iranischen Atomfrage und zur Aufhebung der internationalen Sanktionen gegenüber dem Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) vereinbar sind.
3) Die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das SECO erteilt die Bewilligung für Güter nach Abs. 2 sowie nach Anhang 2 Teil A und damit zusammenhängende Dienstleistungen gegebenenfalls im Verfahren nach Art. 16 der schweizerischen Güterkontrollverordnung vom 25. Juni 1997 (GKV), wenn:56
a) die Anforderungen der Richtlinien vom 13. November 2013 beziehungsweise vom Juni 2013 der Gruppe der Nuklearlieferländer (NSG)7 erfüllt sind;
b) der Iran die Rechte zur Prüfung der Endverwendung und des Ortes der Endverwendung jedes gelieferten Gutes erteilt hat und die Rechte wirksam wahrgenommen werden können;
c) die Tätigkeiten mit dem JCPOA vereinbar sind.
4) Die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das SECO erteilt die Bewilligung für Güter nach Anhang 2 Teil B und damit zusammenhängende Dienstleistungen, wenn kein Grund zur Annahme besteht, dass die Tätigkeit ganz oder teilweise für die Aktivitäten des Iran im Bereich der Anreicherung von Uran, der Wiederaufbereitung von Kernbrennstoffen und des Schweren Wassers oder anderen Aktivitäten im Nuklearbereich beitragen könnte, die nicht mit dem JCPOA vereinbar sind.8
5) Von der Bewilligungspflicht nach Abs. 1 Bst. b ausgenommen sind Dienstleistungen für Güter, für welche die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das SECO eine Bewilligung nach Abs. 4 erteilt hat.9
6) Sofern dies aufgrund der Resolution 2231 (2015) des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen erforderlich ist, holt die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das SECO die Stellungnahme des Sicherheitsrates oder der Gemeinsamen Kommission nach dem JCPOA ein.10
7) Die Ausübung einer Tätigkeit nach Abs. 1 ist der Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit dem SECO innerhalb von fünf Arbeitstagen zu melden. Die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das SECO meldet die Ausübung dem Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen und der Internationalen Atomenergiebehörde nach Massgabe der Resolution 2231 (2015) des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen.11
8) Bewilligungsgesuche sind vorbehaltlich der Zuständigkeit des SECO bei der Stabsstelle FIU einzureichen.12
Art. 5
Verbote betreffend Rüstungsgüter und Güter zur internen Repression
1) Der Verkauf, die Lieferung, die Ausfuhr und die Durchfuhr von Rüstungsgütern jeder Art, einschliesslich Waffen und Munition, Militärfahrzeugen und -ausrüstung, paramilitärischer Ausrüstung, sowie von Zubehör und Ersatzteilen dafür an iranische Personen oder Organisationen oder zur Verwendung im Iran sind verboten.
2) Der Verkauf, die Lieferung, die Ausfuhr und die Durchfuhr von Gütern, die zur internen Repression verwendet werden können und die zur Verwendung im Iran bestimmt sind, sind verboten. Die betreffenden Güter sind in Anhang 3 aufgeführt.
3) Dienstleistungen jeder Art, einschliesslich Finanzdienstleistungen, Vermittlungsdiensten und technischer Beratung, der Gewährung von Finanzmitteln sowie Investitionen und Joint Ventures, im Zusammenhang mit dem Verkauf, der Lieferung, der Ausfuhr, der Durchfuhr, der Entwicklung, der Herstellung und der Verwendung von Rüstungsgütern und Gütern nach Anhang 3 sind verboten.
4) Die Beschaffung, die Einfuhr, die Durchfuhr, die Beförderung und die Vermittlung von Rüstungsgütern und Gütern nach Anhang 3 aus dem Iran sind verboten.
5) Von den Verboten nach den Abs. 1 bis 4 ausgenommen sind gepanzerte Fahrzeuge zum Schutz des diplomatischen und konsularischen Personals der Schweiz im Iran sowie die vorübergehende Ausfuhr von Schutzkleidung, einschliesslich kugelsicherer Westen und Helme, zur persönlichen Verwendung durch das Personal der Vereinten Nationen, der Europäischen Union oder der Schweiz, durch Medienvertreter und humanitäres Personal.
6) Die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das SECO kann Ausnahmen von den Verboten nach den Abs. 1 bis 4 bewilligen für:13
a) nichtletales militärisches Gerät, das ausschliesslich für humanitäre Zwecke oder Schutzzwecke, für Programme der Vereinten Nationen, der Europäischen Union oder der Schweiz zum Aufbau von Institutionen oder zur Krisenbewältigung bestimmt ist;
b) Jagd- und Sportwaffen sowie Munition, Zubehör und Ersatzteile dafür.
7) Gesuche um Ausnahmebewilligungen sind vorbehaltlich der Zuständigkeit des SECO bei der Stabsstelle FIU einzureichen.14
Art. 6
Verbote betreffend Ausrüstung, Technologie und Software zu Überwachungszwecken
1) Der Verkauf, die Lieferung, die Ausfuhr und die Durchfuhr von Ausrüstung, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 4, die für das Überwachen und Abhören des Internets und des Telefonverkehrs benützt werden können, an iranische Personen oder Organisationen oder zur Verwendung im Iran sind verboten.
2) Die Erbringung von technischer Hilfe oder von Vermittlungsdiensten sowie die Gewährung von Finanzmitteln im Zusammenhang mit dem Verkauf, der Lieferung, der Ausfuhr, der Durchfuhr, der Bereitstellung, der Herstellung, der Wartung und der Verwendung von Gütern nach Abs. 1 sind verboten.
3) Es ist verboten, für die iranische Regierung, für öffentliche Einrichtungen, Unternehmen und Agenturen des Iran sowie für Personen oder Organisationen, die in deren Namen oder auf deren Anweisung handeln, Dienstleistungen zum Überwachen und Abhören des Internets und des Telefonverkehrs zu erbringen.
4) Die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das SECO bewilligt Ausnahmen von den Verboten nach den Abs. 1 und 2, sofern sichergestellt ist, dass die betroffenen Güter und Dienstleistungen nicht zum Überwachen und Abhören des Internets und des Telefonverkehrs benützt werden. Entsprechende Gesuche sind vorbehaltlich der Zuständigkeit des SECO bei der Stabsstelle FIU einzureichen.15
III. Finanzierungs- und Beteiligungsbeschränkungen
Art. 7
Bewilligungspflicht für Beteiligungen
1) Unternehmen, die mit iranischen Personen oder Organisationen Vereinbarungen über den Erwerb von Beteiligungen oder die Gründung von Joint Ventures abschliessen möchten, benötigen dafür eine Bewilligung, falls sie:
a) im Uranabbau tätig sind; oder
b) folgende Güter, Technologien oder Software entwickeln oder herstellen:
1. Kernmaterialien nach Art. 1 der schweizerischen Kernenergieverordnung vom 10. Dezember 2004 (KEV),
2. Güter, Technologie oder Software nach Anhang 2 Teil 1 der schweizerischen Güterkontrollverordnung vom 25. Juni 1995 (GKV),
3. Güter, Technologie oder Software nach Anhang 2 Ziff. 2.
2) Unternehmen nach Abs. 1 müssen für die Entgegennahme von Darlehen oder Krediten von iranischen Personen oder Organisationen eine Bewilligung einholen.
3) Die Regierung erteilt die Bewilligung, sofern die Tätigkeit mit dem JCPOA vereinbar ist.
4) Sofern dies aufgrund der Resolution 2231 (2015) des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen erforderlich ist, holt die Regierung die Stellungnahme des Sicherheitsrates oder der Gemeinsamen Kommission nach dem JCPOA ein.
5) Bewilligungsgesuche sind bei der Stabsstelle FIU einzureichen.
IV. Finanzielle Beschränkungen16
Art. 8
Sperrung von Geldern und wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen
1) Gelder und wirtschaftliche Ressourcen, die sich im Eigentum oder unter der direkten oder indirekten Kontrolle von natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach den Anhängen 5 bis 7 befinden, sind gesperrt.
2) Es ist verboten:
a) den natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach Abs. 1 Gelder zu überweisen oder Gelder und wirtschaftliche Ressourcen sonst wie direkt oder indirekt zur Verfügung zu stellen;
b) für natürliche Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach Abs. 1 spezielle Zahlungsverkehrsdienste zu erbringen, die für den Austausch von Finanzdaten verwendet werden.
2a) Das Verbot nach Abs. 2 Bst. a gilt nicht für die Erbringung humanitärer Hilfe und für die Unterstützung anderer Tätigkeiten zur Deckung menschlicher Grundbedürfnisse durch:17
a) die Vereinten Nationen, einschliesslich ihrer Programme, Fonds und sonstiger Einrichtungen und Stellen, sowie ihre Sonderorganisationen und verwandte Organisationen;
b) internationale Organisationen;
c) humanitäre Organisationen mit Beobachterstatus in der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen und Mitglieder dieser Organisationen;
d) bilateral oder multilateral finanzierte nichtstaatliche Organisationen, die sich an den Plänen der Vereinten Nationen für humanitäre Hilfe, an den Plänen für Flüchtlingshilfemassnahmen, an anderen Appellen der Vereinten Nationen oder an vom Amt der Vereinten Nationen für die Koordinierung humanitärer Angelegenheiten (OCHA) koordinierten humanitären Strukturen beteiligen;
e) die Beschäftigten, Beitragsempfänger, Tochtergesellschaften oder Durchführungspartner der in Bst. a bis d genannten Organisationen, soweit sie in dieser Eigenschaft handeln;
f) alle weiteren vom zuständigen Ausschuss des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen bestimmten Akteure.
2b) Das Verbot nach Abs. 2 Bst. a gilt zudem nicht, wenn die Überweisung von Geldern oder das Zurverfügungstellen von Geldern oder wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen an die in Anhang 6a genannten natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen erforderlich ist für die Durchführung humanitärer Aktivitäten in Iran durch öffentliche Stellen oder durch Unternehmen und Organisationen, die für die Durchführung solcher Aktivitäten Beiträge des Landes erhalten.18
3) Die Regierung kann Zahlungen aus gesperrten Konten, Übertragungen gesperrter Vermögenswerte sowie die Freigabe gesperrter wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen ausnahmsweise bewilligen zur:
a) Vermeidung von Härtefallen;
b) Erfüllung bestehender Verträge;
c) Erfüllung von Forderungen, die Gegenstand einer bestehenden Entscheidung eines Gerichts, einer Verwaltungsstelle oder eines Schiedsgerichts sind;
d) Erfüllung der amtlichen Tätigkeit iranischer diplomatischer oder konsularischer Vertretungen;
e) Bezahlung angemessener Honorare und Erstattung von Kosten im Zusammenhang mit der Erbringung juristischer Dienstleistungen;19
f) Bezahlung von Gebühren oder Dienstleistungskosten für die routinemässige Verwahrung oder Verwaltung gesperrter Gelder oder wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen;20
g) Umsetzung des JCPOA; oder21
h) Wahrung liechtensteinischer Interessen.22
3a) Die Regierung kann Ausnahmen von den Verboten nach Abs. 1 und 2 im Zusammenhang mit den natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach Anhang 6a bewilligen, um die Durchführung humanitärer Aktivitäten oder die Unterstützung der Zivilbevölkerung in Iran zu ermöglichen.23
4) Die Regierung bewilligt Ausnahmen nach Abs. 3 gemäss den massgeblichen Resolutionen des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen, falls diese anwendbar sind.
5) Gesuche um Ausnahmebewilligungen sind bei der Stabsstelle FIU einzureichen.
Art. 9
Meldepflicht für gesperrte Vermögenswerte
1) Personen und Institutionen, die Gelder halten oder verwalten oder von wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen wissen, von denen anzunehmen ist, dass sie unter die Sperrung nach Art. 8 Abs. 1 fallen, müssen dies der Stabsstelle FIU unverzüglich melden.
2) Die Meldungen müssen die Namen der Begünstigten sowie Gegenstand und Wert der Gelder und wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen enthalten.
V. Weitere Beschränkungen
Art. 10
Verbote betreffend iranische Frachtflugzeuge
1) Es ist verboten, technische Dienste oder Wartungsdienste für Frachtflugzeuge zu erbringen, die im Eigentum oder unter der direkten oder indirekten Kontrolle von iranischen Personen oder Organisationen stehen, falls der Leistungserbringer weiss oder vermutet, dass das Frachtflugzeug Waren befördert, deren Lieferung, Verkauf, Aus- oder Durchfuhr nach dieser Verordnung verboten ist.
2) Das Verbot nach Abs. 1 gilt, bis die Ladung überprüft und, falls erforderlich, beschlagnahmt oder entsorgt ist.
3) Das Verbot nach Abs. 1 gilt nicht, falls die Erbringung der Dienste für humanitäre Zwecke oder aus Sicherheitsgründen erforderlich ist.
4) Die durch die Beschlagnahme und Entsorgung entstehenden Kosten können dem Importeur auferlegt oder bei jeder anderen Person oder Organisation, die für die versuchte illegale Lieferung, den versuchten illegalen Verkauf oder die versuchte illegale Aus- oder Durchfuhr verantwortlich ist, eingefordert werden.
Art. 11
Ein- und Durchreiseverbot
1) Die Einreise nach Liechtenstein oder die Durchreise durch Liechtenstein ist den in den Anhängen 5 bis 7 aufgeführten natürlichen Personen verboten.
2) Die Regierung kann in Übereinstimmung mit den Beschlüssen des zuständigen Ausschusses des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen Ausnahmen für natürliche Personen nach Anhang 5 gewähren.
3) Sie kann für natürliche Personen nach den Anhängen 6 bis 7 Ausnahmen gewähren:24
a) aus erwiesenen humanitären Gründen;
b) zwecks Teilnahme an Tagungen internationaler Gremien oder an einem politischen Dialog betreffend den Iran; oder
c) zur Wahrung liechtensteinischer Interessen.
4) Gesuche um Ausnahmebewilligungen sind beim Ausländer- und Passamt einzureichen.
Art. 12
Verbot der Erfüllung bestimmter Forderungen
Es ist verboten, Forderungen der folgenden natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen zu erfüllen, wenn sie auf einen Vertrag oder ein Geschäft zurückzuführen sind, dessen Durchführung direkt oder indirekt durch Massnahmen nach dieser Verordnung, nach der Verordnung vom 1. Februar 2011 über Massnahmen gegenüber der Islamischen Republik Iran oder nach der Verordnung vom 13. Februar 2007 über Massnahmen gegenüber der Islamischen Republik Iran verhindert oder beeinträchtigt wurden:
a) iranische Personen oder Organisationen;
b) natürliche Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach den Anhängen 5 bis 7;
c) natürliche Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen, die im Auftrag oder zugunsten von Personen oder Organisationen nach Bst. a oder b handeln.
VI. Vollzug und Strafbestimmungen
Art. 13
Kontrolle und Vollzug
1) Die Stabsstelle FIU vollzieht vorbehaltlich der Zuständigkeit der Regierung die Art. 3 bis 10 und 12. Sie prüft insbesondere Bewilligungsgesuche und Gesuche um Ausnahmebewilligungen und leitet sie - erforderlichenfalls nach Konsultation weiterer betroffener Stellen - mit ihrer Empfehlung an die Regierung weiter.
2) Das Ausländer- und Passamt vollzieht Art. 11. Es prüft insbesondere die Gesuche um Ausnahmebewilligungen und leitet sie - erforderlichenfalls nach Konsultation weiterer betroffener Stellen - mit seiner Empfehlung an die Regierung weiter.
3) Die zuständigen liechtensteinischen Behörden ergreifen die für die Sperrung wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen notwendigen Massnahmen wie die Anmerkung einer Verfügungssperre im Grundbuch oder die Pfändung oder Versiegelung von Luxusgütern.
4) Die Zuständigkeit der schweizerischen Behörden bleibt vorbehalten.
Art. 14
Strafbestimmungen
1) Wer gegen Art. 3 bis 8 oder 10 bis 12 verstösst, wird nach Art. 10 ISG bestraft, soweit nicht Strafbestimmungen der in Liechtenstein anwendbaren schweizerischen Kriegsmaterial-, Güterkontroll- und Embargogesetzgebung zur Anwendung gelangen.
2) Wer gegen Art. 9 verstösst, wird nach Art. 11 ISG bestraft.
VII. Schlussbestimmungen
Art. 14a 25
Automatische Übernahme von Listen der natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen, die Gegenstand von Massnahmen sind
Die Listen, die der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen betreffend natürliche Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen erlassen oder aktualisiert hat (Anhang 5), werden automatisch übernommen.
Art. 14b 26
Anträge auf Aufnahme oder Streichung in die bzw. aus der UNO-Liste
1) Die Regierung kann nach Konsultation weiterer betroffener Stellen dem Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen Anträge auf Aufnahme oder Streichung von Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen mit Bezug zu dem Nuklearprogramm der Islamischen Republik Iran oder zu anderen nach dieser Verordnung verbotenen Aktivitäten in die bzw. aus der UNO-Liste (Anhang 5) vorlegen.
2) Die Kriterien für die Aufnahme und Streichung sowie die Verfahren nach Abs. 1 richten sich nach den massgeblichen Resolutionen des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen, insbesondere der Resolution 2231 (2015).
3) Die Regierung regelt das Nähere, insbesondere die Zuständigkeiten, die Kriterien und das Verfahren, in einer Weisung. Die Stabsstelle FIU veröffentlicht die Weisung auf ihrer Internetseite27.
Art. 15
Aufhebung bisherigen Rechts
Die Verordnung vom 1. Februar 2011 über Massnahmen gegenüber der Islamischen Republik Iran, LGBl. 2011 Nr. 55, in der geltenden Fassung, wird aufgehoben.
Art. 15a 28
Übergangsbestimmung zur Änderung vom 3. Oktober 2023
Für Güter und Technologien nach Anhang 1a gelten die Verbote nach Art. 3a Abs. 1 bis 3 bis zum 27. Oktober 2023 nicht für Verpflichtungen aus vor dem 3. Oktober 2023 geschlossenen Verträgen.
Art. 16
Inkrafttreten
Diese Verordnung tritt am 19. Januar 2016 um 18.00 Uhr in Kraft.

Fürstliche Regierung:

gez. Adrian Hasler

Fürstlicher Regierungschef
Anhang 129
(Art. 3 Abs. 1, 2 und 4)
Güter, Technologie und Software für Trägersysteme, die unter die Verbote nach Art. 3 fallen
Güter, Technologie und Software
1. Vollständige Raketen- und unbemannte Luftfahrzeugsysteme, einschliesslich vollständiger Subsysteme hierfür.
2. Güter nach Anhang 2 Teil 2 GKV mit den Kontrollregime-Codes 101 bis 199.
3. Alle übrigen Güter, die im Zusammenhang mit Raketen- und unbemannten Luftfahrzeugsystemen verwendet werden können und die von Anhang 2 Teil 2 GKV, Anhang 3 GKV oder Anhang 1 der schweizerischen Kriegsmaterialverordnung vom 25. Februar 1998 (KMV) erfasst werden.
Anhang 1a30
(Art. 3a Abs. 1 bis 4 und Art. 15a)
Güter und Technologie, die unter die Verbote nach Art. 2a fallen
A. Kategorie 1 - Unbemannte Luftfahrzeuge
HS-Code
Beschreibung
8806.91
Luftfahrzeuge ohne Besatzung, nicht zum Befördern von Passagieren hergerichtet, nicht ausschliesslich zum ferngesteuerten Betrieb hergerichtet, mit einem höchstzulässigen Abfluggewicht von nicht mehr als 250 g
8806.92
Luftfahrzeuge ohne Besatzung, nicht zum Befördern von Passagieren hergerichtet, nicht ausschliesslich zum ferngesteuerten Betrieb hergerichtet, mit einem höchstzulässigen Abfluggewicht von mehr als 250 g, jedoch nicht mehr als 7 kg
8806.93
Luftfahrzeuge ohne Besatzung, nicht zum Befördern von Passagieren hergerichtet, nicht ausschliesslich zum ferngesteuerten Betrieb hergerichtet, mit einem höchstzulässigen Abfluggewicht von mehr als 7 kg, jedoch nicht mehr als 25 kg
8806.94
Luftfahrzeuge ohne Besatzung, nicht zum Befördern von Passagieren hergerichtet, nicht ausschliesslich zum ferngesteuerten Betrieb hergerichtet, mit einem höchstzulässigen Abfluggewicht von mehr als 25 kg, jedoch nicht mehr als 150 kg
8806.99
Luftfahrzeuge ohne Besatzung, nicht zum Befördern von Passagieren hergerichtet, nicht ausschliesslich zum ferngesteuerten Betrieb hergerichtet, mit einem höchstzulässigen Abfluggewicht von mehr als 150 kg
B. Kategorie 2 - Antriebs- und Navigationselemente
HS-Code
Beschreibung
ex 8411.11
Turbostrahltriebwerke für Luftfahrzeuge mit einer Schubkraft von nicht mehr als 25 kN
ex 8411.12
Turbostrahltriebwerke für Luftfahrzeuge mit einer Schubkraft von mehr als 25 kN
ex 8411.21
Turbopropellertriebwerke für Luftfahrzeuge mit einer Leistung von nicht mehr als 1 100 kW
ex 8411.22
Turbopropellertriebwerke für Luftfahrzeuge mit einer Leistung von mehr als 1 100 kW
ex 8411.91
Speziell konzipierte Teile für Turbostrahltriebwerke oder Turbopropellertriebwerke für Luftfahrzeuge
8407.10
Hubkolben- oder Kreiskolbenmotoren mit Funkenzündung (Verbrennungsmotoren) für Luftfahrzeuge
8409.10
Teile, erkennbar als ausschliesslich oder hauptsächlich für Kolbenmotoren für Luftfahrzeuge bestimmt
ex 8408.90
Kolbenmotoren mit Kompressionszündung für Luftfahrzeuge
ex 9014.20
Trägheitsnavigationssysteme, Trägheitsplattformen (Intertial measurement Unit IMU), Beschleunigungsmesser oder Kreisel
ex 8526.10
Radar für Luftfahrzeuge ohne Besatzung und speziell konzipierte Bestandteile hierfür
ex 8529.90
Radar für Luftfahrzeuge ohne Besatzung und speziell konzipierte Bestandteile hierfür
ex 8526.91
Geräte für Funknavigation für Luftfahrzeuge und speziell konzipierte Bestandteile hierfür
ex 8529.90
Geräte für Funknavigation für Luftfahrzeuge und speziell konzipierte Bestandteile hierfür
ex 8807.30
Flugsteuerorgane (FCU) für Luftfahrzeuge ohne Besatzung (UAV)
ex 8807.30
Fernsteuerungsgeräte für Luftfahrzeuge ohne Besatzung (UAV)
C. Kategorie 3 - Elektronische Bauelemente und Systeme
HS-Code
Beschreibung
ex 8542.31
Integrierte Schaltungen wie folgt: FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array, anwenderprogrammierbares Logikgatter), Mikrocontroller, Mikroprozessor, Signalprozessor, Signalanalysator
ex 8542.39
Integrierte Schaltungen wie folgt: FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array, anwenderprogrammierbares Logikgatter), Mikrocontroller, Mikroprozessor, Signalprozessor, Signalanalysator
ex 8542.33
MMIC (monolithisch integrierte Mikrowellenschaltkreise)
ex 8548.00
HF- oder EMI-Abschirmungen gegen elektromagnetische Interferenzen, geeignet für Luftfahrzeuge
8525.83
Nachtsichtgeräte
ex 8525.89
(Sichtlicht- oder Wärmebild-) Kameras, besonders konzipiert für die Verwendung in Luftfahrzeugen ohne Besatzung
ex 9006.30
Luftbild-Überwachungskamera
ex 9025.80
Wärmesensoren für UAV-Kameras
ex 9027.50
Wärmesensoren für UAV-Kameras
D. Kategorie 4 - Sonstige Güter
1. Ausrüstung für Satellitennavigationssysteme, einschliesslich für den Empfang von GNSS-Signalen geeigneter Antennen
2. luftgestützte Laser-Entfernungsmesser
3. LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging)-Systeme
4. Technologie, die für die Erprobung, Entwicklung oder Herstellung der vorstehend in der Liste aufgeführten Ausrüstung konzipiert oder speziell angepasst wurde
Anhang 2
(Art. 4 Abs. 1)
Güter, Technologie und Software, die unter die Bewilligungspflicht nach Art. 4 fallen
A. Güter, Technologie und Software
1. Kernmaterialien nach Art. 1 KEV.
2. Güter, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 2 Teil 1 GKV.
3. Güter, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 2 GKV mit den Kontrollregime-Codes 201 bis 299.
B. Sonstige Güter
Nummer der EU
Beschreibung
Referenznummer in Anhang 2 GKV
A0. Kerntechnische Materialien, Anlagen und Ausrüstung
II.A0.001
Hohlkathodenlampen wie folgt:
a) Jod-Hohlkathodenlampen mit Fenstern aus reinem Silizium oder Quarz;
b) Uran-Hohlkathodenlampen.
 
II.A0.002
Faraday-Isolatoren im Wellenlängenbereich 500-650 nm.
 
II.A0.003
Optische Gitter im Wellenlängenbereich 500-650 nm.
 
II.A0.004
Optische Fasern im Wellenlängenbereich 500-650 nm, mit Antireflexschichten im Wellenlängenbereich 500-650 nm überzogen und mit einem Kerndurchmesser grösser als 0,4 mm und kleiner/gleich 2 mm.
 
II.A0.005
Bestandteile eines Kernreaktors und Prüfgeräte, soweit nicht in Nummer 0A001 erfasst, wie folgt:
1. Plomben;
2. innenliegende Bestandteile;
3. Ausrüstung für das Verschliessen sowie für das Prüfen und Messen der Verschlüsse.
0A001
II.A0.006
Nukleare Nachweissysteme zum Nachweis, zur Identifizierung und zur Quantifizierung radioaktiver Stoffe oder von Kernstrahlung und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür, soweit nicht in den Unternummern 0A001j und 1A004c erfasst.
0A001j
1A004c
II.A0.007
Faltenbalgventile aus Aluminiumlegierungen oder rostfreiem Stahl vom Typ 304, 304L oder 316L.
Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Faltenbalgventile, erfasst in Unternummer 0B001c6 und Nummer 2A226.
0B001c6
2A226
II.A0.008
Laserspiegel, soweit nicht in Unternummer 6A005e erfasst, aus Substraten mit einem thermischen Ausdehnungskoeffizienten von kleiner/gleich 10-6K-1 bei 20 °C (z.B. Quarzglas oder Saphir).
Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht optische Systeme, die speziell für astronomische Anwendungen entwickelt wurden, sofern die Spiegel kein geschmolzenes Quarz enthalten.
0B001g5
6A005e
II.A0.009
Laserlinsen, soweit nicht in Unternummer 6A005e2 erfasst, aus Substraten mit einem thermischen Ausdehnungskoeffizienten von kleiner/gleich 10-6K-1 bei 20 °C (z.B. Quarzglas).
0B001g
6A005e2
II.A0.010
Rohre, Verrohrungen, Flansche und Anschlussstücke (Fittings), bestehend aus oder beschichtet mit Nickel oder Nickellegierungen mit mehr als 40 Gew.-% Nickel, soweit nicht in Unternummer 2B350h1 erfasst.
2B350
II.A0.011
Vakuumpumpen, soweit nicht in Unternummer 0B002f2 oder Nummer 2B231 erfasst, wie folgt:
Turbomolekularpumpen mit einer Förderleistung grösser/gleich 400 l/s,
Wälzkolben(Roots-)vakuumpumpen mit einer volumetrischen Ansaugleistung grösser als 200 m3/h.
Faltenbalggedichtete Schraubenkompressoren und faltenbalggedichtete Schraubenvakuumpumpen.
0B002f2
2B231
II.A0.012
Abgeschirmte Gehäuse für den Umgang mit, die Aufbewahrung oder die Handhabung von radioaktiven Stoffen (Heisse Zellen).
0B006
II.A0.013
"Natürliches Uran", "abgereichertes Uran" oder Thorium als Metall, Legierung, chemische Verbindung oder Konzentrat sowie jedes andere Material, das einen oder mehrere der vorstehend genannten Stoffe enthält, soweit nicht in Nummer 0C001 erfasst.
0C001
II.A0.014
Detonationskammern mit einer Absorptions-Kapazität von über 2,5 kg TNT-Äquivalent.
 
II.A0.015
"Handschuhfächer", besonders konstruiert für radioaktive Isotope, Strahlenquellen oder Radionuklide.
Technische Anmerkung: "Handschuhfach" bezeichnet ein Gerät, das der Person, die das Gerät von aussen bedient, Schutz vor gefährlichen Dämpfen, Partikeln oder Strahlen bietet, die von den Materialien erzeugt werden, die die Person mittels in das Gerät integrierter Griffe oder Handschuhe innerhalb des Geräts behandelt oder bearbeitet.
0B006
II.A0.016
Systeme zur Überwachung toxischer Gase, ausgelegt für den Dauerbetrieb und zur Feststellung von Schwefelwasserstoff, und besonders konstruierte Detektoren hierfür.
0A001
0B001c
II.A0.0I7
Heliumleckdetektoren.
0A001
0B001c
A1. Werkstoffe, Chemikalien, "Mikroorganismen" und "Toxine"
II.A1.001
Lösungsmittel Bis(2-ethylhexyl) phosphorsäure (HDEHP oder D2HPA) (Nummer im Register des Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) 298-07-7), in beliebiger Menge, mit einer Reinheit grösser als 90 Gew.-%.
 
II.A1.002
Fluorgas - CAS-Nr. 7782-41-4 - mit einer Reinheit grösser als 95 Gew.-%.
 
II.A1.003
Ringförmige Dichtungen und Verschlüsse mit einem Innendurchmesser von kleiner/gleich 400 mm, bestehend aus einem der folgenden Materialien:
a) Copolymere des Vinylidenfluorids, die ungereckt zu mindestens 75 % eine beta-kristalline Struktur aufweisen;
b) fluorierte Polyimide, die mindestens 10 Gew.-% gebundenes Fluor enthalten;
c) fluorierte Phosphazen-Elastomere, die mindestens 30 Gew.-% gebundenes Fluor enthalten;
d) Polychlortrifluorethylen (PCTFE, z.B. Kel-F ®);
e) Fluorelastomere (z.B. Viton ®, Tecnoflon ®);
f) Polytetrafluorethylen (PTFE).
 
II.A1.004
Persönliche Ausrüstung für den Nachweis von Kernstrahlung, einschliesslich Personen-Dosimeter.
Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Kernstrahlungsnachweissysteme, erfasst in Unternummer 1A004c.
1A004c
II.A1.005
Elektrolytische Zellen für die Erzeugung von Fluor mit einer Fertigungskapazität von mehr als 100 g Fluor je Stunde.
Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht elektrolytische Zellen, erfasst in Nummer 1B225.
1B225
II.A1.006
Katalysatoren, soweit nicht nach Nummer 1A225 verboten, die Platin, Palladium oder Rhodium enthalten, verwendbar zur Förderung der Wasserstoffaustauschreaktion zwischen Wasserstoff und Wasser zur Tritiumrückgewinnung aus Schwerem Wasser oder zur Schwerwasserproduktion.
1B231
1A225
II.A1.007
Aluminium und Aluminiumlegierungen, soweit nicht in Unternummer 1C002b4 oder 1C202a erfasst, in Roh- oder Halbzeugform mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:
a) erreichbare Zugfestigkeit grösser/gleich 460 MPa bei 293 K (20 °C); oder
b) mit einer Zugfestigkeit grösser/gleich 415 MPa bei 298 K (25 °C).
1C002b4
1C202a
II.A1.008
Magnetische Metalle aller Typen und in jeder Form mit einer Anfangsrelativpermeabilität (initial relative permeability) grösser/gleich 120 000 und einer Dicke grösser/gleich 0,05 mm und kleiner/gleich 0,1 mm.
1C003a
II.A1.009
"Faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien" oder Prepregs wie folgt:
ANMERKUNG: SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER II.A1.1019.a.
a) "faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien" aus Kohlenstoff oder Aramid mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:
1. "spezifischer Modul" grösser als 10 x 106 m; oder
2. "spezifische Zugfestigkeit" grösser als 17 x 104m;
b) "faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien" aus Glas mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:
1. "spezifischer Modul" grösser als 3,18 x 106 m, oder
2. "spezifische Zugfestigkeit" grösser als 76,2 x 103 m;
c) mit warmaushärtendem Harz imprägnierte endlose "Garne", "Faserbündel" (rovings), "Seile" oder "Bänder" mit einer Breite kleiner/gleich 15 mm (wenn Prepregs) aus "faser- oder fadenförmigen Materialien" aus Kohlenstoff oder Glas, soweit nicht in Unternummer II.A1.010.a oder b erfasst.
Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht "faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien", erfasst in den Unternummern 1C010a, 1C010b, 1C210a und 1C210b.
1C010a
1C010b
1C210a
1C210b
II.A1.010
Harzimprägnierte oder pechimprägnierte Fasern (Prepregs), metall- oder kohlenstoffbeschichtete Fasern (Preforms) oder "Kohlenstofffaser-Preforms" wie folgt:
a) hergestellt aus in Nummer II.A1.009 erfassten "faser- oder fadenförmigen Materialien";
b) kohlenstoffbeschichtete "faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien" in Epoxidharz-"Matrix" (prepregs), erfasst in den Unternummern 1C010a, 1C010b und 1C010c, für die Reparatur von Luftfahrzeug-Strukturen oder Laminaten, bei denen die Grösse der Einzelmatten nicht grösser ist als 50 cm x 90 cm;
c) Prepregs, erfasst in Unternummer 1C010a, 1C010b oder 1C010c, die mit Phenol- oder Epoxydharzen imprägniert sind, mit einer Glasübergangstemperatur (Tg) kleiner als 433 K (160 °C) und deren Aushärtungstemperatur kleiner als die Glasübergangstemperatur ist.
Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht "faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien", erfasst in Unternummer 1C010e.
1C010e
1C210
II.A1.011
Verstärkte Siliziumkarbid-Keramik-Verbundwerkstoffe, geeignet für Bugspitzen, Wiedereintrittskörper, Strahlruder, verwendbar für "Flugkörper", soweit nicht in Nummer 1C107 erfasst.
1C107
II.A1.012
Martensitaushärtender Stahl (maraging Steel), soweit nicht in den Nummern 1C116 oder 1C216 erfasst, geeignet für eine Zugfestigkeit grösser/gleich 2050 MPa bei 293 K (20 °C).
Technische Anmerkung: Martensitaushärtender Stahl geeignet für umfasst martensitaushärtenden Stahl vor und nach einer Wärmebehandlung.
1C216
II.A1.013
Wolfram, Tantal, Wolframkarbid, Tantalkarbid und Legierungen mit beiden folgenden Eigenschaften;
a) in Formen mit hohlzylindrischer oder sphärischer Symmetrie (einschliesslich Zylindersegmente) mit einem Innendurchmesser grösser/gleich 50 mm und kleiner/gleich 300 mm; und
b) einer Masse über 5 kg.
Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Wolfram, Wolframkarbid und Legierungen, erfasst in Nummer 1C226.
1C226
II.A1.014
Elementpulver aus Kobalt, Neodym oder Samarium oder Legierungen oder Mischungen daraus, die mindestens 20 Gew.-% Kobalt, Neodym oder Samarium enthalten, mit einer Partikelgrösse von kleiner 200 μm.
 
II.A1.015
Reines Tributylphosphat (TBP) (CAS-Nr. 126-73-8) oder Mischungen mit einem Gehalt an TBP von über 5 Gew.-%.
 
II.A1.016
Martensitaushärtender Stahl (maraging Steel), soweit nicht nach den Nummern 1C116, 1C216 oder II.A1.012 verboten.
Technische Anmerkung: Martensitaushärtende Stähle sind Eisenlegierungen, die im Allgemeinen gekennzeichnet sind durch einen hohen Nickel- und sehr geringen Kohlenstoffgehalt sowie die Verwendung von Substitutions- oder Ausscheidungselementen zur Festigkeitssteigerung und Ausscheidungshärtung der Legierung.
 
II.A1.017
Metall, Metallpulver und -material wie folgt:
a) Wolfram und Wolframlegierungen, soweit nicht nach Nummer 1C117 verboten, in Form einheitlich kugelförmiger oder staubförmiger Partikel mit einer Partikelgrösse kleiner/gleich 500 μm und einem Gehalt an Wolfram von grösser/gleich 97 Gew.-%;
b) Molybdän und Molybdänlegierungen, soweit nicht nach Nummer 1C117 verboten, in Form einheitlich kugelförmiger oder staubförmiger Partikel mit einer Partikelgrösse kleiner/gleich 500 μm und einem Gehalt an Molybdän von grösser/gleich 97 Gew.-%;
c) Wolframmaterialien in fester Form, soweit nicht nach den Nummern 1C226 oder II.A1.013 verboten, mit einer Materialzusammensetzung wie folgt:
1. Wolfram und Legierungen mit einem Gehalt an Wolfram von grösser/gleich 97 Gew.-%;
2. mit Kupfer infiltriertes Wolfram mit einem Gehalt an Wolfram von grösser/gleich 80 Gew.-%; oder
3. mit Silber infiltriertes Wolfram mit einem Gehalt an Wolfram von grösser/gleich 80 Gew.-%.
 
11.A1.018
Weichmagnetische Legierungen mit einer chemischen Zusammensetzung wie folgt:
a) Gehalt an Eisen zwischen 30 % und 60 %; und
b) Gehalt an Kobalt zwischen 40 % und 60 %.
 
II.A1.019
"Faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien" oder Prepregs, die nicht nach Anhang 2 (Nummer II.A1.009 oder II.A1.010) der vorliegenden Verordnung verboten oder nicht in Anhang 2 GKV aufgeführt sind, wie folgt:
a)"faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien" aus Kohlenstoff; Anmerkung: Unternummer II.A1.019.a erfasst keine Webwaren.
b) mit warmaushärtendem Harz imprägnierte endlose "Garne", "Faserbündel" (rovings), "Seile" oder "Bänder" aus "faser- oder fadenförmigen Materialien" aus Kohlenstoff;
c) endlose "Garne", "Faserbündel" (rovings), "Seile" oder "Bänder" aus Polyacrylnitril (PAN).
 
II.A1.020
Stahllegierungen als Stahlblech oder Stahlplatten mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:
a) Stahllegierungen geeignet für eine Zugfestigkeit grösser/gleich 1 200 MPa bei 293K (20 °C); oder
b) Stickstoffstabilisierter Duplexstahl.
Anmerkung: Der Ausdruck Legierungen geeignet für erfasst Legierungen vor und nach einer Wärmebehandlung.
Technische Anmerkung: "Stickstoffstabilisierter Duplexstahl" besitzt eine Zweiphasen-Mikrostruktur bestehend aus Körnern ferritischen und austenitischen Stahls unter Zusatz von Stickstoff zur Stabilisierung der Mikrostruktur
1C116
1C216
II.A1.021
Kohlenstoff/Kohlenstoff-Verbundwerkstoffe.
1A002b1
II.A1.022
Nickellegierungen in Roh- oder Halbzeugform, mit mindestens 60 Gew.-% Nickel.
1C002c1a
II.A1.023
Titanlegierungen in Form von Titanblech oder Titanplatte geeignet für eine Zugfestigkeit grösser/gleich 900 MPa bei 293 K (20 °C).
Anmerkung: Der Ausdruck Legierungen geeignet für erfasst Legierungen vor und nach einer Wärmebehandlung.
1C002b3
II.A1.024
Treibstoffe und chemische Bestandteile für Treibstoffe, wie folgt:
a) Toluoldiisocyanat (TDI)
b) Methylendiphenyldiisocyanat (MDI)
c) Isophorondiiscocyanat (IPDI)
d) Natriumperchlorat
e) Xylidin
f) hydroxyterminierters Polyether (HTPE)
g) hydroxyterminiertes Caprolactonether (HTCE)
Technische Anmerkung: Diese Nummer bezieht sich auf den Reinstoff und jede Mischung, die zu mindestens 50 % aus den oben genannten Chemikalien besteht.
1C111
II.A1.025
"Schmiermittel", die als Hauptbestandteil eine der folgenden Verbindungen oder einen der folgenden Stoffe enthalten:
a) Perfluoroalkylether, (CAS 60164-51-4);
b) Perfluoropolyalkylether, PFPE, (CAS 6991-67-9).
"Schmiermittel" bedeutet Öle und Flüssigkeiten.
1C006
II.A1.026
Beryllium-Kupfer- oder Kupfer-Beryllium-Legierungen in Form von Platten, Blechen, Streifen oder gewalzten Stangen, bestehend grösstenteils aus Kupfer und aus anderen Elementen mit weniger als 2 Gew.-% Beryllium.
1C002b
A2. Werkstoffbearbeitung
II.A2.001
Vibrationsprüfsysteme, Ausrüstung und Bestandteile hierfür, soweit nicht in Nummer 2B116 erfasst:
a) Vibrationsprüfsysteme mit Rückkopplungs- oder Closed-Loop-Technik mit integrierter digitaler Steuerung, geeignet für Vibrationsbeanspruchungen des Prüflings mit einer Beschleunigung grösser/gleich 0,1 g rms zwischen 0,1 Hz und 2 kHz und bei Übertragungskräften grösser/gleich 50 kN, gemessen am "Prüf-tisch";
b) digitale Steuerungen in Verbindung mit besonders für Vibrationsprüfung entwickelter "Software", mit einer Echtzeit-Bandbreite grösser/gleich 5 kHz und konstruiert zum Einsatz in den in Unternummer a erfassten Systemen;
c) Schwingerreger (Shaker units) mit oder ohne zugehörige Verstärker, geeignet für Übertragungskräfte von grösser/gleich 50 kN, gemessen am "Prüftisch", und geeignet für die in Unternummer a erfassten Systeme;
d) Prüflingshaltevorrichtungen und Elektronikeinheiten, konstruiert, um mehrere Schwingerreger zu einem Schwingerregersystem, das Übertragungskräfte grösser/gleich 50 kN, gemessen am "Prüftisch", erzeugen kann, zusammenzufassen, und geeignet für die in Unternummer a erfassten Systeme.
Technische Anmerkung: Ein "Prüftisch" ist ein flacher Tisch oder eine flache Oberfläche ohne Aufnahmen oder Halterungen.
2B116
II.A2.002
Werkzeugmaschinen und Bestandteile und Steuerungen für Werkzeugmaschinen wie folgt:
a) Werkzeugmaschinen für Schleifbearbeitung mit einer Positioniergenauigkeit mit "allen verfügbaren Kompensationen" von kleiner (besser)/gleich 15 μm nach ISO 230/2 (1988) (1) oder entsprechenden nationalen Normen entlang einer Linearachse;
Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Werkzeugmaschinen für Schleifbearbeitung, erfasst in den Unternummern 2B201b und 2B001c.
b) Bestandteile und Steuerungen, besonders konstruiert für Werkzeugmaschinen, erfasst in Nummer 2B001 oder 2B201 oder in Unternummer a.
2B201b
2B001c
II.A2.003
Auswuchtmaschinen und zugehörige Ausrüstung wie folgt:
a) Auswuchtmaschinen, konstruiert oder geändert für zahnmedizinische oder andere medizinische Ausrüstung, mit allen folgenden Eigenschaften:
1. nicht geeignet zum Auswuchten von Rotoren/Baugruppen mit einer Masse grösser als 3 kg,
2. geeignet zum Auswuchten von Rotoren/Baugruppen bei Drehzahlen grösser als 12 500 U/min,
3. geeignet zur Korrektur von Unwuchten in zwei oder mehr Ebenen; und
4. geeignet zum Auswuchten bis zu einer spezifischen Restunwucht von 0,2 g mm/kg der Rotormasse;
b) Messgeräte (indicator heads), konstruiert oder geändert für den Einsatz in Maschinen, erfasst in Unternummer a.
Technische Anmerkung: Indicator heads werden auch als balancing instrumentation bezeichnet.
2B119
 
II.A2.004
Fernlenk-Manipulatoren, die für ferngesteuerte Tätigkeiten bei radiochemischen Trennprozessen oder in Heissen Zellen eingesetzt werden können, soweit nicht in Nummer 2B225 erfasst, mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:
a) Eignung zur Durchdringung der Wand einer Heissen Zelle mit einer Dicke grösser/gleich 0,3 m (Durch-die-Wand-Modifikation); oder
b) Eignung zur Überbrückung der Wand einer Heissen Zelle mit einer Dicke grösser/gleich 0,3 m (Über-die-Wand-Modifikation).
2B225
II.A2.006
Öfen, geeignet für Betriebstemperaturen grösser als 400 °C, wie folgt:
a) Oxydationsöfen;
b) Mit kontrollierter Atmosphäre betriebene Wärmebehandlungsöfen.
Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Tunnelöfen mit Rollenbahn oder Wagen, Tunnelöfen mit Förderband, Durchschuböfen oder Herdwagenöfen, die für die Herstellung von Glas, Tischgeschirr aus Keramik oder Strukturkeramik konstruiert wurden.
2B226
2B227
II.A2.007
"Druckmessgeräte", soweit nicht in Nummer 2B230 erfasst, geeignet zum Messen von Absolutdrücken im Bereich von 0 bis 200 kPa, mit beiden folgenden Eigenschaften:
a) Drucksensoren, hergestellt aus oder geschützt durch "gegen Korrosion durch Uranhexafluorid (UF 6)- resistente Werkstoffe"; und
b) mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:
1. Messbereich kleiner als 200 kPa und "Messgenauigkeit" kleiner (besser) als ± 1 % vom Skalenendwert; oder
2. Messbereich grösser/gleich 200 kPa und "Messgenauigkeit" kleiner (besser) als 2 kPa.
2B230
II.A2.008
Flüssig-flüssig Kontakt-Ausrüstung (Mischer-Abscheider, Pulsationskolonnen und Zentrifugalextraktoren) und Flüssigkeitsverteiler, Dampfverteiler oder Flüssigkeitssammler, konstruiert für solche Ausrüstung, bei denen die medienberührenden Flächen ganz aus einem der folgenden Werkstoffe bestehen:
ANMERKUNG: SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER II.A2.014.
1. rostfreier Stahl.
Anmerkung: Für rostfreien Stahl mit mehr als 25 Gew.-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom siehe Nummer II.A2.014.a
2B350e
 
II.A2.009
Industrielle Geräte und Bestandteile, soweit nicht in Unternummer 2B350d erfasst, wie folgt:
ANMERKUNG: SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER II.A2.015
Wärmetauscher oder Kondensatoren mit einer Wärmeaustauschfläche grösser als 0,05 m2 und kleiner als 30 m2 sowie für solche Wärmetauscher oder Kondensatoren konstruierte Rohre, Platten, Coils oder Blöcke, bei denen die medienberührenden Flächen ganz aus einem der folgenden Werkstoffe bestehen:
1. rostfreier Stahl.
Anmerkung 1: Für rostfreien Stahl mit mehr als 25 Gew.-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom siehe Nummer II.A2.015.a
Anmerkung 2: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Fahrzeugkühler.
Technische Anmerkung: Die für Dichtungen und Verschlüsse und weitere Verschlussfunktionen verwendeten Materialien bestimmen nicht den Kontrollstatus des Wärmetauschers.
2B350d
II.A2.010
Pumpen mit Mehrfachdichtung und dichtungslose Pumpen, soweit nicht in Unternummer 2B350i erfasst, geeignet für korrodierende Flüssigkeiten, mit einer vom Hersteller angegebenen maximalen Förderleistung grösser als 0,6 m3/h oder Vakuumpumpen mit einer vom Hersteller angegebenen maximalen Förderleistung grösser als 5 m3/h (jeweils unter Standard-Bedingungen von 273 K (0 °C) und 101,3 kPa) sowie für solche Pumpen konstruierte Pumpengehäuse, vorgeformte Gehäuseauskleidungen, Laufräder, Rotoren oder Strahlpumpendüsen, bei denen die medienberührenden Flächen ganz aus den folgenden Materialien bestehen:
ANMERKUNG: SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER II.A2.016.
1. rostfreier Stahl.
Anmerkung: Für rostfreien Stahl mit mehr als 25 Gew.-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom siehe Nummer II.A2.016.a
Technische Anmerkung: Die für Dichtungen und Verschlüsse und weitere Verschlussfunktionen verwendeten Materialien bestimmen nicht den Kontrollstatus der Pumpe.
2B350i
II.A2.011
Zentrifugalseparatoren, geeignet zur kontinuierlichen Trennung ohne Aerosolfreisetzung und hergestellt aus einem der folgenden Werkstoffe:
1. Legierungen mit mehr als 25 Gew,-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom;
2. Fluorpolymeren;
3. Glas oder Email;
4. Nickel oder Nickel-Legierungen mit mehr als 40 Gew. % Nickel;
5. Tantal oder Tantallegierungen;
6. Titan oder Titanlegierungen; oder
7. Zirkonium oder Zirkoniumlegierungen.
Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Zentrifugalseparatoren, erfasst in Unternummer 2B352c.
2B352c
II.A2.012
Filter aus gesintertem Metall, aus Nickel oder Nickellegierungen mit 40 Gew.-% Nickel oder mehr.
Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Filter, erfasst in Unternummer 2B352d.
2B352d
II.A2.013
Drück- und Fliessdrückmaschinen, soweit nicht in Nummer 2B009, 2B109 oder 2B209 erfasst, mit einer Supportkraft grösser als 60 kN und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür.
Technische Anmerkung: Im Sinne von Nummer II.A2.013 werden Maschinen mit kombinierter Drück- und Fliessdrückfunktion als Fliessdrückmaschinen betrachtet.
 
II.A2.014
Flüssig-flüssig-Kontakt-Ausrüstung (Mischer-Abscheider, Pulsationskolonnen und Zentrifugalextraktoren) und Flüssigkeitsverteiler, Dampfverteiler oder Flüssigkeitssammler, konstruiert für solche Ausrüstung, bei denen die medienberührenden Flächen ganz aus einem der folgenden Werkstoffe bestehen:
ANMERKUNG: SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER II.A2.008.
a) hergestellt aus einem der folgenden Materialien:
1. Legierungen mit mehr als 25 Gew.-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom;
2. Fluorpolymeren;
3. Glas oder Email;
4. Grafit oder "Carbon-Grafit";
5. Nickel oder Nickel-Legierungen mit mehr als 40 Gew.-% Nickel;
6. Tantal oder Tantallegierungen;
7. Titan oder Titanlegierungen; oder
8. Zirkonium oder Zirkoniumlegierungen; oder
b) aus Edelstahl und einem oder mehreren in II.A2.014.a erfassten Materialien.
Technische Anmerkung: "Carbon-Grafit" besteht aus amorphem Kohlenstoff und Grafit, wobei der Grafitgehalt 8 Gew.-% oder mehr beträgt.
2B350e
II.A2.015
Industrielle Geräte und Bestandteile, soweit nicht in Unternummer 2B350d erfasst, wie folgt:
ANMERKUNG: SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER II.A2.009.
Wärmetauscher oder Kondensatoren mit einer Wärmeaustauschfläche grösser als 0,05 m2 und kleiner als 30 m2 sowie für solche Wärmetauscher oder Kondensatoren konstruierte Rohre, Platten, Coils oder Blöcke, bei denen die medienberührenden Flächen ganz aus einem der folgenden Werkstoffe bestehen:
a) hergestellt aus einem der folgenden Materialien:
1. Legierungen mit mehr als 25 Gew.-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom;
2. Fluorpolymeren;
3. Glas oder Email;
4. Grafit oder "Carbon-Grafit";
5. Nickel oder Nickel-Legierungen mit mehr als 40 Gew.-% Nickel;
6. Tantal oder Tantallegierungen;
7. Titan oder Titanlegierungen;
8. Zirkonium oder Zirkoniumlegierungen;
9. Siliziumkarbid; oder
10. Titankarbid; oder
b) aus Edelstahl und einem oder mehreren in II.A2.015.a erfassten Materialien.
Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Fahrzeugkühler.
Technische Anmerkung: Die für Dichtungen und Verschlüsse und weitere Verschlussfunktionen verwendeten Materialien bestimmen nicht den Kontrollstatus des Wärmetauschers.
2B350d
II.A2.016
Pumpen mit Mehrfachdichtung und dichtungslose Pumpen, soweit nicht in Unternummer 2B350i erfasst, geeignet für korrodierende Flüssigkeiten, mit einer vom Hersteller angegebenen maximalen Förderleistung grösser als 0,6 m3/h oder Vakuumpumpen mit einer vom Hersteller angegebenen maximalen Förderleistung grösser als 5 m3/h (jeweils unter Standard-Bedingungen von 273 K (0 °C) und 101,3 kPa); sowie für solche Pumpen konstruierte Pumpengehäuse, vorgeformte Gehäuseauskleidungen, Laufräder, Rotoren oder Strahlpumpendüsen, bei denen die medienberührenden Flächen ganz aus einem der folgenden Materialien bestehen:
ANMERKUNG: SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER II.A2.010.
a) hergestellt aus einem der folgenden Materialien:
1. Legierungen mit mehr als 25 Gew.-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom;
2. Keramik;
3. Ferrosiliziumguss;
4. Fluorpolymeren;
5. Glas oder Email;
6. Grafit oder "Carbon-Grafit";
7. Nickel oder Nickel-Legierungen mit mehr als 40 Gew.-% Nickel;
8. Tantal oder Tantallegierungen;
9. Titan oder Titanlegierungen;
10. Zirkonium oder Zirkoniumlegierungen;
11. Niob (Columbium) oder Niob-"Legierungen"; oder
12. Aluminiumlegierungen; oder
b) aus Edelstahl und einem oder mehreren in II.A2.016.a. erfassten Materialien.
Technische Anmerkung: Die für Dichtungen und Verschlüsse und weitere Verschlussfunktionen verwendeten Materialien bestimmen nicht den Kontrollstatus der Pumpe.
2B350i
 
II.A2.017
Funkenerodiermaschinen (EDM) zum Entfernen oder Schneiden von Metallen, Keramiken oder "Verbundwerkstoffen", wie folgt, und besondere konstruierte Ramm-, Senk- oder Drahtelektroden hierfür:
a) Funkenerodiermaschinen mit Ramm- oder Senkelektroden;
b) Funkenerodiermaschinen mit Drahtelektroden.
Anmerkung: Funkenerodiermaschinen werden auch als Drahterodiermaschinen bezeichnet.
2B001d
II.A2.018
Rechnergesteuerte oder "numerisch gesteuerte" Koordinatenmessmaschinen (CMM) mit einer dreidimensionalen (volumetrischen) Längenmessabweichung (MPPE) an einem Punkt innerhalb des Arbeitsbereiches der Maschine (d.h. innerhalb der Achslängen) kleiner (besser)/gleich (3 + L/1000) μm (L ist die Messlänge in mm), geprüft nach ISO 10360-2 (2001), und hierfür konstruierte Messsonden.
2B006a
2B206a
II.A2.019
Rechnergesteuerte oder "rechnergestützte" Elektronenstrahlschweissmaschinen, und besonders konstruierte Bauteile hierfür.
2B001e1b
II.A2.020
Rechnergesteuerte oder "rechnergestützte" Laserschweiss- und Laserschneidmaschinen, und besonders konstruierte Bauteile hierfür.
2B001e1c
II.A2.021
Rechnergesteuerte oder "rechnergestützte" Plasmaschneidmaschinen und besonders konstruierte Bauteile hierfür.
2B001e1
II.A2.022
Vibrationsprüfgeräte besonders konstruiert für Rotoren oder rotierende Ausrüstungen und Maschinen, geeignet zum Messen von Frequenzen zwischen 600 und 2000 Hz.
2B116
II.A2.023
Flüssigringvakuumpumpen, und besonders konstruierte Bauteile hierfür.
2B231
2B350i
II.A2.024
Drehschiebervakuumpumpen, und besonders konstruierte Bauteile hierfür.
Anmerkung 1: Nummer II.A2.024 erfasst nicht Drehschiebervakuumpumpen, die für andere spezifische Ausrüstungen besonders konstruiert sind.
Anmerkung 2: Die Erfassung von Drehschiebervakuumpumpen, besonders entwickelt für andere Geräte, richtet sich nach der Erfassung der anderen Geräte.
2B231
2B235i
0B002f
II.A2.025
Luftfilter, wie folgt, mit einem Durchmesser von mehr als 1000 mm:
a) HEPA-Filter (High Efficiency Particulate Air filters);
b) ULPA-Filter (Ultra Low Penetration Air filters).
Anmerkung: Die Nummer II.A2.025 erfasst nicht für medizinische Ausrüstung besonders konstruierte Luftfilter
2B352d
A3. Allgemeine Elektronik
II.A3.001
Hochspannungs-Gleichstromversorgungsgeräte mit beiden folgenden Eigenschaften:
a) Erzeugung von 10 kV oder mehr im Dauerbetrieb über einen Zeitraum von acht Stunden mit einer Ausgangsleistung grösser/gleich 5 kW, auch mit sweeping; und
b) Strom- oder Spannungsregelung besser als 0,1 % über einen Zeitraum von vier Stunden
Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Stromversorgungsgeräte, erfasst in Unternummer 0B001j5 und Nummer 3A227.
3A227
II.A3.002
Massenspektrometer, soweit nicht in Nummer 3A233 oder Unternummer 0B002g erfasst, für die Messung von Ionen einer Atommasse grösser/gleich 200 amu (atomic mass units) mit einer Auflösung besser als 2 amu bei 200 amu oder grösser, und Ionenquellen hierfür wie folgt:
a) induktiv gekoppelte Plasma-Massenspektrometer (ICP/MS);
b) Glühentladungs-Massenspektrometer (GDMS);
c) Thermoionisations-Massenspektrometer (TIMS);
d) Elektronenstoss-Massenspektrometer mit einer Quellenkammer, hergestellt aus "Uranhexafluorid (UF6)-resistenten Werkstoffen", damit ausgekleidet oder plattiert;
e) Molekularstrahl-Massenspektrometer mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:
1. mit einer Quellenkammer, hergestellt aus rostfreiem Stahl oder Molybdän, damit ausgekleidet oder plattiert, und mit einer Kühlfalle, die auf 193 K (-80 °C) oder weniger kühlen kann; oder
2. mit einer Quellenkammer, hergestellt aus "Uranhexafluorid (UF6)-resistenten Werkstoffen", damit ausgekleidet oder plattiert;
f) Massenspektrometer, ausgestattet mit einer Mikrofluorierungs-Ionenquelle, konstruiert für Aktinide oder Aktinidenfluoride.
3A233
II.A3.003
Spektrometer oder Diffraktometer, konstruiert für den indikativen Test oder die quantitative Analyse der Elementzusammensetzung von Metallen oder Legierungen ohne chemisches Aufschliessen des Materials
 
II.A3.004
Frequenzumwandler oder Generatoren, die nicht nach Nummer 0B001 oder 3A225 verboten sind, mit allen folgenden Eigenschaften sowie besonders konstruierte Bestandteile und entworfene Software hierfür:
a) Mehrphasenausgang mit einer Leistung grösser/gleich 10 W;
b) Betriebsfrequenz von 600 Hz oder mehr; und
c) Frequenzstabilisierung besser (kleiner) als 0,2 %.
Technische Anmerkung: Frequenzumwandler werden auch als Konverter oder Inverter bezeichnet.
Anmerkungen:
1. Nummer II.A3.004 erfasst nicht Frequenzumwandler, die mit Kommunikationsprotokollen oder Schnittstellen für spezifische Industriemaschinen (wie Werkzeugmaschinen, Spinnmaschinen, Leiterplattenmaschinen) ausgestattet sind, so dass die Frequenzumwandler bei Erfüllung der oben genannten Leistungsmerkmale nicht zu anderen Zwecken verwendet werden können.
2. Nummer II.A3.004 erfasst nicht für Fahrzeuge besonders konstruierte Frequenzumwandler mit einer zwischen Frequenzumwandler und Fahrzeugkontrolleinheit gegenseitig kommunizierten Kontrollsequenz.
3A225
0B001b13
A6. Sensoren und Laser
II.A6.001
Stäbe aus Yttrium-Aluminium-Granat (YAG).
 
II.A6.002
Optische Ausrüstung und Bestandteile, soweit nicht in Nummer 6A002 oder Unternummer 6A004b erfasst, wie folgt:
Infrarotoptiken im Wellenlängenbereich grösser/gleich 9000 nm und kleiner/gleich 17000 nm und Bestandteile hierfür, einschliesslich Bestandteilen aus Cadmiumtellurid (CdTe).
6A002
6A004b
II.A6.003
Wellenfrontkorrektursysteme für die Verwendung mit einem Laserstrahl mit einem Durchmesser grösser als 4 mm und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür, einschliesslich Steuersysteme und Phasenfront-Erkennungssysteme und "verformbare Spiegel" einschliesslich bimorphen Spiegeln.
Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Spiegel, erfasst in den Unternummern 6A004a, 6A005e und 6A005f.
6A003
II.A6.004
Argonionen-"Laser" mit einer mittleren Ausgangsleistung grösser/gleich 5 W.
Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Argonionen- "Laser", erfasst in Unternummer 0B001g5, Nummer 6A005 und Unternummer 6A205a.
6A005a6
6A205a
II.A6.005
Halbleiter-"Laser" und Bestandteile hierfür wie folgt:
a) einzelne Halbleiter-"Laser" mit einer jeweiligen Ausgangsleistung grösser als 200 mW, in Mengen grösser als 100;
b) Halbleiter-"Laser"-Arrays mit einer Ausgangsleistung grösser als 20 W.
Anmerkungen:
1. Halbleiter-"Laser" werden gewöhnlich als "Laser"-Dioden bezeichnet.
2. Diese Nummer erfasst nicht "Laser", erfasst in den Unternummern 0B001g5, 0B001h6 und 6A005.
3. Diese Nummer erfasst nicht "Laser"-Dioden mit einer Wellenlänge im Bereich 1200 nm-2000 nm.
6A005b
 
II.A6.006
Abstimmbare Halbleiter-"Laser" und abstimmbare Halbleiter-"Laser"-Arrays mit einer Wellenlänge grösser/ gleich 9 μm und kleiner/gleich 17 μm sowie Stacks aus Halbleiter-"Lasern", die wenigstens ein abstimmbares Halbleiter-"Laser"-Array mit einer solchen Wellenlänge enthalten.
Anmerkungen:
1. Halbleiter-"Laser" werden gewöhnlich als "Laser"-Dioden bezeichnet.
2. Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Halbleiter-"Laser", erfasst in den Unternummern 0B001h6 und 6A005b.
6A005b
 
II.A6.007
"Abstimmbare" Festkörper-"Laser" und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür wie folgt:
a) Titan-Saphir-Laser;
b) Alexandrit-Laser.
Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Titan-Saphir- und Alexandrit-Laser, erfasst in den Unternummern 0B001g5, 0B001h6 und 6A005c1.
6A005c1
1I.A6.008
Neodym-dotierte (andere als Glas-) "Laser" mit einer Ausgangswellenlänge grösser als 1000 nm und kleiner/gleich 1100 nm und einer Ausgangsenergie je Puls grösser als 10 J.
Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Neodym-dotierte (andere als Glas-) "Laser", erfasst in Unternummer 6A005c2b.
6A005c2
II.A6.009
Akustooptische Bestandteile wie folgt:
a) Aufnahmeröhren und Halbleiter-Bildsensoren, die eine Bildwiederholungsfrequenz grösser/gleich 1 kHz erlauben;
b) die Bildwiederholungsfrequenz bestimmendes Zubehör;
c) Pockels-Zellen.
6A203b4c
II.A6.010
Strahlungsfeste Kameras oder Linsen hierfür, soweit nicht in Unternummer 6A203c erfasst, besonders konstruiert oder ausgelegt als unempfindlich gegen Strahlungsbelastungen grösser als 50 x 103 Gy (Silizium)
(5 x 106 Rad (Silizium)) ohne betriebsbedingten Qualitätsverlust.
Technische Anmerkung: Der Ausdruck Gy (Silizium) bezieht sich auf die in Joule pro Kilogramm ausgedrückte Energie, die von einer ionisierender Strahlung ausgesetzten Probe von nicht abgeschirmtem Silizium absorbiert wird.
6A203c
II.A6.011
Abstimmbare, gepulste Farbstoff-(Dye-) Laserverstärker und -Oszillatoren mit allen folgenden Eigenschaften:
1. einer Betriebswellenlänge grösser/gleich 300 nm und kleiner/gleich 800 nm;
2. einer mittleren Ausgangsleistung grösser als 10 W und kleiner/gleich 30 W;
3. Pulsfrequenz grösser als 1 kHz; und
4. einer Pulsdauer kleiner als 100 ns.
Anmerkungen:
1. Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Single-Mode-Oszillatoren
2. Diese Nummer erfasst nicht abstimmbare, gepulste Farbstoff-(Dye-) Laserverstärker und -Oszillatoren, erfasst in den Unternummern 6A205c und 0B001g5 sowie in Nummer 6A005.
6A205c
II.A6.012
Gepulste CO2 -"Laser" mit allen folgenden Eigenschaften:
1. einer Betriebswellenlänge grösser/gleich 9000 nm und kleiner/gleich 11 000 nm;
2. einer Pulsfrequenz grösser als 250 Hz;
3. einer mittleren Ausgangsleistung grösser als 100 W und kleiner/gleich 500 W; und
4. einer Pulsdauer kleiner als 200 ns.
Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht gepulste CO2 - Laserverstärker und -Oszillatoren, erfasst in den Unternummern 6A205d, 0B001h5 und 6A005d.
6A205d
 
II.A6.013
Kupferdampf-"Laser" mit allen folgenden Eigenschaften
1. Ausgangswellenlänge grösser/gleich 500 nm und kleiner/gleich 600 nm; und
2. einer mittleren Ausgangsleistung grösser/gleich 15 W.
6A005b
II.A6.014
Gepulste CO-"Laser" mit allen folgenden Eigenschaften
1. Ausgangswellenlänge grösser/gleich 5000 nm und kleiner/gleich 6000 nm;
2. Pulsfrequenz grösser als 250 Hz;
3. mittlere Ausgangsleistung grösser als 100 W; und
4. Pulsdauer kleiner als 200 ns.
Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht industrielle Hochleistungs-CO-Laser (typischerweise 1-5 kW) für Anwendungen wie Schneiden und Schweissen, da es sich bei solchen Lasern um Dauerstrich-Laser oder um Laser handelt, deren Pulsdauer grösser ist als 200 ns.
 
II.A6.015
"Vakuum-Druckmesser" mit elektrischem Antrieb und eine Messgenauigkeit von 5 % oder weniger (besser).
"Vakuum-Druckmesser" umfasst Pirani-Sensoren, Penning-Sensoren und Kapazitätsmanometer
0B001b
II.A6.016
Mikroskope und zugehörige Ausrüstungen und Detektoren, wie folgt:
a) Rasterelektronenmikroskope;
b) Raster-Augur-Mikroskope;
c) Durchstrahlungs-Elektronenmikroskope;
d) Atomkraftmikroskope;
e) Rasterkraftmikroskope;
f) Ausrüstung und Detektoren, besonders konstruiert zur Verwendung mit den in II.A6.013 a bis e erfassten Mikroskopen, für den Einsatz in der Werkstoffanalyse unter Verwendung folgender Techniken:
1. Röntgenphotoelektronenspektroskopie (XPS);
2. energiedispersive Röntgenspektroskopie (EDX,EDS); oder
3. Elektronenspektroskopie für die chemische Analyse (ESCA).
6B
A7. Navigation und Luftfahrtelektronik
II.A7.001
Trägheitsnavigationssysteme und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür wie folgt:
I. Trägheitsnavigationssysteme, die für den Einsatz in "zivilen Luftfahrzeugen" von einer Zivilluftfahrtbehörde in einem Mitgliedstaat des Wassenaar-Arrangements zugelassen sind, und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile wie folgt:
a) Trägheitsnavigationssysteme (INS) (kardanisch oder strapdown) und Trägheitsgeräte, konstruiert für Lageregelung, Lenkung oder Steuerung von "Luftfahrzeugen", (Über- oder Unterwasser-) Schiffen, Land- oder "Raumfahrzeugen", mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür:
1. Navigationsfehler (trägheitsfrei) kleiner (besser)/gleich 0,8 nautische Meilen/h "Circular Error Probable" (CEP) nach normaler Ausrichtung; oder
2. spezifiziert zum Betrieb bei linearen Beschleunigungswerten grösser als 10 g;
b) Hybride Trägheitsnavigationssysteme mit einem integrierten weltweiten Satelliten-Navigationssystem (GNSS) oder "Datenbankgestützten Navigationssystem" ("DBRN") zur Lageregelung, Lenkung oder Steuerung, nach normaler Ausrichtung, mit einer Positionsgenauigkeit des INS, nach Ausfall des GNSS oder des "DBRN" von bis zu vier Minuten Dauer, von kleiner (besser) als 10 m "Circular Error Probable" (CEP);
c) Trägheitsgeräte für Azimut, Kurs oder Nordweisung mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür:
1. konstruiert für eine Azimut-, Kurs- oder Nordweisungsgenauigkeit kleiner (besser)/gleich 6 Bogenminuten (rms) bei 45 Grad geografischer Breite; oder
2. konstruiert für Nicht-Betriebs-Schockwerte (non- operating shock level) von grösser/gleich 900 g über eine Zeitdauer von grösser/gleich 1 ms.
Anmerkung: Die in den Unternummern I.a und I.b genannten Parameter müssen unter einer der folgenden Umgebungsbedingungen eingehalten werden:
1. Zufallsverteilte Vibration (input random Vibration) mit einer Gesamtstärke von 7,7 g rms in der ersten halben Stunde und einer Gesamttestzeit von 1,5 Stunden in allen drei Achsen mit folgenden Schwingungseigenschaften:
a) spektrale Leistungsdichte (power spectral density, PSD) von 0,04 g2/Hz im Frequenzbereich 15 Hz bis 1000 Hz; und
b) spektrale Leistungsdichte von 0,04 g2/Hz bei 1000 Hz auf 0,01 g2/Hz bei 2000 Hz abfallend;
2. Roll- und Gierrate grösser/gleich +2,62 rad/s (150°/s); oder
3. Nationale Prüfbedingungen äquivalent den in den Unternummern 1 und 2 beschriebenen Bedingungen.
Technische Anmerkungen.
1. Unternummer I.b bezieht sich auf Systeme, in denen ein INS und andere unabhängige Hilfsnavigationseinrichtungen in eine Einheit integriert sind, um eine Leistungssteigerung zu erreichen.
2. "Circular Error Probable" (CEP) bezeichnet innerhalb einer kreisförmigen Normalverteilung den Radius des Kreises, der 50 % der einzelnen durchgeführten Messungen enthält, oder den Radius des Kreises, in dem eine 50 %-Wahrscheinlichkeit des Vorhandenseins besteht.
II. Theodolitensysteme mit eingebauten Trägheitsgeräten, die besonders konstruiert sind für zivile Überwachungszwecke und konstruiert für eine Azimut-, Kurs- oder Nordweisungsgenauigkeit kleiner (besser)/gleich 6 Bogenminuten (rms) bei 45 Grad geografischer Breite, und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür.
III. Trägheitsgeräte oder sonstige Geräte, die in Nummer 7A001 oder 7A101 erfasste Beschleunigungsmesser enthalten, sofern diese Beschleunigungsmesser für Arbeiten an Bohrlöchern bestimmt und als MWD-(Measurement While Drilling-) Sensoren zur Messung während des Bohrvorgangs besonders konstruiert sind.
7A003
7A103
II.A7.002
Beschleunigungsmesser mit piezoelektrischem Keramikmesswandler, mit einer Empfindlichkeit von 1000 mV/g oder besser (höher)
7A001
A9. Luftfahrt, Raumfahrt und Antriebe
II.A9.001
Sprengbolzen
 
II.A9.002
"Kraftmessdosen", geeignet zum Messen der Schubkraft von Raketenmotoren, mit einer Messkapazität von mehr als 30 kN.
Technische Anmerkung: "Kraftmessdosen" bezeichnet Geräte und Wandler zum Messen von Spann- und Kompressionskraft.
Anmerkung: Die Nummer II.A9.002 erfasst nicht Ausrüstung, Geräte oder Wandler, besonders konstruiert zum Wiegen von Fahrzeugen, z. B. Brückenwaagen.
9B117
II.A9.003
Gasturbinen zur Stromerzeugung, Bauteile und zugehörige Ausrüstung wie folgt:
a) Gasturbinen besonders konstruiert zur Stromerzeugung mit einer Leistung von mehr als 200 MW;
b) Schaufeln, Statoren, Brennkammern und Einspritzdüsen, besonders konstruiert für von Nummer II.A9.003.a erfasste Gasturbinen zur Stromerzeugung;
c) Ausrüstung besonders konstruiert für die "Entwicklung" und "Herstellung" von von Nummer II.A9.003.a erfassten Gasturbinen zur Stromerzeugung.
9A001
9A002
9A003
9B001
9B003
9B004
C. Sonstige Technologie und Software
Nummer der EU
Beschreibung
Referenznummer in Anhang 2 GKV
II.B.001
Technologie und Software, die für die Entwicklung, Herstellung oder Verwendung der in diesem Anhang aufgeführten Güter erforderlich sind.
 
Anhang 3
(Art. 5 Abs. 2 bis 4)
Güter, die zur internen Repression verwendet werden können
1 Bomben und Granaten, die nicht von Anhang 1 KMV und nicht von Anhang 3 GKV erfasst werden.
2 Fahrzeuge, ausgenommen für die Brandbekämpfung besonders konstruierte Fahrzeuge, wie folgt:
2.1 mit einem Wasserwerfer ausgerüstete Fahrzeuge, besonders konstruiert oder geändert für die Bekämpfung von Ausschreitungen und Unruhen;
2.2 Fahrzeuge, besonders konstruiert oder geändert für die Abgabe von Stromstössen zur Abwehr von Angreifern;
2.3 Fahrzeuge, besonders konstruiert oder geändert für die Beseitigung von Barrikaden;
2.4 Fahrzeuge, besonders konstruiert für den Transport oder die Überstellung von Strafgefangenen und/oder inhaftierten Personen;
2.5 Fahrzeuge und Anhänger, besonders konstruiert für die Errichtung mobiler Absperrungen;
2.6 Bestandteile der in den Ziff. 2.1 bis 2.5 aufgeführten Fahrzeuge, besonders konstruiert für die Bekämpfung von Ausschreitungen und Unruhen.
3 Explosivstoffe und dazugehörige Ausrüstung, die nicht von Anhang 1 KMV und nicht von Anhang 3 GKV erfasst werden, wie folgt:
3.1 Geräte und Ausrüstung, besonders konstruiert zum Auslösen von Explosionen durch elektrische oder nichtelektrische Mittel, einschliesslich Zündvorrichtungen, Sprengkapseln, Zündern, Zündverstärkern, Sprengschnüren, sowie besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür.
Ausgenommen sind Geräte und Ausrüstung, die in industriellen Produkten zur Anwendung kommen, zum Beispiel Anzünder für Airbags.
3.2 Andere Explosivstoffe und dazugehörige Stoffe wie folgt:
a) Amatol;
b) Nitrocellulose (mit mehr als 12,5 % Stickstoff);
c) Nitroglykol;
d) Pentaerythrittetranitrat (PETN);
e) Pikrylchlorid;
f) 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluol (TNT).
4 Schutzausrüstung, die weder von Nummer ML 13 Anhang 3 GKV erfasst noch besonders konstruiert ist für den Sport oder als Arbeitsschutz, wie folgt:
4.1 Körperpanzer mit ballistischem Schutz und/oder Stichschutz;
4.2 Helme mit ballistischem Schutz und/oder Splitterschutz, Schutzhelme, Schutzschilde und ballistische Schutzschilde.
5 Andere Simulatoren als die von Nummer ML 14 Anhang 3 GKV erfassten, für das Training im Gebrauch von Feuerwaffen, und besonders entwickelte Software hierfür.
6 Andere Nachtsicht- und Wärmebildausrüstung sowie Bildverstärkerröhren als die von den Anhängen 3 und 5 GKV erfassten.
7 Bandstacheldraht.
8 Militärmesser, Kampfmesser und Bajonette mit einer Klingenlänge von mehr als 10 cm, die nicht von Ziff. 1 des Anhangs 5 GKV erfasst werden.
9 Güter, die für die Hinrichtung von Menschen konstruiert sind, wie folgt:
9.1 Galgen und Fallbeile;
9.2 elektrische Stühle;
9.3 hermetisch verschliessbare Kammern, zum Beispiel hergestellt aus Stahl oder Glas, konstruiert zur Hinrichtung von Menschen durch Verabreichung von tödlichen Gasen oder Substanzen;
9.4 automatische Injektionssysteme, konstruiert zur Hinrichtung von Menschen durch Verabreichung einer letalen chemischen Substanz.
10 Elektroschock-Gürtel, konstruiert, um durch Abgabe von Elektroschocks mit einer Leerlaufspannung von mehr als 10 000 Volt auf Menschen Zwang auszuüben.
11 Güter, konstruiert zur Fesselung von Menschen, wie folgt:
11.1 Zwangsstühle und Fesselungsbretter. Nicht erfasst sind Stühle, die für behinderte Personen konstruiert sind.
11.2 Fusseisen, Mehrpersonen-Fesseln, Fesseln und Einzelschellen oder Fesselarmbänder. Nicht erfasst sind Handschellen, deren Gesamtlänge einschliesslich Kette, gemessen im geschlossenen Zustand vom Aussenrand einer Schelle zum Aussenrand der anderen Schelle, zwischen 150 und 280 mm beträgt und die nicht verändert wurden, um körperliche Schmerzen oder Leiden zu verursachen.
11.3 Daumenschellen und Daumenschrauben, einschliesslich gezackter Daumenschellen.
12 Tragbare Elektroschockgeräte, einschliesslich Elektroschock-Schlagstöcken, Elektroschock-Schilden, Elektroschockern (Paralyser) und Elektroschock- Pfeilwaffen, die eine Leerlaufspannung von mehr als 10 000 Volt haben und die nicht von Ziff. 1 des Anhangs 5 GKV erfasst werden.
Nicht erfasst sind einzelne Elektroschockgeräte, wenn diese zum persönlichen Schutz mitgeführt werden.
13 Substanzen zur Bekämpfung von Ausschreitungen und Unruhen oder zum Selbstschutz sowie dazugehörige tragbare Ausbringungsausrüstung, wie folgt:
13.1 Tragbare Geräte zur Bekämpfung von Ausschreitungen und Unruhen oder zum Selbstschutz durch Verabreichung oder Verbreitung einer handlungsunfähig machenden chemischen Substanz, die nicht von Ziff. 1 des Anhangs 5 GKV erfasst werden.
Nicht erfasst sind einzelne tragbare Geräte mit oder ohne chemische Substanz, wenn diese zum persönlichen Schutz mitgeführt werden;
13.2 Pelargonsäurevanillylamid (Nonivamid, PAVA) (CAS-Nr. 2444-46-4);
13.3 Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) (CAS-Nr. 8023-77-6).
14 Ausrüstung, besonders konstruiert für die Herstellung der in dieser Liste aufgeführten Güter.
15 Spezifische Technologie zur Entwicklung, Herstellung oder Verwendung der in dieser Liste aufgeführten Güter.
Anhang 4
(Art. 6 Abs. 1)
Ausrüstung, Technologie oder Software zu Überwachungszwecken
1. Ausrüstungen
- Ausrüstung für tiefe Paketinspektion
- Netzüberwachungsausrüstung einschliesslich Abhörmanagementausrüstung (IMS) und Intelligence-Ausrüstung für Datenverbindungsvorratsspeicherung
- Funkfrequenz-Überwachungsausrüstung
- Ausrüstung zum Stören von Funknetzen und der Satellitenkommunikation
- Ausrüstung für die Ferneinbringung von Computerviren
- Sprechererkennungs- und Sprecherverarbeitungsausrüstung
- Ausrüstung zum Überwachen und Abhören von:
IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity): Eindeutiger Identifizierungscode für jedes Mobilfunkgerät, der fest in der SIM-Karte integriert ist und die Identifizierung der SIM-Karte über GSM- und UMTS-Netze ermöglicht.
MSISDN (Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network Number): Nummer zur eindeutigen Identifizierung eines GSM- oder UMTS-Netzteilnehmers. Dies ist die Telefonnummer, die der SIM-Karte eines Mobiltelefons zugeordnet ist und daher - genauso wie eine IMSI - die Identifizierung eines Mobilfunkteilnehmers ermöglicht, aber auch der Anrufvermittlung an den Teilnehmer dient.
IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity): In der Regel eindeutige Nummer zur Identifizierung von GSM-, WCDMA- und IDEN- Mobiltelefonen sowie einiger Satellitentelefone. Die Nummer ist zumeist im Batteriefach des Telefons aufgedruckt. Die Überwachung (Abhören) kann mit Hilfe der IMEI-Nummer sowie der IMSI und MSISDN erfolgen.
TMSI (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity): Kennung, die in der Regel zwischen dem Mobilfunkgerät und dem Netz übertragen wird.
- Taktische Ausrüstung zum Überwachen und Abhören von SMS (Short Message System), GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications), GPS (Global Positioning System), GPRS (General Package Radio Service), UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunication System), CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access), PSTN (Public Switch Telephone Networks)
- Ausrüstung zum Überwachen und Abhören von DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol), SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) und GTP (GPRS Tunneling Protocol)
- Ausrüstung für die Mustererkennung und die Erstellung von Musterprofilen
- Ferngesteuerte Forensikausrüstung
- Ausrüstung für die semantische Verarbeitung
- Entschlüsselungsausrüstung für WEP- und WPA-Schlüssel
- Abhörausrüstung für geschützte und standardisierte Protokolle für die Sprachübermittlung über das Internet (VoIP)
2. Software für die Entwicklung, Herstellung oder Verwendung der Ausrüstung nach Ziff. 1
3. Technologie für die Entwicklung, Herstellung oder Verwendung der Ausrüstung nach Ziff. 1
Ausrüstung, Technologie und Software, die unter diese Kategorien fällt, ist nur insoweit Gegenstand des vorliegenden Anhangs, als sie von der allgemeinen Beschreibung für "Systeme für das Abhören und die Überwachung des Internets, des Telefonverkehrs und der Satellitenkommunikation" erfasst wird.
Für die Zwecke dieses Anhangs bezeichnet "Überwachung" die Erfassung, Extrahierung, Entschlüsselung, Aufzeichnung, Verarbeitung, Analyse und Archivierung von Gesprächsinhalten oder Netzdaten.
4. Ausnahmen
Ausgenommen von den Ziff. 1 bis 3 ist:
a) Software, die dazu entwickelt ist, um vom Benutzer ohne umfangreiche Unterstützung durch den Lieferanten installiert zu werden, und die frei erhältlich ist und im Einzelhandel ohne Einschränkungen mittels einer der folgenden Geschäftspraktiken verkauft wird:
1. Barverkauf,
2. Versandverkauf,
3. Verkauf über elektronische Medien, oder
4. Telefonverkauf; oder
b) Software, die allgemein zugänglich ist.
Anhang 531
Art. 8 Abs. 1, 11 Abs. 1 und 2, 12 Bst. b sowie 14a)
Natürliche Personen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen und das Ein- und Durchreiseverbot richten, sowie Unternehmen und Organisationen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen richten (UNO-Liste)
Anmerkung
Dieser Anhang entspricht der Liste der vom Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen bezeichneten natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen.32
Anhang 633
(Art. 8 Abs. 1, 11 Abs. 1 und 3 sowie 12 Bst. b)
Natürliche Personen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen und das Ein- und Durchreiseverbot richten, sowie Unternehmen und Organisationen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen richten (Beschluss 2010/413/GASP)
A.
Natürliche Personen
1.
Name: Al Yasin Javad
Justification: Head of the Research Centre for Explosion and Impact, also known as METFAZ. Relation: Head of Research Centre for Explosion and Impact
2.
Name: Davoud BABAEI
Justification: The current head of security for the Ministry Of Defence Armed Forces Logistics’ research institute the Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), which was run by UN-designated Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi. The IAEA have identified SPND with their concerns over possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme over which Iran refuses to co-operate. As head of security, Babaei is responsible for preventing the disclosure of information, including to the IAEA.
3.
Aufgehoben
4.
Sayed Shamsuddin BORBORUDI
(a.k.a. Seyed Shamseddin BORBOROUDI) DOB: 21/9/1969 Justification: Former Deputy Head of UN designated Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, where he was subordinate to UN designated Feridun Abbasi Davani. Has been involved in the Iranian nuclear programme since at least 2002, including as the former head of procurement and logistics at AMAD, where he was responsible for using front companies such as Kimia Madan to procure equipment and material for Iran’s nuclear weapons programme.
5.
Name: Kamran DANESHJOO
(a.k.a. DANESHJOU)
Justification: Former Minister of Science, Research and Technology. As project manager of the 111th section of the AMAD Plan, he has provided support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
6.
Name: IRGC Brigadier-General Javad DARVISH-VAND
Justification: Former Deputy Minister of Defence and Inspector General of MODAFL.
7.
Name: Rear Admiral Ali FADAVI
Justification: Deputy Commander-General of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Former Commander of IRGC Navy.
8.
Name: IRGC Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi FARAHI
Justification: Deputy Minister of Defence and Armed Forces Support since 2021. Previously Deputy Minister of Defence and Industrial Affairs of the Ministry of Defence, head of the Defence Industries and Aerospace Organizations of the Ministry of Defence, as well as commander of the Armed Forces Personnel Training Camp. Former head of Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and former managing director of the UN-designated Defence Industries Organisation (DIO). Member of the IRGC.
9.
Name: Parviz FATAH
DOB: Born in 1961
Justification: Former member of the IRGC. Former Minister of Energy. Since July 2019, head of the "Mostazafan Foundation", former member of the Board of Trustees of the Imam Khomeini Foundation.
10.
Name: Haeri Mojtaba
Justification: Engineer; MODAFL Deputy for Industry. Supervisory role over AIO and DIO. Relation: Deputy at Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces Logistics
11.
Name: Hoseynitash Ali
Justification: IRGC Brigadier-General; Member of the IRGC. Member of the Supreme National Security Council and involved in formulating policy on nuclear issues.
12.
Name: Milad JAFARI (Milad JAFERI)
DOB: 20.9.1974
Justification: An Iranian national supplying goods, mostly metals, to UN designated SHIG front companies. Delivered goods to SHIG between January and November 2010. Payments for some of the goods were made at the central branch of EU-designated Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) in Tehran after November 2010.
13.
Name: Mohammad Ali JAFARI
Justification: Former Commander of the IRGC. Currently head of the Hazrat Baqiatollah al-Azam Cultural and Social Headquarters.
14.
Name: Karimian Ali
Justification: An Iranian national supplying goods, mostly carbon fibre to UN-designated SHIG and SBIG.
15.
Name: Khansari Majid
Justification: Managing Director of UN-designated Kalaye Electric Company. Relation: Managing Director of Kala-Electric (E.37.A.3.)
16.
Name: Ebrahim MAHMUDZADEH
Justification: Head of the Management Board of Iran Telecommunications; former Managing Director of Iran Electronic Industries (see Part B, No 20). Director general of the Armed Forces Social Security Organization until September 2020. Iranian Deputy Defense Minister until December 2020.
17.
Name: Mohammadi Mohammad
Justification: Managing Director of MATSA. Relation: Managing director of MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company)
18.
Name: Mohammadlu Beik
Justification: Brigadier-General; MODAFL Deputy for Supplies and Logistics. Relation: Deputy for Supplies and Logistics of Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces Logistics
19.
Mohammad Reza MOVASAGHNIA
Justification: Former head of Samen Al A’Emmeh Industries Group (SAIG), also known as the Cruise Missile Industry Group. This organisation was designated under UNSCR 1747 and listed in Annex I to Common Position 2007/140/CFSP.
20.
Name: Anis NACCACHE
Justification: Former administrator of Barzagani Tejarat Tavanmad Saccal companies; his company has attempted to procure sensitive goods for entities designated under Resolution 1737 (2006).
21.
Name: Naderi Mohammad
Justification: Brigadier-General; Head of Iran's Aviation Industries Organisation (IAIO). Former Head of Iran's Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO). AIO has taken part in sensitive Iranian programmes.
22.
Name: IRGC Brigadier-General Mostafa Mohammad NAJJAR
Justification: Former Minister for the Interior and former Minister of MODAFL, responsible for all military programmes, including ballistic missiles programmes. Since September 2013, Senior Advisor to the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces on Knowledge and Technology Industry. Member of the IRGC.
23.
Name: Mohammad Reza NAQDI
(a.k.a. Mohammad-Reza NAQDI; Mohammad Reza NAGDI; Gholamreza NAQDI)
Identifying information: POB: Tehran, Iran
Function: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Deputy Commander
Rank: Brig. General
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Justification: Mohammad Reza Naqdi is a Deputy Commander and Brigadier General within the IRGC and is therefore a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
24.
Name: Naseri Mohammad Sadegh
Justification: Head of the Physics Research Institute (formerly known as the Institute of Applied Physics). Relation: Head of Institute of Applied Physics (IAP)
25.
Aufgehoben
26.
Aufgehoben
27.
Name: Hossein SALAMI
(a.k.a. Hosein SALIMI; Hussain SALIMI; Hosain SALIMI; Husain SALIMI; Hossein SALIMI; Hossein SALEEMI; Hussain SALEEMI; Husain SALEEMI; Hosein SALEEMI)
Identifying information: DOB: 1960 or 1961
POB: Isfahan, Iran
Function: Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Rank: Maj. General
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Passport No.: D08531177
Justification: Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
28.
Name: Rear Admiral Mohammad SHAFI'I RUDSARI (a.k.a. ROODSARI, Mohammad, Hossein, Shafiei; ROODSARI, Mohammad, Shafi’I; ROODSARI, Mohammad, Shafiei; RUDSARI, Mohammad, Hossein, Shafiei; RUDSARI, Mohammad, Shafi’I; RUDSARI, Mohammad, Shafiei)
Justification: Former MODAFL Deputy for Coordination (see Part B, n°29).
29.
Name: Shams Abolghassem Mozaffari
Justification: Former head of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters.
30.
Name: IRGC Brigadier-General Ali SHAMSHIRI
Justification: Member of the IRGC. Advisor to the director of the Defence Science and Education Research Institute. Has held senior roles in MODAFL.
31.
Name: Abdollah SOLAT SANA (a.k.a. Solatsana Solat Sanna; Sowlat Senna; Sovlat Thana)
Justification: Managing Director of the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in Esfahan. This is the facility that produces the feed material (UF6) for the enrichment facilities at Natanz. On 27 August 2006, Solat Sana received a special award from President Ahmadinejad for his role.
32.
Name: Soltani Hamid
Justification: Managing Director of the EU-designated Management Company for Nuclear Power Plant Construction (MASNA).
33.
Name: IRGC Brigadier-General Ahmad VAHIDI
Justification: Since 25 August 2021, Minister of Interior. Former President of the Supreme National Defence University and former Minister of MODAFL.
34.
Name: Ali Ashraf NOURI
Justification: Head of the Basij Islamic Revolution Art Educational and Research Complex. Formerly IRGC Deputy Commander, IRGC Political Bureau Chief.
35.
Name: Hojatoleslam Ali SAIDI
(a.k.a. Hojjat- al-Eslam Ali Saidi or Saeedi)
Justification: Since March 2017, head of the ideological and political bureau of the Supreme Leader in his role as Commander-in-chief. Previously representative of the Supreme Leader to the IRGC.
36.
Name: Zadeh Amir Ali Haji
Good quality a.k.a.: Hajizadeh Amir Ali Justification: IRGC Air Force Commander, Brigadier General. Relation: Commander of IRGC Air Force
37.
Name: Mohammad ESLAMI
Identifying information: DOB: 23.9.1956
POB: Isfahan, Iran
Function: Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran; Vice President of Iran
Rank: Brig. General
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Passport no.: D10008684 (Diplomatic Passport)
Justification: As Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and Vice President of Iran, IRGC Brig. General Mohammad Eslami is directly associated with, or providing support for, Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
38.
Name: Reza-Gholi ESMAELI
(a.k.a. Rezaqoli ESMAILI)
Identifying information: DOB: 03.4.1961
POB: Tehran, Iran
Function: Head of Department in Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Passport no.: A0002302 issued in Iran
Justification: Reza-Gholi Esmaeli is associated with IRGC General Seyyed Hojjatollah Qoraishi and various institutions of the Iranian military and government, notably as a Head of Department at the Aerospace Industries Organization. He is also associated with the Ministry of Defense logistics and research office. He therefore provides support to the Government of Iran and is associated with persons and entities providing support to the Government of Iran.
39.
Name: Mohsen HOJATI
Identifying information: DOB: 28.9.1955
POB: Najafabad, Iran
Function: Head of Fajr Industrial Group
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Passport no.: G4506013 issued in Iran
Justification: Mohsen Hojati is the head of Fajr Industrial Group, a subsidiary of Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), a sub-entity of the Ministry of Defence engaged in Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Mohsen Hojati is thus directly involved in and providing support for, the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
40.
Name: Naser MALEKI
(a.k.a. Nasser MALEKI; Naser MAALEKI)
Identifying information: DOB: 1960
POB: Iran
Function: Head of Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG)
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Passport no.: A0003039 issued in Iran
National ID.: 0035011785
Justification: Naser Maleki is Head of Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), which is responsible for Iran’s liquid-fuelled ballistic missile programme. He is also a Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) Official overseeing work on the Shahab-3 ballistic missile programme. He is therefore engaged in and providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
41.
Name: Mohammad Baqer ZOLQADR
(a.k.a. Mohammad Baqer ZULQADER; Mohammad Bagher ZOLGHADR)
Identifying information: DOB: 1954
POB: Faisa, Iran
Function: Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Justification: Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr is a retired IRGC officer who is currently Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council. The supreme leader, who appoints members of this Council, has delegated the supervision of the government to it. In practice, the Expediency Discernment Council supports the Government of Iran by being an intricate part of the regime. In his role, Zolqadr therefore provides support to the Government of Iran.
42.
Name: Ali Akbar AHMADIAN
Identifying information: DOB: 1961
POB: Kerman, Iran
Function: Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC)
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Justification: Ali Akbar Ahmadian is the former chief of the IRGC Joint Staff and former head of the IRGC’s Strategic Planning Division. He is the current Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Council’s decisions. The SNSC is coordinating all activities that affect Iran’s defence and has steered Iran’s nuclear negotiations. Ahmadian built his career within the IRGC and led the IRGC Strategic Centre from 2007 onwards, where he has reportedly been an influential figure in shaping security and military policies, as well as in developing Iran’s missile programme. He is thus engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
43.
Name: Mehrdad AKHLAGHI-KETABACHI
Identifying information: DOB: 10.9.1958
Function: Director of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and of the Aerospace Industries Organization
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Passport no.: A0030940 issued in Iran
Justification: Mehrdad Akhlaghi-Ketabachi is the Director of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), a conglomerate of companies run by the Islamic Republic of Iran whose function is to provide the Armed Forces with the necessary manufacturing capacity and technical abilities. In recent years, the DIO has attempted to become export-oriented, allowing Iran to become an exporter of weapons. He is also the director of the Aerospace Industries Organization that has recently designed the medium-range precision-guided projectile Kheibar aimed at strengthening the Iranian Armed Forces in the missile, drone, radar and other areas. In his capacity, Mehrdad Akhlaghi-Ketabachi is involved in the procurement of prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology in support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. Therefore, Mehrdad Akhlaghi-Ketabachi is responsible for providing support to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
44.
Name: Fereidoun ABASSI-DAVANI
(a.k.a. Fereydoon ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidun ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereydoun ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidoon ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidoun ABBASI-DAVANI)
Identifying information: DOB: 11.7.1958
POB: Abadan, Iran
Function: member of parliament in Iran
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Justification: Fereidoun Abassi-Davani is a former Senior Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) Scientist and former Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. He currently serves as member of parliament in Iran, specifically in its energy commission. He is a senior nuclear scientist, affiliated with the IRGC. Considering his membership of the Iranian parliament and his scientific activities, Fereydoon Abassi-Davani is providing support to the Government of Iran and was directly engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
45.
Name: Ahmad DERAKHSHANDEH
Identifying information: DOB: 11.8.1956
POB: Iran
Function: CEO of Shahr Bank
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Justification: Ahmad Derakhshandeh is the CEO of Shahr Bank. Shahr Bank is part of the financial sector of Iran’s economy and funds the Iranian government. In his role, Ahmad Derakhshandeh therefore provides support to the Government of Iran.
46.
Name: Morteza REZAIE
(a.k.a. Morteza REZAEE; Morteza REZAI)
Identifying information: DOB: 1956
POB: Iran
Function: Member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); senior military adviser to Ali Khamenei and his son Mojtaba Khamenei in the Office of the Supreme Leader.
Rank: Brig. General
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Justification: Morteza Rezaie is a senior military officer (Brigadier General) within the IRGC and has had various positions within the IRGC for decades. He is therefore a member of the IRGC. Furthermore, he is a senior military adviser to Ali Khamenei and his son Mojtaba Khamenei in the Office of the Supreme Leader. Morteza Rezaie is therefore also a person providing support to the Government of Iran and persons associated with it.
47.
Name: Ahmad Vahid DASTJERDI
Identifying information: DOB: 15.01.1954
POB: Iran
Function: Member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); adviser to the Minister of Petroleum
Rank: Brig. General
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Passport No.: A0002987 issued in Iran
Justification: Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi is a Brigadier General of the IRGC, adviser to the Minister of Petroleum, former head of Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) and deputy defence minister. He served as general manager of the Sepah Cooperative Foundation, a large investment fund linked to the IRGC, until the end of 2017. He is therefore engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
48.
Name: Ali Akbar TABATABAEI
(a.k.a. Sayed Akbar TAHMAESEBI)
Identifying information: DOB: 1967
POB: Iran
Function: Member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods-Force (IRGC-QF)
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Justification: Ali Akbar Tabatabaei is the former Commander of the IRGC-QF Africa Corps. As the commander of all IRGC-QF operations in Africa, Tabatabaei’s duties entail overseeing IRGC-QF weapons transfers to Africa. As such he is a member of the IRGC.
49.
Name: Azim AGHAJANI
(a.k.a. Azim ADHAJANI; Hosein AGHAJANI)
Identifying information: DOB: 1967
POB: Iran
Function: Member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Justification: Azim Aghajani is a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
50.
Name: Morteza BAHMANYAR
Identifying information: DOB: 31.12.1952
POB: Tehran, Iran
Function: Chief Financial Officer of the Bonyad Taavon Sepah;
Head of Kauthar/Kausar/Kothar/Kosar Insurance.
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Justification: Morteza Bahmanyar is Chief Financial Officer of the Bonyad Taavon Sepah, also known as the the IRGC Cooperative Foundation. Bonyad Taavon Sepah was formed by the Commanders of the IRGC to structure the IRGC’s investments. It is controlled by the IRGC and Kauthar Insurance, also known as Kausar, Kothar or Kosar Insurance. Kauthar Insurance is a subsidiary controlled by the IRGC. Bahmanyar is currently the head of Kauthar Insurance. Therefore, Bahmanyar is directly associated with and provides insurance to the IRGC.
51.
Name: Mohammad Mehdi Nejad NOURI
(a.k.a. Mohammad Mehdi Nezhad NOURI; Mohammad Mehdi Nejad NURI; Mohammad Mehdi Nezhad NURI)
Identifying information: DOB: 1960
POB: Amol, Iran
Function: Vice President of Science, Research and Technology of the General Staff of the Armed Forces
Rank: Brig. General
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Justification: Mohammad Mehdi Nejad Nouri is Brigadier General in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Vice President of Science, Research and Technology of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.
Therefore, he is a member of the IRGC.
52.
Name: Yahya Rahim SAFAVI
(a.k.a. Rahim SAFAVI; Sayed Yahya SAFAVI; Yahia Rahim SAFAWI; Seyyed Yahya RAHIM-SAFAVI; Yahya Rahim AL-SIFAWI; Yahya RAHIM-SAFAVI)
Identifying information: DOB: 1952 or 1953
POB: Isfahan, Iran
Function: Member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Senior Adviser to the Supreme Leader for Military Affairs
Rank: Maj. General
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Justification: Yahya Rahim Safavi is a Major General of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Senior Adviser to the Supreme Leader for Military Affairs.
53.
Name: Mohammad Reza ZAHEDI
(a.k.a. Mohammad Raza ZAHEDI; Mohammad Reza ZAHIDI; Hassan MAHDAVI)
Identifying information: DOB: 1944
POB: Isfahan, Iran
Function: Commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Justification: Mohammad Reza Zahedi is a high-ranking official and Ground Forces Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Mohammad Reza Zahedi is therefore a member of the IRGC.
B.
Unternehmen und Organisationen
1.
Name: Aerospace Industries Organisation, AIO
Address: a) AIO, 28 Shian 5, Lavizan, Tehran, Iran b) Langare Street, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran Justification: AIO oversees Iran’s production of missiles, including Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group and Fajr Industrial Group, which were all designated under UNSCR 1737 (2006). The head of AIO and two other senior officials were also designated under UNSCR 1737 (2006).
2.
Name: Aran Modern Devices (AMD)
Justification: Affiliate of Modern Technologies FZC (MTFZC) network. Relation: Affiliated to Modern Technologies FZC (MTFZC)
3.
Name: Aras Farayande
Address: Unit 12, No 35 Kooshesh Street, Tehran Justification: Involved in procurement of materials for Iran Centrifuge Technology Company.
4.
Name: Aria Nikan
Good quality a.k.a.: Pergas Aria Movalled Ltd Address: Suite 1, 59 Azadi Ali North Sohrevardi Avenue, Tehran, 1576935561 Justification: Known to procure for designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) Commercial Department. They have made efforts to procure designated materials, including goods from the EU, which have applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.
5.
Name: Armed Forces Geographical Organisation
Justification: A subsidiary of MODAFL assessed to provide geospatial data for the Ballistic Missile programme.
6.
Name: Ashtian Tablo
Address: Ashtian Tablo, No 67, Ghods Mirheydari St, Yoosefabad, Tehran Justification: A manufacturer of electrical equipment (switchgear) involved in the construction of the Fordow (Qom) facility, built without being declared to the IAEA.
7.
Name: Bals Alman
Justification: A manufacturer of electrical equipment (switchgear) involved in the ongoing construction of the Fordow (Qom) facility built without being declared to the IAEA.
8.
Aufgehoben
9.
Aufgehoben
10.
Name: Bargh Azaraksh
Good quality a.k.a.: Barghe Azerakhsh Sakht Address: No 599, Stage 3, Ata Al Malek Blvd, Emam Khomeini Street, Esfahan Justification: Company that has been contracted to work at the uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom/Fordow on the electricity and piping works. It was in charge of designing, procuring and installing electrical control equipment at Natanz in 2010.
11.
Name: Electronic Components Industries (ECI)
Address: Hossain Abad Avenue, Shiraz, Iran Justification: Subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries. Relation: Subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries (including all branches and subsidiaries)
12.
Name: ESNICO (Equipment Supplier for Nuclear Industries Corporation)
Address: No 1, 37th Avenue, Asadabadi Street, Tehran, Iran Justification: Procures industrial goods, specifically for the nuclear programme activities carried out by AEOI, Novin Energy and Kalaye Electric Company (all designated under UNSCR 1737). ESNICO’s Director is Haleh Bakhtiar (designated in UNSCR 1803).
13.
Name: Etemad Amin Invest Co Mobin
(a.k.a.: Etemad Amin Investment Company Mobin; Etemad-e Mobin; Etemad Amin Invest Company Mobin; Etemad Mobin Co.; Etemad Mobin Trust Co.; Etemade Mobin Company; Mobin Trust Consortium; Etemad-e Mobin Consortium)
Address: Pasadaran Av. Tehran, Iran
Justification: A company owned or controlled by IRGC that contributes to financing the strategic interests of the regime.
14.
Name: Eyvaz Technic
Address: No 3, Building 3, Shahid Hamid Sadigh Alley, Shariati Street, Tehran, Iran Justification: Producer of vacuum equipment that has supplied the uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom/Fordow. In 2011 it supplied pressure transducers to UN-designated Kalaye Electric Company.
15.
Name: Fajr Aviation Composite Industries
Address: Mehrabad Airport, PO Box 13445-885, Tehran, Iran Justification: A subsidiary of the IAIO within MODAFL both designated by the EU which primarily produces composite materials for the aircraft industry. Fajr Aviation Composite Industries also produces drones, which are allegedly being used for regional destabilisation.
16.
Name: Ghani Sazi Uranium Company
Good quality a.k.a.: Iran Uranium Enrichment Company Address: 3, Qarqavol Close, 20th Street, Teheran Justification: Subordinate to the UN-designated TAMAS. It has production contracts with UN-designated Kalaye Electric Company and EU-designated TESA.
17.
Name: Hirbod Co
Address: Hirbod Co, Flat 2, 3 Second Street, Asad Abadi Avenue, Tehran, 14316 Justification: A company that has procured goods and equipment destined for Iran’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile programmes for the UN-sanctioned Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).
18.
Name: Institute of Applied Physics (IAP)
Justification: Conducts research into military applications of Iranian nuclear programme.
19.
Name: Iran Aircraft Industries (IACI)
Justification: A subsidiary of the IAIO within MODAFL. Manufactures, repairs, and conducts overhauls of airplanes and aircraft engines and procures aviation related parts often of USorigin typically via foreign intermediaries. IACI and its subsidiaries have also been detected using a worldwide network of brokers seeking to procure aviation-related goods. Relation: Subsidiary of Iranian Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO)
20.
Name: Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Company
Good quality a.k.a.: a) HESA b) HESA Trade Center c) HTC d) IAMCO e) IAMI f) Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Company g) Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries h) Karkhanejate Sanaye Havapaymaie Iran i) Hava Peyma Sazi-e Iran j) Havapeyma Sazhran k) Havapeyma Sazi Iran, l) Hevapeimasazi Address: a) 28 km Esfahan - Tehran Freeway, Shahin Shahr, P.O.Box 83145-311, Esfahan, Iran b) No. 27 Ahahamat Ave., Vallie Asr Square, P.O.Box 14155-5568, Tehran, 15946, Iran c) P.O.Box 81465-935, Esfahan, Iran d) Shahih Shar Industrial Zone, Isfahan e) No. 107 Sepahbod Gharany Ave., P.O.Box 8140, Tehran, Iran Justification: Owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of; MODAFL. Relation: Owned or controlled by Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces Logistics
21.
Name: Iran Centrifuge Technology Company
Good quality a.k.a.: a) TSA b) TESA Address: 156 Golestan Street, Saradr-e Jangal, Tehran Justification: Iran Centrifuge Technology Company has taken over the activities of Farayand Technique (designated under UNSCR 1737). It manufactures uranium enrichment centrifuge parts, and is directly supporting proliferation sensitive activity that Iran is required to suspend by UNSCRs. Carries out work for Kalaye Electric Company (designated under UNSCR 1737).
22.
Name: Iran Communications Industries (ICI)
(a.k.a. Sanaye Mokhaberat Iran; Iran Communication Industries; Iran Communications Industries Group; Iran Communications Industries Co.)
Address: PO Box 19295-4731, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Alternative address: PO Box 19575-131, 34 Apadana Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Alternative address: Shahid Langary Street, Nobonyad Square Ave, Pasdaran, Tehran
Justification: Iran Communications Industries, a subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries (listed by the EU), produces various items including communication systems, avionics, optics and electro-optics devices, micro-electronics, information technology, test and measurement, telecommunication security, electronic warfare, radar tube manufacture and refurbishment, and missile launchers. ICI procured sensitive material through Hoda Trading, its Hong Kong based subsidiary.
23.
Name: Iran Electronics Industries
(including all branches) and subsidiaries:
Address: P. O. Box 18575-365, Tehran, Iran
Justification: Wholly-owned subsidiary of MODAFL (and therefore a sister-organisation to AIO, AvIO and DIO). Its role is to manufacture electronic components for Iranian weapons systems.
24.
Name: Isfahan Optics
Address: a) Kaveh Ave., P.O.Box 81465-313, Isfahan, Iran b) P.O.Box 81465-117, Isfahan, Iran Justification: Owned, controlled by, or acts on behalf of Iran Electronics Industries. Relation: Owned or Controlled or acting on behalf of Iran Electronics Industries (including all branches and subsidiaries)
25.
Name: Iranian Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO)
Address: a) Ave. Sepahbod Gharani, P.O.Box 15815/1775, Tehran, Iran b) Ave. Sepahbod Gharani, P.O.Box 15815/3446, Tehran, Iran c) 107 Sepahbod Gharani Avenue, Tehran, Iran Justification: A MODAFL organisation responsible for planning and managing Iran’s military aviation industry. Relation: Organisation of Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces Logistics
26.
Name: Iran Marine Industrial Company (SADRA)
Address: Sadra Building No. 3, Shafagh St., Poonak Khavari Blvd., Shahrak Ghods, P.O.Box 14669-56491, Tehran, Iran Justification: Effectively controlled by Sepanir Oil & Gas Energy Engineering Company, which is designated by the EU as an IRGC company. Provides support to the Government of Iran through its involvement in the Iranian energy sector including in the South Pars Gas field. Relation: Owned or controlled by Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) (E.29.II.7.)
27.
Name: Iran Pooya
Good quality a.k.a.: Iran Pouya Justification: A government owned company that operated the biggest extruder of aluminium in Iran and supplied material for use in the production of casings for the IR-1 and IR-2 centrifuges. A major manufacturer of aluminium cylinders for centrifuges whose customers include the UN-designated AEOI and EU-designated TESA.
28.
Name: Javedan Mehr Toos
Justification: Engineering firm that procures for the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran which was designated under UNSCR 1737.
29.
Name: Karanir
Good quality a.k.a.: Karanir Sanat, Moaser; Tajhiz Sanat
Address: 1139/1 Unit 104 Gol Building, Gol Alley, North Side of Sae, Vali Asr Avenue. PO Box 19395-6439, Tehran
Justification: Involved in purchasing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.
30.
Khala Afarin Pars
(a.k.a. PISHRO KHALA AFARIN COMPANY)
Address: Last address known: Unit 5, 2nd Floor, No 75, Mehran Afrand St, Sattarkhan St, Tehran. Justification: Involved in purchasing equipment and materials which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.
31.
Name: MAAA Synergy
Address: Malaysia Justification: Involved in procurement of components for Iranian fighter planes.
32.
Name: MACPAR Makina San Ve Tic
Address: Istasyon MH, Sehitler cad, Guldeniz Sit, Number 79/2, Tuzla, Istanbul, 34930 Justification: Company run by Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to UN designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies. Relation: Run by Jafari Milad
33.
Name: Marine Industries
Address: Pasdaran Av., P.O.Box 19585/ 777, Tehran
Justification: A subsidiary of the DIO. Relation: Subsidiary of Defence Industries Organisation (DIO) (E.37.A.6.)
34.
Name: Marou Sanat
Good quality a.k.a.: Mohandesi Tarh Va Toseh Maro Sanat Company Address: 9, Ground Floor, Zohre Street, Mofateh Street, Tehran Justification: Procurement firm that has acted for Mesbah Energy which was designated under UNSCR 1737.
35.
Name: MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company)
Address: 90, Fathi Shaghaghi Street, Tehran, Iran Justification: Iranian company contracted to UN-designated Kalaye Electric Company to provide design and engineering services across the nuclear fuel cycle. Most recently has been procuring equipment for the Natanz uranium enrichment site.
36.
Name: Mechanic Industries Group
Good quality a.k.a.: Mechanic Industries Organisation; Mechanical Industries Complex; Mechanical Industries Group; Sanaye Mechanic
Justification: Took part in the production of components for the ballistics programme.
37.
Name: Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces Logistics
Good quality a.k.a.: a) Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics b) MODAFL c) MODSAF Address: Located on the west side of Dabestan Street, Abbas Abad District, Tehran Justification: Responsible for Iran’s defence research, development and manufacturing programmes, including support to missile and nuclear programmes.
38.
Name: Mobin Sanjesh
Address: Entry 3, No 11, 12th Street, Miremad Alley, Abbas Abad, Tehran Justification: Involved in purchasing equipment and materials which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.
39.
Name: Modern Technologies FZC (MTFZC)
Address: P.O.Box 8032, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates Justification: Involved in procurement of components for Iranian nuclear programme.
40.
Name: Multimat lc ve Dis Ticaret Pazarlama Limited Sirketi
Justification: Company run by Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to UN designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies. Relation: Run by Jafari Milad
41.
Aufgehoben
42.
Aufgehoben
43.
Name: Noavaran Pooyamoj
Address: No 15, Eighth Street, Pakistan Avenue, Shahid Beheshti Avenue, Tehran Justification: Involved in procurement of materials that are controlled and have direct application in the manufacture of centrifuges for Iran’s uranium enrichment programme.
44.
Name: Parchin Chemical Industries
Justification: Worked on propulsion techniques for the Iranian ballistics programme.
45.
Name: Parto Sanat Co.
Address: No. 1281 Valiasr Ave., Next to 14th St., Tehran, Iran Justification: Manufacturer of frequency changers and it is capable of developing/modifying imported foreign frequency changers in a way that makes them usable in gas centrifuge enrichment. It is deemed to be involved in nuclear proliferation activities.
46.
Name: Passive Defense Organization
Justification: Responsible for the selection and construction of strategic facilities, including - according to Iranian statements - the uranium enrichment site at Fordow (Qom) built without being declared to the IAEA contrary to Iran’s obligations (affirmed in a resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors). Brigadier General Gholam-Reza Jalali, former IRGC is PDO’s chairman.
47.
Name: Paya Parto
Good quality a.k.a.: Paya Partov Justification: Subsidiary of Novin Energy, which was sanctioned under UNSCR 1747, involved in laser welding.
48.
Name: Raad Iran
(a.k.a. Raad Automation Company; Middle East Raad Automation; RAAD Automation Co.; Raad Iran Automation Co.; RAADIRAN; Middle East RAAD Automation Co.; Automasion RAAD Khavar Mianeh; Automation Raad Khavar Mianeh Nabbet Co)
Address: Unit 1, No 35, Bouali Sina Sharghi, Chehel Sotoun Street, Fatemi Square, Tehran
Justification: A company involved in procurement of inverters for Iran’s proscribed enrichment programme. Raad Iran was established to produce and design controlling systems and provides the sale and installation of inverters and programmable Logic Controllers.
49.
Name: Raka
Justification: A department of Kalaye Electric Company (designated under UNSCR 1737). Established in late 2006, it was responsible for the construction of the Uranium enrichment plant at Fordow (Qom). Relation: Part of Kala-Electric (E.37.A.3.)
50.
Name: Research Centre for Explosion and Impact
Good quality a.k.a.: METFAZ Address: 44, 180th Street West, Tehran, 16539-75751 Justification: Subordinate to the designated Malek Ashtar University, it oversees activity linked to the Possible Military Dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme upon which Iran is not cooperating with the IAEA. Relation: Subordinate to Malek Ashtar University (E.29.I.9.)
51.
Name: Saman Nasb Zayendeh Rood
Good quality a.k.a.: Saman Nasbzainde Rood Address: Unit 7, 3rd Floor Mehdi Building, Kahorz Blvd, Esfahan, Iran Justification: Construction contractor that has installed piping and associated support equipment at the uranium enrichment site at Natanz. It has dealt specifically with centrifuge piping.
52.
Name: Saman Tose’e Asia (SATA)
Justification: Engineering firm involved in supporting a range of large scale industrial projects including Iran’s uranium enrichment programme, including undeclared work at the uranium enrichment site at Qom/Fordow.
53.
Name: Samen Industries
Good quality a.k.a.: Khorasan Metallurgy Industries
Address: 2nd km of Khalaj Road End of Seyyedi St., P.O.Box 91735-549, 91735 Mashhad, Iran, Tel.: +98 511 3853008, +98 511 3870225
Justification: Shell name for UN-designated Khorasan Metallurgy Industries, subsidiary of Ammunition Industries Group (AMIG).
54.
Name: Schiller Novin
Good quality a.k.a.: Schiler Novin Co.; Schiller Novin Co.; Shiller Novin
Address: Gheytariyeh Avenue - no 153 - 3rd Floor - PO BOX 17665/153 6 19389 Tehran
Justification: Acting on behalf of Defense Industries Organisation (DIO).
55.
Name: Sepanir Oil and Gas Energy Engineering Company
(a.k.a. Sepah Nir; SEPANIR; SepanirCompany; Sepanir Oil & Gas Energy Eng. Co.; Sepanir Oil and Gas Energy Eng. Co SSK)
Identifying information: Address No 1: No 216 (Former 319) Bahonar Avenue (Niavaran), Tehran, Iran
Address No 2: P.O. Box 19575/657, Tehran, Iran
Telephone no.: +98 21 22833960; +98 22 833960 (10 lines)
Telefax no.: +98 2122 833970
Website: www.sepanir.com
Type of entity: public company
Place of registration: Iran
Date of registration: 2006
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA)
Justification: Sepanir Oil and Gas Energy Engineering Company is an oil and gas company and a subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) and is therefore controlled by the IRGC.
56.
Name: Shahid Ahmad Kazemi Industrial Group (SAKIG)
Justification: Entity subordinate to Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO). SAKIG develops and produces surface-to-air missiles systems for Iran's military. It maintains military, missile, and air defense projects and procures goods from Russia, Belarus, and North Korea.
57.
Name: Shahid Beheshti University
Address: Daneshju Blvd., Yaman St., Chamran Blvd., P.O.Box 19839-63113, Tehran, Iran Justification: Shahid Beheshti University is a public entity which is under the supervision of the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology. Carries out scientific research relevant to the development of nuclear weapons. Relation: Owned or controlled by Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces Logistics
58.
Name: Shakhese Behbud Sanat
Justification: Involved in the production of equipment and parts for the nuclear fuel cycle.
59.
Name: Shiraz Electronics Industries
Address: Mirzaie Shirazi, P.O.Box 71365-1589, Shiraz, Iran Justification: Subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries. Relation: Subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries (including all branches and subsidiaries)
60.
Name: State Purchasing Organisation (SPO, a.k.a. State Purchasing Office; State Purchasing Organization)
Justification: The SPO appears to facilitate the import of whole weapons. It appears to be a subsidiary of MODAFL.
61.
Name: STEP Standart Teknik Parca San ve TIC A.S.
Address: 79/2 Tuzla, Istanbul, 34940, Turkey Justification: Company run by Milad Jafari, who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to UN designated Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) through front companies. Relation: Run by Jafari Milad
62.
Name: Sun Middle East FZ Company
Justification: A company that procures sensitive goods for the Nuclear Reactors Fuel Company (SUREH). Sun Middle East uses intermediaries based outside of Iran to source goods SUREH requires. Sun Middle East provides these intermediaries with false end user details for when the goods are sent to Iran, thereby seeking to circumvent the relevant country’s customs regime.
63.
Name: SURENA
Good quality a.k.a.: Sakhd Va Rah-An-Da-Zi Justification: Company for Construction and Commissioning of Nuclear Power Plants. Controlled by the UN designated Novin Energy Company.
64.
Name: TABA (Iran Cutting Tools Manufacturing company - Taba Towlid Abzar Boreshi Iran; a.k.a. Iran Centrifuge Technology Co.; Iran's Centrifuge Technology Company; Sherkate Technology Centrifuge Iran, TESA, TSA)
Address: 12 Ferdowsi, Avenue Sakhaee, avenue 30 Tir (sud), nr 66 - Tehran
Justification: Owned or controlled by EU-sanctioned TESA, Involved in manufacturing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.
65.
Name: Taghtiran
Justification: Engineering firm that procures equipment for Iran’s IR-40 heavy water research reactor.
66.
Name: Tajhiz Sanat Shayan (TSS)
Address: Unit 7, No. 40, Yazdanpanah, Afriqa Blvd, Tehran, Iran Justification: Involved in procurement of components for Iranian nuclear programme.
67.
Name: Technology Cooperation Office (TCO) of the Iranian President’s Office
Good quality a.k.a.: Center for Innovation and Technology (CITC) Address: Tehran, Iran Justification: Responsible for Iran’s technological advancement through relevant foreign procurement and training links. Supports the nuclear and missile programmes.
68.
Name: Test Tafsir
Address: No 11, Tawhid 6 Street, Moj Street, Darya Blvd, Shahrak Gharb, Tehran, Iran Justification: Company produces and has supplied UF6 specific containers to the uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom/ Fordow.
69.
Name: Tosse Silooha
Good quality a.k.a.: Tosseh Jahad E Silo Justification: Involved in the Iranian nuclear programme at the Natanz, Qom and Arak facilities.
70.
Aufgehoben
71.
Name: Yarsanat
Good quality a.k.a.: a) Yar Sanat b) Yarestan Vacuumi Address: a) No. 101, West Zardosht Street, 3rd Floor, Tehran, 14157 b) No. 139 Hoveyzeh Street, Tehran, 15337 Justification: Procurement company for UN-designated Kalaye Electric Company. Involved in purchasing equipment and materials which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme. It has attempted the procurement of vacuum products and pressure transducers.
72.
Name: Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
Justification: Company dealing with procurement activities related to the purchase of materials and technologies necessary to nuclear and ballistic programmes.
73.
Name: Arfa Paint Company
Justification: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. Relation: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
74.
Name: Arfeh Company
Justification: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. Relation: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
75.
Name: Farasepehr Engineering Company
Justification: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. Relation: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
76.
Name: Hosseini Nejad Trading Co.
Justification: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. Relation: Acting on behind of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
77.
Name: Iran Saffron Company
Good quality a.k.a.: Iransaffron Co. Justification: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. Relation: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
78.
Name: Shetab G.
Justification: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. Relation: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
79.
Name: Shetab Gaman
Justification: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. Relation: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
80.
Name: Shetab Trading
Justification: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. Relation: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
81.
Name: Y.A.S. Co. Ltd
Justification: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. Relation: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
82.
Name: Tidewater
Good quality a.k.a.: a) Tidewater Middle East Co. b) Faraz Royal Qeshm Company LLC Address: No. 80, Tidewater Building, Vozara Street, Next to Saie Park, Tehran, Iran Justification: Owned or controlled by IRGC Relation: Owned or controlled by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
83.
Name: Turbine Engineering Manufacturing (TEM)
Good quality a.k.a.: T.E.M. Co. Address: Shishesh Mina Street, Karaj Special Road, Tehran, Iran Justification: Used as a front company by designated Iran Aircraft Industries (IACI) for covert procurement activities.
84.
Name: Rosmachin
Address: Haftom Tir Square, South Mofte Avenue, Tour Line No; 3/1, P.O.Box 1584864813, Tehran, Iran Justification: Front company of Sad Export Import Company. Involved in illicit arms transfer aboard M/V Monchgorsk. Relation: Front company of Sad Export Import Company (I.AC.50.20.12.12.(2))
85.
Name: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Address: Tehran, Iran Justification: Responsible for Iran’s nuclear programme. Has operational control for Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Has undertaken procurement attempts to support Iran’s ballistic missiles and nuclear programmes.
86.
Name: Ansar Bank
Good quality a.k.a.: a) Ansar Finance and Credit Fund b) Ansar Financial and Credit Institute c) Ansae Institute d) Ansar al-Mojahedin No-Interest Loan Institute e) Ansar Saving and Interest Free-Loans Fund Address: No. 539, North Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran; Ansar Building, North Khaje Nasir Street, Tehran, Iran Justification: Bonyad Taavon Sepah created Ansar Bank to provide financial and credit services to IRGC personnel. Initially, Ansar Bank operated as a credit union and transitioned into a fully fledged bank in mid 2009, upon receiving a licence from Iran’s Central bank. Ansar Bank, formerly known as Ansar al Mojahedin, has been linked to the IRGC for over 20 years. IRGC members received their salaries through Ansar bank. In addition, Ansar bank provided special benefits to IRGC personnel, including reduced rates for home furnishings and free, or reduced-cost, health care.
87.
Name: Bonyad Taavon Sepah
Good quality a.k.a.: a) IRGC Cooperative Foundation b) Bonyad-e Ta’avon-Sepah c) Sepah Cooperative Foundation Address: Niayes Highway, Seoul Street, Tehran, Iran Justification: Bonyad Taavon Sepah, also known as the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, was formed by the Commanders of the IRGC to structure the IRGC’s investments. It is controlled by the IRGC. Bonyad Taavon Sepah’s Board of Trustees is composed of nine members, of whom eight are IRGC members. These officers include the IRGC’s Commander in Chief, who is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, the Supreme Leader’s representative to the IRGC, the Basij commander, the IRGC Ground Forces commander, the IRGC Air Force commander, the IRGC Navy commander, the head of the IRGC Information Security Organization, a senior IRGC officer from the Armed Forces General Staff, and a senior IRGC officer from MODAFL. Relation: Controlled by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
88.
Name: IRGC Air Force
Justification: Operates Iran’s inventory of short and medium range ballistic missiles. The head of the IRGC air force was designated by UNSCR 1737 (2006).
89.
Name: IRGC-Air Force Al-Ghadir Missile Command
Justification: The IRGC-Air Force Al-Ghadir Missile Command is a specific element within the IRGC Air Force that has been working with SBIG (designated under UNSCR 1737) with the FATEH 110, short range ballistic missile as well as the Ashura medium range ballistic missile. This command appears to be the entity that actually has the operational control of the missiles. Relation: Part of IRGC Air Force
90.
Name: IRGC Qods Force
Address: Tehran, Iran Justification: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force is responsible for operations outside Iran and is Tehran’s principal foreign policy tool for special operations and support to terrorists and Islamic militants abroad. Hizballah used Qods Force-supplied rockets, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), manportable air defense systems (MANPADS), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the 2006 conflict with Israel and benefited from Qods Force training on these systems, according to press reporting. According to a variety of reports, the Qods Force continues to resupply and train Hizballah on advanced weaponry, anti-aircraft missiles, and long-range rockets. The Qods Force continues to provide limited lethal support, training, and funding to Taliban fighters in southern and western Afghanistan including small arms, ammunition, mortars, and short-range battlefield rockets. Commander has been sanctioned under UNSCR 1747.
91.
Name: Mehr Bank
(a.k.a. Mehr Finance and Credit Institute; Mehr Interest-Free Bank)
Address: No 182, Shahid Tohidi St, 4th Golsetan, Pasdaran Ave, Tehran 1666943, Iran
Justification: Mehr Bank is controlled by Bonyad Taavon Sepah and the IRGC. Mehr Bank provides financial services to the IRGC. According to an open source interview with the then head of Bonyad Taavon Sepah, Parviz Fatah, Bonyad Taavon Sepah created Mehr Bank to serve the Basij (paramilitary arm of the IRGC).
92.
Name: Naserin Vahid
Justification: Naserin Vahid produces weapons parts on behalf of the IRGC. An IRGC front company. Relation: Front company of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
93.
Name: Behnam Sahriyari Trading Company
Postal address: Ziba Building, 10th Floor, Northern Sohrevardi Street, Tehran, Iran Justification: Involved in the shipment of arms on behalf of the IRGC.
94.
Aufgehoben
95.
Aufgehoben
96.
Aufgehoben
97.
Aufgehoben
98.
Name: Iran Composites Institute
(a.k.a. Composites Research Laboratory (CRL))
Identifying information: Iran Composites Institute,
Iranian University of Science and Technology,
16845-188, Tehran, Iran,
Telephone: 98 217 3912858
Fax 98 217 7491206
Email: mailto:ici@iust.ac.ir
Website: http://www.irancomposites.org
Justification: Iranian Composites Institute (ICI, a.k.a. Composite Institute of Iran; Composites Research Laboratory (CRL)) is assisting designated entities in violating the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of 2011, ICI had been contracted to provide EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) with IR-2M centrifuge rotors.
99.
Name: Jelvesazan Company
Address: 22 Bahman St., Bozorgmehr Ave, 84155666, Esfahan, Iran Tel: 98 0311 2658311 15 Fax: 98 0311 2679097 Justification: Jelvesazan Company is assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of early 2012 Jelvesazan intended to supply controlled vacuum pumps to EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA).
100.
Name: Iran Aluminium Company
Address: Arak Road Km 5, Tehran Road, 38189-8116, Arak, Iran Tel: 98 861 4130430 Fax: 98 861 413023 Website: www.iralco.net Justification: The Iran Aluminium Company (aka IRALCO, Iranian Aluminium Company) is assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of mid-2012 IRALCO had a contract to supply aluminium to EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA).
101.
Name: Simatec Development Company
Justification: Simatec Development Company is assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of early 2010 Simatec was contracted by UN-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) to procure Vacon inverters to power uranium enrichment centrifuges. As of mid-2012 Simatec was attempting to procure EU-controlled inverters.
102.
Name: Aluminat
Address: 1. Parcham St, 13th Km of Qom Rd 38135 Arak (Factory) 2. Unit 38, 5th Fl, Bldg No 60, Golfam St, Jordan, 19395-5716, Tehran Tel: 98 212 2049216 / 22049928 / 22045237 Fax: 98 21 22057127 Website: www.aluminat.com
Justification: Aluminat is assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. In early 2012 Aluminat had a contract to supply 6061-T6 aluminium to EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA).
103.
Name: Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND)
Justification: The Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) directly supports Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. The IAEA has identified SPND with their concerns over possible military dimensions (PMD) to Iran's nuclear programme. SPND was run by UN-designated Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi and is part of the Ministry of Defence For Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) designated by the EU.
104.
Aufgehoben
105.
Name: Sharif University of Technology
Address: Last address known: Azadi Ave/Street, PO Box 11365-11155, Tehran, Iran, Tel. +98 21 66 161 Email: info@sharif.ir
Justification: Sharif University of Technology (SUT) has a number of cooperation agreements with Iranian Government organisations which are designated by the UN and/or the EU and which operate in military or military-related fields, particularly in the field of ballistic missile production and procurement. This includes: an agreement with the EU-designated Aerospace Industries Organisation for, inter alia, the production of satellites; cooperating with the Iranian Ministry of Defence and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) on smart boat competitions; a broader agreement with the IRGC Air Force which covers developing and strengthening the University’s relations, organisational and strategic cooperation.
Taken together, these show a significant record of engagement with the Government of Iran in military or military-related fields that constitutes support to the Government of Iran.
106.
Name: Naval Defense Missile Industry Group
(a.k.a. Cruise Missile Industry Group; Samen al-Aemeh Industries Group)
Identifying information: Address no. 1: 28 Shian 5, Lavizan, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 2: P.O. Box 13185/3198, Tehran, Iran
Type of entity: subsidiary of Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
Justification: Naval Defense Missile Industry Group (a.k.a. Cruise Missile Industry Group) is involved in the development of missile systems as a subsidiary of the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), an entity directly controlled by the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). The Naval Defense Missile Industry Group is therefore associated with an entity providing support to the government of Iran.
107.
Name: Defense Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC)
(a.k.a. Institute for Defense Education and Research; Moassese Amozesh Va Tahghighati)
Identifying information: Address: Pasdaran Av., P.O. Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran
Type of entity: government entity
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
Principal place of business: Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL);
Defense Industries Organization (DIO)
Associated individuals: Aman Allah Paydar (commercial manager and procurement agent for the DTSRC);
Murat Bukey (procurement agent);
Asghar Mahmoudi (facilitator and commissioner)
Justification: The Defense Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC) is an Iran-based government entity that conducts defence-related research and development as well as procurement. It is majority-owned by and subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and falls under its Defense Industries Organization (DIO). MODAFL provides logistic support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Therefore, DTSRC provides support to the Government of Iran.
108.
Name: Electro Sanam Company
(a.k.a. E.S. Co.; E.X. Co.; Electro Sanam Co.; Electro Sanam; Sanam Industrial Group; Electro Sanam Industries; Sanam Electronics)
Identifying information: Address no. 1: No 24, 3rd Floor, Sink St., after Beheshti St., Northern Sohrevardi Ave. 15779 Tehran, Iran
Address no. 2: Tehran P.O. Box 19395/5339, Araj Forkway, Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, Iran
Telephone no.: +98 21 8757587; +98 21 7863352; +98 21 88757587
Fax no.: +98 21 8757588; +98 21 7867810; +98 21 88757588; +98 21 22549738
Email: fadjr@isiran-net.com; info@sanamel.com
Place of registration: Iran
Date of registration: 1992
Registration no.: 339747
National ID no.: 10103864724
Principal place of business: Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Sanam Industrial Group;
Aerospace Industries Organization
Justification: Electro Sanam Company is a front company for the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) that is involved in Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Electro Sanam Company is therefore engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
109.
Name: Ettehad Technical Group
Identifying information: Address no. 1: 28 Shian 5, Lavizan, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 2: P.O. Box 13185/3198, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 3: P.O. Box 19395/6874, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 4: Langare Street, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran
Website: https://www.ettehad-group.com/
Justification: Leading industrial and military subsidiary of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), oversees Iran’s missile production. Ettehad Technical Group is an AIO front company involved in the ballistic missile programme and is therefore directly associated with and providing support for, Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology.
110.
Name: Fajr Industrial Group
(a.k.a. Industrial Factories of Precision Machinery (IFP); Fadjr Industries Group (FIG); Nasr Industries Group; Instrumentation Factories Plan (IFP); Instrumentation Factories of Precision-Machinery; Precision Component Project Group; Sasadja Precision Industrial Complex; Mojtame Santy Ajzae Daghigh; Mojtama-e Sanaty-e Ajza-ye Daqiq; Department 140/16; Instrumentation Factories Plant; Instrumentation Factory Plant; Fajr Industries Group; Fadjr Industrial Group; IFP; Instrumentation Factories Plant (IFP))
Identifying information: Address no. 1: Javadian Far Ave. 212, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 2: Khavaran Road Km 40, Parchin, Iran
Address no. 3: P.O. Box 1985/777, Tehran, Iran
Telephone no.: +98 21 88978036
Fax no.: +98 21 88960239
Place of registration: Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO);
Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
Justification: Fajr Industrial Group is a subsidiary of Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), and is therefore controlled by an entity providing support to the government of Iran. It is involved in the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
111.
Name: Farayand Technique
(a.k.a. Technology of Centrifuge of Iran Company)
Identifying information: Address no. 1: Saadat Abad, Kaj Square, Sarv Gharbi, Sina Medical Building, first floor, unit 8, Tehran, Iran (HQ)
Address no. 2: Zobe-Ahan Highway, after highway police station, Siman Road, Ashtarjan industrial city, Sixth Avenue, building of the board of trustees of the industrial city, number 59, Isfahan, Iran (Factory)
Principal place of business: Tehran, Iran; Esfahan, Iran
Associated entities: Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI);
Kalaye Electric Company
Associated individuals: Jafar Mohammadi
Justification: Farayand Technique is owned or linked to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and is therefore directly associated with Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
112.
Name: 7th of Tir
(a.k.a. 7th of Tir Complex; 7th of Tir Industrial Complex; 7th of Tir Industries; 7th of Tir Industries of Isfahan/Esfahan; Haftom-e Tir)
Identifying information: Address no. 1: Mobarakeh Road Km 45, Isfahan, Iran
Address no. 2: P.O. Box 81465/478, Isfahan, Iran
Date of registration: 1997
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO);
Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG);
Khorasan Metallurgical Industries;
Yazd Metallurgical Industries
Justification: 7th of Tir (Haftom-e Tir) is a subsidiary of the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) and of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO) that produces mortar bombs and fuses. DIO is a conglomerate of companies run by the Islamic Republic of Iran whose function is to provide the Armed Forces with the necessary manufacturing capacity and technical abilities. 7th of Tir is therefore controlled by an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapons delivery systems.
113.
Name: Amin Industrial Complex
Identifying information: Address no. 1: Amin Industrial Estate, Khalage Rd., Seyedi District P.O. Box 91735/549, Mashad, Iran
Address no. 2: P.O. Box 91735/549, Mashad, Iran
Address no. 3: Amin Industrial Estate, Khalage Rd., Seyedi District, Mashad, Iran
Address no. 4: Kaveh Complex, Khalaj Rd., Seyedi St., Mashad, Iran
Address no. 5: No 160, Besat Blvd., Ahmad-Abad 2nd 30-Meter St., Mashad, Iran
Address no. 6: Km. 8th of Asiaei Rd., Mashad, Iran (Factory)
Address no. 7: Khalaj St., End of Seyyedi Alley, 91638 Mashad
Website: www.amincomplex.ir
Type of entity: military weapon provider
Place of registration: Mashad, Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO);
Kaveh Cutting Tools Company
Justification: Amin Industrial Complex is a military weapon provider that has been involved in the proliferation of illicit missile and nuclear technology to Iran through a Chinese intermediary. It is thus engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems by Iran.
114.
Name: Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG)
Identifying information: Address no. 1: P.O. Box 16765/1835 Pasdaran Street
Address no. 2: Department 145-42 P.O. Box 16765/128 Moghan Avenue, Pasdaran Street
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Shahid Sattari Industries;
Parchin Ammunition Industries;
7th of Tir Industries Complex;
Yazd Metallurgy Industries;
Khorasan Metallurgy Industries;
Isfahan Ammunition Industries;
Shahid Shiroudi Industries;
Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries;
Defense Industries Organization (DIO)
Justification: Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) is the largest industrial group of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO). Its products include ammunition, mortar bombs, pyrotechnics, anti-tank and sea mines, hand grenades, detonators, brass materials, cutting tools, industrial valves, perforating charges for the oil industry and other industrial parts. It is comprised of ten subsidiaries, including Shahid Sattari Industries, Parchin Ammunition Industries, 7th of Tir Industries Complex, Yazd Metallurgy Industries, Khorasan Metallurgy Industries, Isfahan Ammunition Industries, Shahid Shiroudi Industries and Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries. It has played a key role in manufacturing and developing weaponry and is linked to several companies involved in proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. It is thus engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems by Iran.
115.
Name: Armament Industries Group (AIG)
Identifying information: Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO)
Justification: Armament Industries Group is a large manufacturer of weapons and a subsidiary of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO). DIO is a conglomerate of companies run by the Islamic Republic of Iran whose function is to provide the Armed Forces with the necessary manufacturing capacity and technical abilities. AIG is therefore controlled by an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapons delivery systems.
116.
Name: Defense Industries Organization (DIO)
Identifying information: Address: Amin Industrial Estate, Khalage Rd., Seyedi District P.O. Box 91735/549, Mashad, Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Kaveh cutting tool company;
7th of Tir Industries;
Khorasan Metallurgy Industries;
Aviation Industries Organization (AvIO);
Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO);
Iran Electronics Industries (IEI); Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
Justification: The Defense Industries Organization (DIO) is a conglomerate of over 300 companies and a subsidiary of Iran’s Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) whose function is to provide the Armed Forces with the necessary manufacturing capacity and technical abilities. It has played a central role in Iran’s ballistic missile development programme and in the implementation of Iran’s centrifuge programme. DIO oversees numerous state-owned defence contractors and front companies directly or through its primary subsidiary, the Aerospace Industries Organization. It plays a significant role in producing diverse military hardware for Iran, including missiles. In recent years, the DIO has attempted to become export-oriented, allowing Iran to become an exporter of weapons: in 2022, DIO has grown by 200 % compared to 2021, has developed 75 new weapons and has multiplied its exports by 2,5, thus contributing to the growth of Iran’s defence industry. DIO is thus providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
117.
Name: Kaveh Cutting Tools Company
(a.k.a. Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. Persian; Mojtame-e Abzar Boreshi Kaveh)
Identifying information: Address no. 1: Km 4 Khalaj Road, end of Seyyedi Street, Mashad 91638, Iran
Address no. 2: P.O. Box 91735/549, Mashad, Iran
Address no. 3: 3rd Km of Khalaj Road, Seyyedi Street, Mashad, Iran
Address no. 4: Moqan St., Tehran, Iran
Website: www.kavehtools.ir
Place of registration: Mashad, Iran
Date of registration: 1993
Principal place of business: Mashad, Iran
Associated entities: Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co.;
Defense Industries Organization (DIO);
Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG)
Justification: Kaveh Cutting Tools Company is an Iranian manufacturing company that has been involved in the production of components for Iran’s IR-1 centrifuges, and in the procurement for Iran’s centrifuge programme. It is controlled by the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) and subordinate to the Defense Industries Organization (DIO). It is thus engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems by Iran.
118.
Name: Khorasan Metallurgy Industries
(a.k.a. Khorasan Metallurgy; Khorasan Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries; Khorasan Metalogy Industries; The Metallurgy Industries of Khorasan; Metalogy Industry of Khorasan; Previously known as: Amin Industrial Complex)
Identifying information: Address: 2nd km of Khalaj Road End of Seyyedi St., P.O.Box 91735-549, 91735 Mashad, Iran.
Website: www.khwarizmi.ir
Telephone no.: +98 511 3853008; +98 511 3870225
Type of entity: public company
Place of registration: Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG);
Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL);
Defense Industries Organization (DIO)
Justification: Khorasan Metallurgy Industries is part of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and a subsidiary of the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG). It is responsible for the production of ammunition and centrifuge components as well as cutting tools and products such as drills, milling cutters, taps, reamers and compound tools. It is providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
119.
Name: Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries
(a.k.a. Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries; Sayyad Shirazi Industries; Sayad Shirazi; Sayad Shirazi industries; Sayad Shirazi industry; Shaheed Sayad Shirazee ammunition industries; Shahid Sayyadi Shirazi Industries; Shahid Sayyed Shirazi Ind.)
Identifying information: Address no. 1: Next To Nirou Battery Mfg. Co, Shahid Babaii Expressway, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 2: Pasdaran St., P.O. Box 16765, Tehran 1835, Iran
Address no. 3: Babaei Highway - Next to Niru M.F.G, Tehran, Iran
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG);
Defense Industries Organization (DIO)
Associated individuals: Shahid Sayyad Shirazi (former deputy chief of staff of Iran’s Armed Forces)
Justification: Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries is a missile producer owned by Shahid Sayyad Shirazi, former deputy chief of staff of Iran’s Armed Forces that is linked to the Iranian military industry. Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries has been trying to acquire metals from China used in high-tech weaponry, including long-range nuclear missiles. It is part of the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG), which has played a key role in manufacturing and developing weaponry and is linked to several companies involved in proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, and a subsidiary of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO) that is directly involved in missile development. It is therefore controlled by an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapons delivery systems.
120.
Name: Joza Industrial Co.
Identifying information: Address: P.O. Box 16595/159, Tehran, Iran
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
Date of registration: 03.3.2008
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: AIO (Aerospace Industries Organization);
SHIG (Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group)
Justification: Joza Industrial Co. is controlled by Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which is involved in the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. It has recently designed the medium-range precision-guided projectile Kheibar aimed at strengthening the Iranian Armed Forces in the missile, drone and radar areas. Joza Industrial Co. is therefore controlled by an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapons delivery systems.
121.
Name: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)
(a.k.a. Kola Electric Co.; Kala Electric; Kola Electric Company; Kalia; Kalaye Electric Co.; Kala Electric Company; Kalay Electric Company; KEC)
Identifying information: Address: 33 Fifteenth Street, Seyed Jamaleddin Assadabadi Avenue, Tehran, Iran
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Justification: Kalaye Electric Company is a manufacturer of advanced centrifuges for Iran’s nuclear programme, namely the IR-8 model, as well as a research and development site working on centrifuges for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. It is therefore engaged in and providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
122.
Name: M Babaie Industries
(a.k.a. Shahid Babaie Industries Complex; SBIC; Shahid Babaie Industrial Complex; Shaheed Babaie Industries; Shahid Babaii Industries; sh. Babaie industries)
Identifying information: Address: Kalery Bldg., Damovand Road, Tehran 1916, Iran
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
Justification: M Babaie Industries is a subordinate to Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which is involved in the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. M. Babaie Industries develops missile technologies for the benefit of the Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, such as an improved version of the MIM-23B air defence missile. It is thus controlled by an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities (AIO).
123.
Name: Malek Ashtar University
Identifying information: Address no. 1: Shahin Shahr Township, End of Ferdowsi Avenue, PO Box 83154/115, Isfahan, Iran
Address no. 2: Corner of Imam Ali Highway and Babaei Highway, Tehran, Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL);
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
Defense Technology and Science Research Center (DTSRC)
Justification: Malek Ashtar University is an Iranian university subordinate to the Defense Technology and Science Research Center (DTSRC) that supports the education and research and development needs of the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Its faculty members have conducted research relevant to missiles and nuclear power. They have also been involved in illicit procurement of MTCR-listed goods in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions. Therefore, it is directly associated with Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
124.
Name: Mizan Machinery Manufacturing
(a.k.a. 3MG; Mizan; Mizan Machine; 3M Mizan Machinery Manufacturing)
Identifying information: Address: P.O. Box 16595/365, Tehran, Iran
Place of registration: Iran
Principal place of business: Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
Justification: Mizan Machinery Manufacturing is acting on behalf of, and is controlled by, Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which is involved in the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. It has been involved in commercial transactions around sensitive ballistic missile-related material. It is thus providing support for nuclear weapon delivery systems.
125.
Name: Niru Battery Manufacturing Company
(a.k.a. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company; Niru Batteries MFG. Co. Ltd.; Nour Battery Manufacturing Company; Sherkate Battrijazi Niru; Niru Battery Co; Niru Battery Mfg. Co.; Nirou Battery Manufacturing Saba Battery Company; Niru Co. Ltd.; Sherkat Battery Sazi Niru Sahami Khass; The Niru Battery Company; Niru Battery Manufacturing (Batrisazi-ye Niru); Niru Battery Mfg.CO (Saba Battery); Sherkate Batri-e Niru; Power Energy Source Development Company (ESDO))
Identifying information: Address no. 1: Nobonyad Blvd., Pasdaran Avenue, P.O. Box 19575/361, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 2: Next to Babee Exp. Way, Nobonyad Sq., Tehran, Iran
Address no. 3: Next to Shahid Babaei Exp. way, Nobonyad Sq., 16689, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 4: End of Pasdaran Avenue, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran
Telephone no.: +98 21 251 0523/254 7093; +98 21 22547094; +98 21 22567608-9; +98 21 2545084
Website: www.nirubattery.com; www.niruco.com
Email: info@nirubattery.com; export@niruco.com; niru@isiran.com
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Saba Battery;
Defense Industries Organization (DIO);
Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
Justification: Niru Battery Manufacturing Company is an entity registered in Iran that manufactures power units for the Iranian military, including for missile systems. It is controlled by the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), responsible for Iran’s defence research, development and manufacturing programmes, including support to missile and nuclear programmes. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company is a subsidiary of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), a conglomerate of companies run by the Islamic Republic of Iran whose function is to provide the Armed Forces with the necessary manufacturing capacity and technical abilities. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company is therefore controlled by an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
126.
Name: Safety Equipment Procurement Company
(a.k.a.Safety Equipment Procurement; SEP; SEP Co.; SEPCO; Safety Equipment Procurement Inc.)
Identifying information: Address: P.O. Box 16785/195, Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO);
Pejman Industrial Services
Justification: Safety Equipment Procurement Company is a front company for Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which is responsible for Iran’s liquid-fuelled ballistic missile programme. AIO is the leading industrial and military subsidiary of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and oversees Iran’s missile production. AIO has used the Safety Equipment Procurement Company for procurement since at least 2003. It is involved in Iran’s ballistic missile activities and is therefore engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
127.
Name: Sanam Industrial Group
(a.k.a. Sanam Industries Group; Sanam Industrial Production Group; Department 140; Sanam Projects Management (SPM); Sanam Industrial Company; Sanam Industries Co.; Sanam Industrial and Trading Company; Sanam Group)
Identifying information: Address no. 1: Pasdaran Road 15, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 2: 3rd Fl., Sanam Bldg., Nobonyad Sq., Pasdaran Ave., Tehran (19579), Iran
Address no. 3: P.O. Box 19575/596, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 4: Km. 25th of Khavaran Rd., Tehran, Iran (Factory Address)
Address no. 5: Farzam Alley, No 3, Fatemi Square, Palestine St
Telephone no.: +98 21 2546008; +98 21 2556772; +98 21 88969501
Fax: +98 21 2556830; +98 21 88969501
Place of registration: Tehran
Registration no.: 176855
Economic code: 411139673763
National ID: 10102191894
Date of registration: 1987 and 2001
Associated individuals: Reza Sadougi, CEO
Justification: Sanam Industrial Group is controlled by Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) and has purchased equipment for the Iranian missile programme. Sanam Industrial Group is therefore providing support for Iran’s development of nuclear weapon delivery systems and is an entity that provides support to the Government of Iran and entities owned or controlled by it or persons and entities associated with it.
128.
Name: Special Industries Group (SIG)
(a.k.a.:Ministry of Defense Special Industries Group; Special Industries Organization (SIO); Special Industrial Groups of the Ministry of Defense; Organization of Special Industries; Special Group; SIG; Ministry of Defense Special Industries Organization; Ministry of Defense Special Industrial Groups; Department 154; Special Industries Section; Special Industries Division; Special Industry Group; Special Industries; Organization of Special Industry; Special Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Industries; MIDSPGIC Co)
Identifying information: Address no. 1: North Felestine Ave., Tehran, Iran
Address no. 2: Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, Iran
Address no. 3: P.O. Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 4: Zartosht Street, Tehran
Type of entity: Subsidiary of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which is a subsidiary of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO);
Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
Justification: Special Industries Group (SIG) is a subsidiary of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which is controlled by, and provides support to, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). It is therefore controlled by an entity that provides support to the Government of Iran.
129.
Name: Yazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI)
(a.k.a.YMI; Yazd Metallurgy Industry; Yazd Ammunition Industries; Yazd Metallurgical Ind’s Co.; Yazd Metallurgical Industries; Yazd Metal Smelting Industrial Group; Yazd Ammunition Manufacturing and Metallurgy Industries; Directorate of Yazd Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries)
Identifying information: Address no. 1: Pasdaran Ave., Next to Telecommunication Industry, Tehran 16588, Iran
Address no. 2: P.O. Box 89195/878, Yazd, Iran
Address no. 3: P.O. Box 89195/678, Yazd, Iran
Address no. 4: Km 5 of Taft Road, Yazd, Iran
Telephone no.: +98 35 15220322
Fax no.: +98 35 1523096
Place of registration: Iran
Date of registration: 1961
Registration number: 860
Economic code: 411315443678
Associated individuals: Li Fang Wei a.k.a. Karl Lee
Associated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO);
LIMMT Economic and Trade Company (LIMMT);
Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG);
Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries;
Justification: Yazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI) is affiliated with Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and is a subsidiary of Ammunition Industries Group in Iran. YMI is involved in IR-1 centrifuge components manufacturing at DIO workshops in Iran’s missile programme. Furthermore, it is involved in the production of goods that can be used for either the production of nuclear weapons or vehicles for the delivery of such weapons.
Therefore, it has been providing support for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems by Iran, through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology.
130.
Name: Qods Aeronautics Industries
(a.k.a. Qods Aviation Industries (QAI); Quds Air Industries; Company for Designing and Manufacturing Light Aircraft;Light Aircraft Design and Manufacturing Industries)
Identifying information: Address no.1: Unit 207, Tarajit Maydane Taymori (or Teimori) Square, Basiri Building, Tarasht, Tehran, Iran
Address no.2: 4 Km Karaj Road, Tehran, Iran
Type of entity: Aviation manufacturing company
Associated entities: IRGC;
Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL);
Iran Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO);
Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
Justification: Qods Aeronautics Industriesis an Iranian company that designs and manufactures Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It is a subsidiary of the Iran Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO), a state-owned enterprise subordinate to the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Therefore, Qods Aeronautics is controlled by an entity supporting the government of Iran and providing essential services to the IRGC.
131.
Name: Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG)
(a.k.a. Shahid Baheri Organisation; SBIG; Shahid Baheri Industries Group; Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group; Department 140/14; Shahid Bagheri Industries Group; Mahtab Technical Engineering Company; Composite Propellant Missile Industry; Sanaye Sokhte Morakab; SSM)
Identifying information: Address: Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, Iran
Associated individuals: Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi (Head of Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG))
Associated entities: Subordinate entity of Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
Justification: Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG) is a subsidiary to Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG) develops and produces Iran’s solid-propellant ballistic missiles. The development of such missiles is key to the building of nuclear weapon delivery capacities. Therefore, SBIG is engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for, Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
132.
Name: Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG)
(a.k.a. Sabalan CIE; Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO); Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG); Chahid Hemmat Industrial Group; Hemmat Missile Industries Factory; Shahid Hemmat Industrial Complex; SHIC; Shahid Hemmat Industrial Factories; SHIF; Shahid Hemmat Industries Group; Shahid Hemmat Complex; Shahid Hemmat Industries; Shahid Hemmat Industrial Complex; Shahid Hemat; Industrial Complex; Shahid Hemmat)
Identifying information: Address: Damavand Tehran Highway, P.O. Box 16595/159, No 5, Eslami St., Golestane Sevvom St., Pasdaran St., Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO);
Sabalan Company;
Sabalan Petrochemical company;
Sabalan Petrochemical Industries Company;
SPICO;
SPC
Justification: Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) is subordinate to Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). SHIG is responsible for Iran’s liquid-fuelled ballistic missile programme, including the production of missiles. The development of such missiles is key to the building of nuclear weapon delivery capacities. Therefore, SHIG is engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for, Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
133.
Name: Shahid Kharrazi Industries
(a.k.a. Kharrazi Industry; Shahid Kharrazy Industries Group)
Identifying information: Address: After Atashneshani Square, Khojir region, southeastern Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG);
Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
Justification: Shahid Kharrazi Industries is a defence firm subordinate to Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG) - itself subordinate to Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) - which is responsible for Iran’s solid-fuelled ballistic missile programme. Develops and produces guidance and control systems for solid-propellant ballistic missiles. Therefore, Shahid Kharrazi Industries is engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for, Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
134.
Name: Shahid Sattari Industries Group (SSIG)
(a.k.a. Sanaye Shahid Satari; Mohemat Sazie Shahid Satary)
Identifying information: Address: Southeast Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG);
Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
Shahid Sattari Industries Group (SSIG) is involved in the manufacturing and maintenance of ground support equipment for Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG), which is responsible for Iran’s solid-fuelled ballistic missile programme and a subsidiary of Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). SSIG produces ammunition components, including fuses, detonators, and primers, is involved in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and manufactures pressure regulators and equipment for mines and oil wells.
135.
Name: Ya Mahdi Industries Group
(a.k.a. Ya Mahdi Industrial Complex; Ya Mahdi Industries Group; Ya Mahdi Group; Ya-Mahdi Aircraft Manufacturing; O Mahdi Aircraft Manufacturing; YMA Research & Industrial Complex; Ya Mahdi AG Industrial Research Complex; YMA College)
Identifying information: Address no. 1: Khorasan Road, Lavizan, Parchin, PO Box 19395-4731, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 2: P. O. Box 19585-774, Tehran, Iran
Address No 3: Noboniad Sq., Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
Justification: Ya Mahdi Industries Group has been involved in international purchases of missile-related technology and goods on behalf of the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). Ya Mahdi Industries Group offers anti-tank guided missiles and produces anti-tank missile systems and air-defence systems. The development of such missiles is key to the building of nuclear weapon delivery capacities. Therefore Ya Mahdi Industries Group is engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for, Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
136.
Name: Fater Institute
(a.k.a.Faater Institute; Fater Engineering Company; Gharargah Ghaem Faater Institute; Fater Engineering)
Identifying information: Address no. 1: No 25, Valiasr Jonoobi, Azizi Street, Azadi Sq. NE, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 2: No 221, Phase 4, North Falamak-Zarafshan Intersection, Shahrak-E-Ghods, Tehran 14678, Iran
Type of entity: public company
Place of registration: Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA);
Niro Holding
Justification: Fater Institute is a construction company and subsidiary of the IRGC entity Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) and is therefore controlled by the IRGC.
137.
Name: Gharagahe Sazandegi Ghaem
(a.k.a. Gharargah Ghaem; Gharargah Sazandegi Ghaem/Khatam Ghaem; GHAEM Construction Organization; Ghaem Construction Co.; Garagahe Sazandegi Ghaem; Gharargahe Sazandegi Khatam Alanbia Company)
Identifying information: Address: No 25, Valiasr St., Azadi Sq., Tehran, Iran
Type of entity: public company
Place of registration: Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA)
Justification: Gharagahe Sazandegi Ghaem is a construction company and subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA), a company controlled by the IRGC. It is therefore controlled by IRGC.
138.
Name: Ghorb Karbala
Identifying information: Address: No 2 Firouzeh Alley, Shahid Hadjipour St., Resalat Highway, Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA)
Justification: Ghorb Karbala is a subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) and therefore controlled by the IRGC.
139.
Name: Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters
Identifying information: Address: No 221, Phase 4, North Falamak-Zarafshan Intersection, Shahrak-E-Ghods, Tehran 14678, Iran
Type of entity: public company
Place of registration: Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated individuals: Sardar Abed (Commander of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters)
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
Fater Institute;
Niro Holding
Justification: Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters is a construction company controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
140.
Name: Makin Institute
(a.k.a. Makin company)
Identifying information: Address: No 2 Iravan St. - Tishfoon St. - Khaje Abdol ah Ansari St. - Shariati St., Tehran, Iran
Type of entity: subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, which is an Iranian engineering firm controlled by the IRGC.
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
Principal place of business: Tehran, Iran
Associated entities:
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA)
Justification: The Makin Institute is an engineering company operating under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Makin Institute is therefore controlled by the IRGC.
141.
Name: Rah Sahel
(a.k.a. Rah Sahel Institute; Rah Sahel Co; Rah e Sahel Org.; Rah Sahel est.)
Identifying information: Address: Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA)
Justification: Rah Sahel is a construction company and a subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA), which is controlled by the IRGC. As a subsidiary of KAA, the engineering arm of the IRGC, Rah Sahel serves to help the IRGC generate income and fund its operation. Rah Sahel is therefore controlled by the IRGC and acting on its behalf.
142.
Name: Rahab Engineering Institute
(a.k.a. Rahab Institute; Previously known as: Rahsaz Institute)
Identifying information: Address no. 1: Eastern 14th St., Beihaghi Blvd., Arjantin Sq., Tehran, Iran
Address no. 2: Ghorb-e Ghaem Building, Valiasr St., Azizi Blvd., Azadi Sq., Tehran, Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA)
Justification: Rahab Engineering Institute, formerly known as Rahsaz Institute, is a company and subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA). It directly supports mining and engineering projects. It is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and is controlled by it.
143.
Name: Sepasad Engineering Company
(a.k.a. Sepasad Co.)
Identifying information: Address: No 4 corner of Shad St., Mollasadra Ave., Vanak Sq., Tehran, Iran
Telephone no.: +98 21 88643750
Website: www.sepasad.com
Date of registration: 1992
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA)
Justification: Sepasad Engineering Company is a subsidiary of the IRGC entity Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) and is therefore controlled by the IRGC.
144.
Name: Sho’a’ Aviation
(a.k.a. Sho’a’ Aviation; Shuaa Airlines)
Identifying information: Address no. 1: Opposite to Golestan Np. 7, Bldg. No 110, Suite No 5, Pasdaran Street, Tehran
Address no. 2: Pasdaran Street, Across from Golestan Haftom, Building 3110, Apartment 5, Tehran, Iran
Type of entity: Aviation company
Place of registration: Iran
Associated individuals: Morteza Rezaie;
Ali Akbar Ahmadian;
Mohammad Reza Zahedi;
Morteza Safari;
Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC);
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force
Justification: Sho’a’ Aviation is an aviation company in Iran. The company has procured military goods for the IRGC that were used by the IRGC in its asymmetric warfare doctrine. Sho’a’ Aviation has therefore acted on behalf of the IRGC and provided essential services to the IRGC.
145.
Name: Behineh Trading Co.
Identifying information: Address: Tavakoli Building, Opposite of 15th Alley, Emam-Jomeh Street, Tehran, Iran.
Associated individuals: Ali Akbar Tabatabaei (IRGC);
Azim Aghajani (IRGC);
Esmail Ghani, a.k.a. Ismail Akbar Nezhad or Esmail Qani
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Justification: Behineh Trading Co., which is owned and/or controlled by the Behineh Trading Company, is a front company for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Behineh Trading Company is also related to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran’s development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. It has also been involved in the illegal transport to deliver IRGC equipment. Behineh Trading Co. has been managed and/or overseen by Esmail Ghani, the Head of Iran’s IRGC Quds Force. Therefore, Behineh Trading Co. is owned and/or controlled by the IRGC.
146.
Name: Ghorb Nooh
Identifying information: Address: P.O. Box 16765/3476, Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA);
Hara Company;
Omran Sahel;
Sahel Consultant Engineers;
National Iranian Oil company (NIOC);
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Justification: Ghorb Nooh is a subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) and therefore controlled by the IRGC.
147.
Name: Hara Company
(a.k.a. Hara Institute)
Identifying information: Address: Takhti Three-way Intersection, Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
Ghorb Nooh;
Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA)
Justification: Hara Company is a subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbiya, a company which is owned and controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Khatam al-Anbiya’s top management positions are controlled by senior members of the IRGC. Therefore Hara Company is controlled by the IRGC.
148.
Name: Omran Sahel
Identifying information: Website: www.sahelomran.ir
Associated entities: Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA);
Ghorb Nooh
Justification: Omran Sahel is owned and/or controlled by Ghorb Nooh, a subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbiya, a company which is owned and controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Khatam al-Anbiya’s top management positions are controlled by senior members of the IRGC. Therefore, Omran Sahel is an entity or body owned or controlled by the IRGC.
149.
Name: Oriental Oil Kish
(a.k.a. Oriental Kish Company; Oriental Oil)
Identifying information: Address: No 98 East Atefi St. Africa Blvd., Tehran
Associated entities: Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA);
Justification: Oriental Oil Kish is a subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, which is owned and controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Therefore, Oriental Oil Kish is owned or controlled by the IRGC.
150.
Name: Pars Aviation Services Company
(a.k.a. Pars Aviation Service Company; Pars Aviation Service Co.; PASC)
Identifying information: Address: P.O. Box 1656/13455, Karaj special road - after Ekbatan overpass - beside the commercial customs, Mehrabad International Airport, Tehran, Iran
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Yas Air;
Pouya Air
Justification: Pars Aviation Services Company is an Iranian aircraft supply and repair company operating for the IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGC-AF). Therefore, Pars Aviation Services Company is controlled by the IRGC.
151.
Name: Sahel Consultant Engineers
(a.k.a. Sahel Consultant Engineering Co.; Sahel Company; Sahel Consulting Engineers; Sahel; Sahel Engineering Consulting Co.; Sahel Consultant Engineering)
Identifying information: Address no. 1: P.O Box 16765-34, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 2: No 57, Eftekhar St., Larestan St., Motahhari Ave, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 3: NO. 57, Oftani St., Larestan St., Motahari Ave., Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Ghorb Nooh;
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA)
Justification: Sahel Consultant Engineers is owned and/or controlled by Ghorb Nooh, a subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbiya, a company which is owned and controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Therefore, Sahel Consultants Engineers is an entity owned or controlled by the IRGC.
152.
Name: Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute
(a.k.a. ICEI; Imensazen Consultant Engineers; Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute; Imen Sazan Consultant Engineers; Imen Sazen Consultant Engineers Institute; Imen Sazan Consulting Engineers; Imen Sazan Consulting Ins.; Imensazan Co. Eng.; Imensazan Consulting Eng.)
Identifying information: Address no. 1: 121 First Golestan Street, Pasdaran Tehran, Tehran Province 65916, Iran
Address no. 2: No 5/1, Niroo Alley, Padegan-e-Valiasr Street, Sepah Square, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 3: Tehran - Ashrafi Esfahani to the north - above Hakim Bridge - before Chirag Bagh Faiz - East Ayatollah
Address no. 4: Sadouq Street - No 5 - Postal code 1461934358 (Mr Engineer Azad - Iran Concrete Association)
Telephone no.: 44234261
Place of registration: Iran
Date of registration: 1989 and 1990
Associated individuals: Abdollah Abdullahi (Executive Managing Director);
Mr Surah Kia Pasha (Managing Director)
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA)
Justification: Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute is a tunnel construction and passive defence company and a subsidiary of the IRGC entity Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA). Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute is therefore controlled by the IRGC.
153.
Name: Yas Air
(a.k.a. Pouya Air; Pouya Airlines; Yas Air Kish; YasAir Cargo Airline; Pars Air; Pars Aviation Service Company; Qeshm Air)
Identifying information: Address: Mehrabad International Airport, Next to Terminal No 6, Tehran, Iran
Website: pouyaair.com;
yasair.com
Type of entity: Cargo airline
Place of registration: Iran
Date of registration: 2000 (as Qeshm Air) and 2008 renamed Yas Air
Associated entities: Pars Aviation Services Company (PASC);
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Justification: Yas Air, also known as Pouya Air, is an Iranian cargo airline created and managed as a direct subsidiary of the IRGC. It is therefore controlled by the IRGC.
Anhang 6a34
(Art. 8 Abs. 1, Art. 11 Abs. 1 und 3, Art. 12 Bst. b)
Natürliche Personen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen und das Ein- und Durchreiseverbot richten, sowie Unternehmen und Organisationen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen richten (Beschluss (GASP) 2023/1532)35
Anhang 736
(Art. 8 Abs. 1, 11 Abs. 1 und 3 sowie 12 Bst. b)
Natürliche Personen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen und das Ein- und Durchreiseverbot richten, sowie Unternehmen und Organisationen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen richten (Beschluss 2011/235/GASP)
A. Natürliche Personen
 
Name
Identifizierungsinformationen
Gründe
1.
AHMADI-MOQADDAM
Esmail
POB: Tehran (Iran)
DOB: 1961
Gender: male
Director of the University and the Higher National Defence Research Institute since 20 September 2021. Former Senior Advisor for Security Affairs to the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff. Chief of Iran’s National Police from 2005 until early 2015. Also Head of the Iranian Cyber Police (EU-listed) from January 2011 until early 2015. Forces under his command led brutal attacks on peaceful protests and a violent night-time attack on the dormitories of Tehran University on 15 June 2009. Former head of Iran’s Headquarters in support of the Yemeni People.
2.
ALLAHKARAM Hossein
POB: Najafabad (Iran)
DOB: 1945
Gender: male
Head of Ansar-e Hezbollah Coordination Council and former general in the IRGC. He co-founded Ansar-e Hezbollah. This paramilitary force was responsible for extreme violence during crackdown against students and universities in 1999, 2002 and 2009.
He maintains his senior role in an organisation which is ready to commit human rights violations against the public, including promoting aggression against women for their choice of clothing.
3.
ARAGHI (ERAGHI)
Abdollah
Gender: male
Title: Brigadier-General
Brigadier-General in the IRGC. Head of the Security Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Former Deputy Head of IRGC's Ground Forces. He had a direct and personal responsibility in the crackdown of protests all through the summer of 2009.
4.
FAZLI Ali
Gender: male
Title: Brigadier-General
Former Chief of the Imam Hossein Cadet College (2018-June 2020). Former deputy Commander of the Basij (2009-2018), Head of the IRGC’s Seyyed al-Shohada Corps, Tehran Province (until February 2010). The Seyyed al-Shohada Corps is in charge of security in Tehran province and played a key role in the brutal repression of protesters in 2009.
5.
JAFARI Mohammad-Ali (a.k.a. "Aziz
Jafari")
POB: Yazd (Iran)
DOB: 1.9.1957
Gender: male
Director of the Hazrat-e Baqiatollah Social and Cultural Base. Former Commander of the IRGC (September 2007 - April 2019). IRGC and the Sarollah Base commanded by General Mohammad-Ali (Aziz) Jafari have played a key role in illegally interfering with the 2009 Presidential Elections, arresting and detaining political activists, as well as clashing with protestors in the streets.
6.
KHALILI Ali
Gender: male
IRGC General, in a senior role within the Sarollah Base. He signed a letter sent to the Ministry of Health June 26, 2009 forbidding the submission of documents or medical records to anyone injured or hospitalized during post-elections events.
7.
MOTLAGH Bahram Hosseini
Gender: male
Member of the teaching staff of Imam Hossein University (Guardians of the Revolution). Former Head of the Army Command and General Staff College (DAFOOS). Former Head of the IRGC’s Seyyed al-Shohada Corps, Tehran Province. The Seyyed al-Shohada Corps played a key role in organising the repression of protests in 2009.
8.
NAQDI
Mohammad-Reza
POB: Najaf (Iraq)
DOB: Circa 1952
Gender: male
Title: Brigadier-General
Deputy Coordinator of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Former Deputy Chief of the IRGC for cultural and social affairs. Former Commander of the Basij (2009-2016). As commander of the IRGC's Basij Forces, Naqdi was responsible for or complicit in Basij abuses occurring in late 2009, including the violent response to the December 2009 Ashura Day protests, which resulted in up to 15 deaths and the arrests of hundreds of protesters. Prior to his appointment as commander of the Basij in October 2009, Naqdi was the head of the intelligence unit of the Basij responsible for interrogating those arrested during the post-election crackdown.
9.
RADAN Ahmad-Reza
POB: Isfahan (Iran)
DOB: 1963
Gender: male
Head of the Centre for Strategic Studies of the Iranian Law Enforcement Force, a body linked to the National Police. Deputy Chief of Iran's National Police until June 2014. As Deputy Chief of National Police from 2008, Radan was responsible for beatings, murder, and arbitrary arrests and detentions against protestors that were committed by the police forces. Currently IRGC commander in charge of training Iraqi "anti-terrorist" forces.
10.
RAJABZADEH
Azizollah
Gender: male
Commander of the Urban Order Headquarters since 2014. Former Head of Tehran Disaster Mitigation Organisation (2010-2013). As Head of Tehran Police until January 2010, he was responsible for violent police attacks on protesters and students. As Commander of the Law Enforcement Forces in the Greater Tehran, he was the highest ranking accused in the case of abuses in Kahrizak Detention Centre in December 2009.
11.
SAJEDI-NIA Hossein
Gender: male
Police Operations Deputy Commander. Former head of Tehran Police, former Deputy Chief of Iran's National Police responsible for Police Operations. He is in charge of coordinating, for the Ministry of Interior, repression operations in the Iranian capital.
12.
TAEB Hossein
POB: Tehran (Iran)
DOB: 1963
Gender: male
Head of the IRGC intelligence organisation since October 2009. His responsibilities were expanded in May 2019 with the merging the Office of the Deputy of Strategic Intelligence of the IRGC and the IRGC's Intelligence Organization. Commander of the Basij until October 2009. Forces under his command participated in mass beatings, murders, detentions and tortures of peaceful protestors.
13.
SHARIATI Seyeed Hassan
Gender: male
Advisor and Member of the 28th Section of the Supreme Court. Head of Mashhad Judiciary until September 2014. Trials under his supervision have been conducted summarily and inside closed sessions, without adherence to basic rights of the accused, and with reliance on confessions extracted under pressure and torture. As execution rulings were issued en masse, death sentences were issued without proper observance of fair hearing procedures.
14.
DORRI-NADJAFABADI Ghorban-Ali
POB: Najafabad (Iran)
DOB: 3.12.1950
Gender: male
Member of the Assembly of Experts and representative of the Supreme Leader in Markazi (‘Central’) Province and Head of the Supreme Administrative Court. Prosecutor General of Iran until September 2009, as well as former Intelligence Minister under Khatami presidency. As Prosecutor General of Iran, he ordered and supervised the show trials following the first post-election protests, where the accused were denied their rights and access to an attorney.
15.
Aufgehoben
 
 
16.
SOLTANI Hodjatoleslam Seyed Mohammad
Gender: male
Since 2018, Hodjatoleslam Seyed Mohammad Soltani serves as deputy prosecutor in the Revolutionary Prosecution Office, Mashhad. Head of the Organisation for Islamic Propaganda in the province of Khorasan-Razavi. Former Judge, Mashhad Revolutionary Court (2013-2019). Trials under his jurisdiction have been conducted summarily and inside closed session, without adherence to basic rights of the accused. As execution rulings were issued en masse, death sentences were issued without proper observance of fair hearing procedures. He is responsible for issuing heavy prison sentences to citizens of the Baha’is minority, due to their religious beliefs, through unfair trials with lack of due process, and the use of extrajudicial procedures.
17.
HEYDARIFAR Ali-Akbar
Gender: male
Former judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court. He participated in protesters trials. He was questioned by the judiciary about Kahrizak abuses. He was instrumental in issuing detention orders to consign detainees to Kahrizak Detention Centre in 2009. In November 2014, his role in the deaths of detainees was officially recognised by the Iranian authorities.
18.
JAFARI-DOLATABADI
Abbas
POB: Yazd (Iran)
DOB: 1953
Gender: male
Former advisor to the Supreme Disciplinary Court of judges (29 April 2019-at least 2020). Former Prosecutor General of Tehran (August 2009-April 2019). Abbas Jafari-Dolatabadi’s office indicted a large number of protesters, including individuals who took part in the December 2009 Ashura Day protests. He ordered the closure of Karroubi’s office in September 2009 and the arrest of several reformist politicians, and he banned two reformist political parties in June 2010. His office charged protesters with "Muharebeh", or "enmity against God", which carries the death penalty, and denied due process to those facing the death penalty. His office also targeted and arrested reformists, human rights activists and members of the media, as part of a broad crackdown on the political opposition.
In October 2018, he announced to the media that four detained Iranian environmental activists were to be charged with "sowing corruption on earth", a charge which carries the death penalty.
19.
MOGHISSEH
Mohammad (a.k.a. NASSERIAN)
Gender: male
Judge at the Supreme Court since November 2020. Former head of Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 28. Also considered responsible for condemnations of members of the Baha’i community. He has dealt with post-election cases. He issued long prison sentences during unfair trials of social and political activists and journalists, and several death sentences for protesters and social and political activists.
20.
MOHSENI-EJEI Gholam-Hossein
POB: Ejiyeh (Iran)
DOB: circa 1956
Gender: male
Chief of Justice since July 2021. Member of the Expediency Council. Prosecutor General of Iran from September 2009 until 2014. Former Deputy Head of the Judiciary (2014 until July 2021) and spokesperson of the Judiciary (2010-2019). Intelligence Minister from 2005 until 2009. While he was Intelligence Minister during the 2009 elections, intelligence agents under his command were responsible for the detention and torture of, and the extraction of false confessions under pressure from, hundreds of activists, journalists, dissidents and reformist politicians. In addition, political figures were coerced into making false confessions under unbearable interrogation, which included torture, abuse, blackmail and the threatening of family members. During the 2022/2023 protests, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei stated that there would be no leniency with protesters.
21.
MORTAZAVI Said (a.k.a. MORTAZAVI Saeed)
POB: Meybod, Yazd (Iran)
DOB: 1967
Gender: male
Head of the Welfare System from 2011 to 2013. Prosecutor General of Tehran until August 2009. As Prosecutor General of Tehran, he issued a blanket order used for the detention of hundreds of activists, journalists and students. In January 2010, a parliamentary investigation held him directly responsible for the detention of three prisoners who subsequently died in custody. He was suspended from office in August 2010 after an investigation by the Iranian judiciary into his role in the deaths of the three men detained on his orders following the election.
In November 2014, his role in the deaths of detainees was officially recognised by the Iranian authorities. He was acquitted by an Iranian Court on 19 August 2015, on charges connected to the torture and deaths of three young men at the Kahrizak detention centre in 2009. Sentenced to prison in 2017 and released in September 2019. In August 2021, Iran’s Supreme Court issued a ruling in full support of Said Mortazavi, overturning his earlier two-year jail sentence.
22.
PIR-ABASSI Abbas
Gender: male
Magistrate of a Criminal chamber. Former Judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 26. He was in charge of post-election cases. He issued long prison sentences during unfair trials against human rights activists and issued several death sentences for protesters.
23.
MORTAZAVI Amir
Gender: male
Deputy head of the Unit for Social Affairs and Crime Prevention at the judiciary in the province of Khorasan-Razavi. Deputy Prosecutor of Mashhad until at least 2015. Trials under his prosecution have been conducted summarily and inside closed session, without adherence to basic rights of the accused. As execution rulings were issued en masse, death sentences were issued without proper observance of fair hearing procedures.
24.
SALAVATI
Abdolghassem
Gender: male
Judge of the Special Court for Financial Crimes, branch 4 since 2019. Former Head of Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 15. Committing Judge in the Tehran Tribunal. In charge of the post-election cases, he was the Judge presiding over the "show trials" in summer 2009, he condemned to death two monarchists that appeared in the show trials. He has sentenced more than a hundred political prisoners, human rights activists and demonstrators to lengthy prison sentences.
In 2018, reports showed that he continued to hand down similar sentences without proper observance of fair hearing procedures.
During the 2022 protests, Abdolghassem Salavati sentenced many protestors to death including Mohammad Beroghani and Saman Seydi.
25.
SHARIFI Malek Adjar (aka: SHARIFI Malek Ajdar)
Gender: male
Judge at the Supreme Court, head of the 43rd section. Former Head of East Azerbaidjan Judiciary. He was responsible for Sakineh Mohammadi-Ashtiani's trial.
26.
Aufgehoben
 
 
27.
YASAGHI Ali-Akbar
Gender: male
Judge at the Supreme Court, head of the 13th section. Deputy Chief Executive Officer of Setad-e Dieh Foundation. Chief Judge, Mashhad Revolutionary Court (2001-2011). Trials under his jurisdiction have been conducted summarily and in closed sessions, without adherence to basic rights of the accused. As execution rulings were issued en masse (up to 550 between summer 2009 and summer 2011), death sentences were issued without proper observance of fair hearing procedures.
28.
BOZORGNIA Mostafa
Gender: male
Head of ward 350 of Evin Prison. He unleashed on a number of occasions disproportionate violence upon prisoners.
29.
ESMAILI
Gholam-Hossein (a.k.a. ESMAILI Gholam Hossein)
Gender: male
Chief of Staff of Iranian President Raisi since August 2021. Judiciary spokesman from April 2019 until July 2021. Former head of the Tehran Judiciary. Former Head of Iran’s Prisons Organisation. In this capacity, he was complicit in the massive detention of political protesters and covering up of abuses performed in the jailing system.
30.
SEDAQAT (a.k.a. Sedaghat) Farajollah
Gender: male
Assistant Secretary of the General Prison Administration in Tehran. Head of Evin's prison, Tehran until October 2010 during which time torture took place. He was warden, and threatened and exerted pressure on prisoners numerous times.
31.
ZANJIREI
Mohammad-Ali
Gender: male
As Senior advisor to Head, and Deputy Head of Iran's Prisons Organisation, responsible for serious human rights violations against prisoners. Administered a system in which prisoners suffered abuse, torture and inhuman/degrading treatment and were accommodated in very poor living conditions.
32.
ABBASZADEH-MESHKINI Mahmoud
Gender: male
Member of Parliament (since February 2020) and Speaker of the Parliament’s Committee for National Security and Foreign Affairs. Former Advisor to Iran’s High Council for Human Rights (until 2019). Former secretary of the High Council for Human Rights. Former Governor of Ilam Province. Former Political Director of the Interior Ministry. As Head of the Article 10 Committee of the Law on Activities of Political Parties and Groups, he was in charge of authorising demonstrations and other public events and registering political parties.
In 2010, he suspended the activities of two reformist political parties linked to Mousavi - the Islamic Iran Participation Front and the Islamic Revolution Mujahedeen Organisation. From 2009 onwards, he has consistently and continuously prohibited all non-governmental gatherings, therefore denying a constitutional right to protest and leading to many arrests of peaceful demonstrators in contravention of the right to freedom of assembly.
In 2009, he also denied the opposition a permit for a ceremony to mourn people killed in protests over the Presidential elections.
33.
AKBARSHAHI
Ali-Reza
Gender: male
Former Director-General of Iran’s Drug Control Headquarters (a.k.a. Anti-Narcotics Headquarters). Former Commander of Tehran Police. Under his leadership, the police force was responsible for the use of extrajudicial force on suspects during arrest and pre-trial detention. The Tehran police were also implicated in raids on Tehran university dorms in June 2009 when, according to an Iranian Majlis commission, more than 100 students were injured by the police and Basiji. Until 2018, head of the railway police.
34.
AKHARIAN Hassan
Gender: male
Head of Ward 5 and in charge of solitary confinement in EU-listed Rajaee Shahr Prison since 2015; formerly Keeper of Ward 1 of Rajaee Shahr Prison, Karadj until July 2010. Several former detainees have denounced his use of torture, as well as orders he gave to prevent inmates receiving medical assistance. According to a transcript of one reported detainee in the Rajaee Shahr Prison, wardens all beat him severely, with Akharian’s full knowledge. There is also at least one reported case of ill treatment and the death of a detainee, Mohsen Beikvand, under Akharian’s wardenship. Beikvand died in September 2010. Other prisoners claim credibly that he was killed on the instructions of Hassan Akharian.
35.
AVAEE Seyyed
Ali-Reza (a.k.a. AVAEE Seyyed
Alireza, AVAIE
Alireza)
POB: Dezful (Iran)
DOB: 20.5.1956
Gender: male
Minister of Justice until 25 August 2021. Former Director of the special investigations office. Deputy Minister of the Interior and Head of the Public Register until July 2016. Advisor to the Disciplinary Court for Judges in April 2014. Former President of the Tehran Judiciary. As President of the Tehran Judiciary, he has been responsible for human rights violations, arbitrary arrests, denials of prisoners’ rights and a high number of executions.
36.
BANESHI Jaber
Gender: male
Head of Branch 22 of the Appeals Court of Shiraz from November 2011. Prosecutor of Shiraz until October 2011. Prosecutor during the Shiraz bombing case in 2008, which was used by the regime to sentence to death other unconnected persons. He has pursued capital charges and other severe penalties against minorities, such as to constitute, inter alia, a violation of their human rights to fair trial and freedom from arbitrary detention.
37.
Aufgehoben
 
 
38.
GANJI Mostafa
Barzegar
Gender: male
General Director of Inspection Supervision and Performance Evaluation of Courts since June 2020. Former Prosecutor General of Qom (2008-2017) and former Head of the Directorate-General for prisons. He was responsible for the arbitrary detention and maltreatment of dozens of offenders in Qom. He was complicit in a grave violation of the right to due process, contributing to the excessive and increasing use of the death penalty and a sharp increase in executions in 2009/2010.
39.
HABIBI Mohammad Reza
Gender: male
Chief Justice of Isfahan. Former Attorney General of Isfahan. Former Head of the Ministry of Justice office in Yazd. Former Deputy Prosecutor of Isfahan. Complicit in proceedings denying defendants a fair trial - such as Abdollah Fathi, executed in May 2011 after his right to be heard and mental health issues were ignored by Habibi during his trial in March 2010. He was, therefore, complicit in a grave violation of the right to due process, contributing to a sharp increase in executions in 2011.
40.
Aufgehoben
 
 
41.
JAVANI Yadollah
Gender: male
Nationality:
Iranian
Rank: Brigadier-General
IRGC deputy commander for political affairs. Has made numerous attempts to suppress free speech and free discourse through his public statements supporting the arrest and punishment of protesters and dissenters. One of the first high-ranking officials to demand in 2009 the arrest of Moussavi, Karroubi and Khatami. Has supported the use of techniques that breach rights to a fair trial, including public confessions, and he has released the contents of interrogations before trial. Evidence also indicates that he has condoned the use of violence against protesters and as an integral member of the IRGC he is highly likely to have been aware of the use of harsh interrogation techniques to force confessions.
42.
JAZAYERI Massoud
Gender: male
Title: Brigadier-General
Cultural advisor to the Joint Chief of Staff of Iran’s Armed Forces since April 2018. Within the joint military staff of Iran’s Armed Forces, Brigadier-General Massoud Jazayeri was the Deputy Chief of Staff for cultural and media affairs (a.k.a. State Defence Publicity HQ). He actively collaborated in the repression of 2009 protests as Deputy Chief of Staff. He warned in a Kayhan interview that many protesters inside and outside Iran had been identified and would be dealt with at the right time.
He has openly called for the suppression of foreign mass media outlets and the Iranian opposition. In 2010, he asked the government to pass tougher laws against Iranians who cooperate with foreign media sources.
43.
JOKAR Mohammad Saleh
POB: Yazd (Iran)
DOB: 1957
Gender: male
Member of Parliament for the Province of Yazd. Former Deputy for Parliamentary Affairs of the Revolutionary Guards. From 2011 to 2016, parliamentary deputy for the Province of Yazd and Member of the Parliamentary Committee for National Security and Foreign Policy. Former Commander of Student Basij Forces. In this role, he was actively involved in suppressing protests and indoctrinating children and young people with a view to continuing suppression of free speech and dissent. As Member of the Parliamentary Committee for National Security and Foreign Policy, he publically supported the suppression of opposition to the government.
44.
KAMALIAN Behrouz
(a.k.a. Hackers Brain, Behrooz_Ice)
POB: Tehran (Iran)
DOB: 1983
Gender: male
Head of the ‘Ashiyaneh’ cyber group linked with the Iranian regime. The ‘Ashiyaneh’ Digital Security, founded by Behrouz Kamalian, is responsible for intensive cyber attacks both on domestic opponents and reformists and foreign institutions. Kamalian’s ‘Ashiyaneh’ organisation’s work has assisted the regime’s crackdown against the opposition, which has involved numerous serious human rights violations in 2009. Both Kamalian and the ‘Ashiyaneh’ cyber group have continued their activities until at least December 2021.
45.
KHALILOLLAHI Moussa (a.k.a. KHALILOLLAHI Mousa, ELAHI Mousa Khalil)
POB: Tabriz (Iran)
DOB: 1963
Gender: male
Chief of Justice of East Azerbaijan province. Former prosecutor of Tabriz from 2010 to 2019. He was involved in Sakineh Mohammadi-Ashtiani’s case and is complicit in grave violations of the right to due process.
46.
MAHSOULI Sadeq (a.k.a. MAHSULI Sadeq)
POB: Oroumieh (Iran)
DOB: 1959/1960
Gender: male
Deputy Secretary-General of the Paydari Front (Front of Islamic Stability). Former Advisor to Former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, former member of the Expediency Council and former Deputy Chief of the Perseverance Front. Minister of Welfare and Social Security between 2009 and 2011. Minister of the Interior until August 2009. As Minister of the Interior, Mahsouli had authority over all police forces, interior ministry security agents, and plain-clothes agents. The forces under his direction were responsible for attacks on the dormitories of Tehran University on 14 June 2009 and the torture of students in the basement of the Ministry (the notorious basement level 4). Other protestors were severely abused at the Kahrizak Detention Centre, which was operated by police under Mahsouli’s control.
47.
MALEKI Mojtaba
Gender: male
Deputy head of the Ministry of Justice in the Khorasan Razavi province. Former prosecutor of Kermanshah. Has played a role in the high number of death sentences being passed in Iran, including prosecuting the cases of seven prisoners convicted of drug trafficking who were hanged on the same day on 3 January 2010 in Kermanshah's central prison.
48.
OMIDI Mehrdad (aka: Reza; OMIDI Reza)
Gender: male
Head of section VI of the police, investigation department. Former Head of the Intelligence Services within the Iranian Police. Former Head of the Computer Crimes Unit of the Iranian Police. He was responsible for thousands of investigations and indictments of reformists and political opponents using the Internet. He was thus responsible for grave human rights violations in the repression of persons who speak out in defence of their legitimate rights, including freedom of expression during and after the 2009 Green Movement.
49.
SALARKIA Mahmoud
Gender: male
Former director of Tehran Football Club "Persepolis"
Former Head of the Petrol and Transport commission of the City of Tehran. Deputy to the Prosecutor-General of Tehran for Prison Affairs during the crackdown of 2009. As Deputy to the Prosecutor-General of Tehran for Prison Affairs he was directly responsible for many of the arrest warrants against innocent, peaceful protesters and activists. Many reports from human rights defenders show that virtually all those arrested were, on his instruction, held incommunicado without access to their lawyer or families, and without charge, for varying lengths of time, often in conditions amounting to enforced disappearance. Their families have often not been notified of the arrest. He is currently working as a lawyer.
50.
KHODAEI SOURI Hojatollah
POB: Selseleh (Iran)
DOB: 1964
Gender: male
Member of the National Security and Foreign policy Committee. Parliamentary deputy for Lorestan Province. Member of the Parliamentary Commission for Foreign and Security Policy. Head of Evin prison until 2012. Torture was a common practice in Evin prison while Souri was its head. In Ward 209, many activists were held for their peaceful activities in opposition to the ruling government.
51.
TALA Hossein (a.k.a. TALA Hosseyn)
POB: Tehran (Iran)
DOB: 1969
Gender: male
Mayor of Eslamshahr until 2020. Former Iranian MP. Former Governor-General (‘Farmandar’) of Tehran Province until September 2010, he was responsible for the intervention of police forces and therefore for the repression of demonstrations. He received a prize in December 2010 for his role in the post-election repression.
52.
TAMADDON
Morteza (a.k.a. TAMADON
Morteza)
POB: Shahr Kord-Isfahan (Iran)
DOB: 1959
Gender: male
Former Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council. Former IRGC Governor-General of Tehran Province. In his capacity as Governor and Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council, he bore overall responsibility for all repressive activities undertaken by the IRGC in Tehran Province, including cracking down on political protests since June 2009. Currently board member at Khajeh Nasireddin Tusi University of Technology.
53.
ZEBHI Hossein
Gender: male
First Deputy Advisor to the Judiciary and Judge of the Supreme Court (head of Branch 41 of the Supreme Court, dealing in particular with security offences and drugs). Deputy to the Prosecutor-General of Iran (2007-2015). In this role, he was responsible for judicial cases brought after the post-election protests in 2009, which were conducted in contravention of human rights. Also in this role, he has condoned excessive punishments for drug offences.
54.
BAHRAMI
Mohammad-Kazem
Gender: male
Head of the administrative justice court until April 2021. He was complicit in the repression of peaceful demonstrators in 2009 as head of the judiciary branch of the armed forces.
55.
HAJMOHAM-MADI Aziz (a.k.a. Aziz Hajmohammadi, Noorollah
Azizmohammadi)
POB: Tehran (Iran)
DOB: 1948
Gender: male
Judge at branch 71 of the Tehran Provincial Criminal Court. Working for the judiciary since 1971, he has been involved in several trials of demonstrators, inter alia, that of Abdol-Reza Ghanbari, a teacher arrested in January 2010 and sentenced to death for his political activities.
56.
BAGHERI
Mohammad-Bagher
Gender: male
In 2019, Mohammad-Bagher Bagheri was appointed Deputy Head of the Judiciary for International Affairs and Secretary of the Human Rights Staff replacing Mohammad Javad Larijani in this position by a decree of Ebrahim Raisi. He was judge at the Supreme court between December 2015 and 2019. Former vice-chairman of the judiciary administration of South Khorasan province, in charge of crime prevention. In addition to his acknowledging, in June 2011, 140 executions for capital offences between March 2010 and March 2011, about 100 other executions are reported to have taken place in the same period and in the same province of South Khorasan without either the families or the lawyers being notified. He was, therefore, complicit in a grave violation of the right to due process, contributing to a high number of death sentences.
57.
BAKHTIARI Seyyed Morteza
POB: Mashhad (Iran)
DOB: 1952
Gender: male
President of the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation (since July 2019). Former deputy custodian of Imam Reza shrine. Former Official of the Special Clerical Tribunal. Former Minister of Justice from 2009 to 2013. During his time as Minister of Justice, prison conditions within Iran fell well below accepted international standards, and there was widespread mistreatment of prisoners. In addition, he played a key role in threatening and harassing the Iranian diaspora by announcing the establishment of a special court to deal specifically with Iranians who live outside the country. He also oversaw a sharp increase in the number of executions in Iran, including secret executions not announced by the government, and executions for drug-related offences.
58.
HOSSEINI Dr Seyyed Mohammad (a.k.a. HOSSEYNI Dr
Seyyed Mohammad; Seyed, Sayyed and Sayyid)
POB: Rafsanjan, Kerman (Iran)
DOB: 23.7.1961
Gender: male
Vice-president for parliamentary affairs under President Raisi since August 2021. Former advisor to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and spokesperson for YEKTA, a hard-line political faction. Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance (2009-2013). Former Deputy Director of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). Former advisor to the Director of Islamic Culture and Relations Organisation (ICRO). Ex-IRGC, he was complicit in the repression of journalists.
59.
MOSLEHI Heydar (Aka: MOSLEHI Heidar; MOSLEHI Haidar)
POB: Isfahan (Iran)
DOB: 1956
Gender: male
Representative of the Ideological-Political Bureau of the Commander in Chief of Iran's Armed Forces (since 2018). Former advisor of Supreme Jurisprudence in the IRGC. Head of the organisation for publications on the role of the clergy at war. Former Minister of Intelligence (2009-2013). Under his leadership, the Ministry of Intelligence continued the practices of widespread arbitrary detention and persecution of protesters and dissidents. The Ministry of Intelligence runs Ward 209 of Evin Prison, where many activists have been held on account of their peaceful activities in opposition to the government in power. Interrogators from the Ministry of Intelligence have subjected prisoners in Ward 209 to beatings and mental and sexual abuse.
60.
ZARGHAMI
Ezzatollah
POB: Dezful (Iran)
DOB: 22.7.1959
Gender: male
Minister of Culture, Crafts and Tourism since 25 August 2021. Member of the Supreme Cyberspace Council and Cultural Revolution Council since 2014. Former Head of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) until November 2014. Under his tenure at IRIB, He was responsible for all programming decisions. IRIB has broadcast forced confessions of detainees and a series of ‘show trials’ in August 2009 and December 2011. These constitute a clear violation of international provisions on fair trial and the right to due process.
61.
TAGHIPOUR Reza
POB: Maragheh (Iran)
DOB: 1957
Gender: male
Member of the 11th Iranian parliament (Tehran constituency). Member of the Supreme Cyberspace Council. Former Member of the City Council of Teheran. Former Minister for Information and Communications (2009-2012).
As Minister for Information, he was one of the top officials in charge of censorship and control of internet activities and also all types of communications (in particular mobile phones). During interrogations of political detainees, the interrogators make use of the detainees’ personal data, mail and communications. On several occasions following the 2009 presidential election and during street demonstrations, mobile lines and text messaging were blocked, satellite TV channels were jammed and the internet locally suspended or at least slowed down.
62.
KAZEMI Toraj
Gender: male
Chief of the Greater Tehran division of the EU-designated Cyber Police until June 2020. In this capacity, he announced a campaign for the recruitment of government hackers in order to achieve better control of information on the internet and attack ‘dangerous’ sites.
63.
LARIJANI Sadeq
POB: Najaf (Iraq)
DOB: 1960 or August 1961
Gender: male
Head of the Expediency Council since 29 December 2018. Former member of the Guardian Council (until September 2021). Former Head of the Judiciary (2009-2019). The Head of the Judiciary is required to consent to and sign off every qisas (retribution), hodoud (crimes against God) and ta’zirat (crimes against the state) punishment. This includes sentences carrying the death penalty, floggings and amputations. In this regard, he has personally signed off numerous death penalty sentences, contravening international standards, including stoning, executions by suspension strangulation, execution of juveniles, and public executions such as those where prisoners have been hanged from bridges in front of crowds of thousands. Therefore, he has contributed to a high number of executions. He has also permitted corporal punishment sentences such as amputations and the dripping of acid into the eyes of the convicted. Since Sadeq Larijani took office, arbitrary arrests of political prisoners, human rights defenders and minorities have increased markedly. Sadeq Larijani also bears responsibility for systemic failures in the Iranian judicial process with respect to the right to a fair trial.
64.
MIRHEJAZI Ali
Ashgar
DOB: 8 September 1946
POB: Isfahan
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Intelligence advisor to the Supreme Leader. Part of the Supreme Leader’s inner circle, one of those responsible for planning the suppression of protests, which has been implemented since 2009, and associated with those responsible for supressing the protests.
He was also responsible for planning the suppression of public unrest in December 2017/2018 and November 2019.
65.
SAEEDI Ali
Gender: male
Head of the Supreme Leader’s political ideology bureau. Former representative of the Supreme Leader for the Pasdaran (1995-2020) after spending his whole career within the institution of the military, and specifically in the Pasdaran intelligence service. This official role made him the key figure in the transmission of orders emanating from the Office of the Supreme Leader to the Pasdaran’s repression apparatus.
66.
RAMIN Mohammad-Ali
POB: Dezful (Iran)
DOB: 1954
Gender: male
Secretary-general of the World Holocaust Foundation, established at the International Conference to Review the Global Vision of the Holocaust in 2006, which Ramin was responsible for organising on behalf of the Iranian Government. Main figure responsible for censorship as Vice-Minister in charge of the Press up to December 2013, being directly responsible for the closure of many reforming newspapers (Etemad, Etemad-e Melli, Shargh, etc.), closure of the Independent Press Syndicate and the intimidation or arrest of journalists.
67.
MORTAZAVI Seyyed Solat
POB: Farsan, Tchar Mahal-o-Bakhtiari (South) - (Iran)
DOB: 1967
Gender: male
Since 19 October 2022 (acting) Minister of Cooperatives, Labour and Social Welfare. From September 2021 until October 2022, Vice-President for Executive Affairs of Iran and Head of the Presidential Office. Head of the real estate branch of the Mostazafan Foundation, which was directly run by Supreme Leader Khamenei from 16 September 2019 until September 2021. Until November 2019, Director of the Tehran branch of the Foundation Astan Qods Razavi. Former mayor of the second largest city of Iran, Mashhad, where public executions are regularly carried out. Former Deputy Interior Minister for Political Affairs, appointed in 2009. In that capacity, he was responsible for directing the repression of persons who spoke up in defence of their legitimate rights, including freedom of expression. Later appointed as Head of the Iranian Election Committee for the parliamentary elections in 2012 and for the presidential elections in 2013.
68.
FARHADI Ali
Gender: male
Deputy Head of Inspectorate of Legal Affairs and Public Inspection of the Ministry of Justice of Tehran. Former prosecutor of Karaj. Responsible for grave violations of human rights, including prosecuting trials in which the death penalty was handed down. There were a high number of executions in Karaj region during his time as prosecutor.
69.
REZVANMA-NESH Ali
Gender: male
Deputy prosecutor in the province of Karaj, region of Alborz in the period 2010-2016. Responsible for grave violations of human rights, including involvement in the execution of a juvenile.
70.
RAMEZANI Gholamhossein
Gender: male
Since 2011 Chief of the Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence; from November 2009 to March 2011: Commander of Intelligence of the Pasdaran; from March 2008 to November 2009: Deputy Commander of Intelligence of the Pasdaran; from April 2006 to March 2008: Head of Protection and Intelligence of the Pasdaran. Involved in the suppression of freedom of expression, including by being associated with those responsible for the arrests of bloggers/journalists in 2004, and reported to have had a role in the suppression of the post-election protests in 2009.
71.
SADEGHI
Mohamed
Gender: male
Colonel and Deputy of IRGC technical and cyber intelligence and in charge of the centre of analysis and fight against organised crime within the Pasdaran. Responsible for the arrests and torture of bloggers/journalists.
72.
JAFARI Reza
DOB: 1967
Gender: male
Former advisor to the Disciplinary Court for Judges (2012-2022). Member of the "Committee for Determining Criminal Web Content", a body responsible for the censorship of websites and social media. Former Head of special prosecution of cybercrime between 2007 and 2012. Was responsible for the repression of freedom of expression, including through the arrest, detention and prosecution of bloggers and journalists. Persons arrested on suspicion of cybercrime were mistreated and subjected to an unfair judicial process.
73.
RESHTE-AHMADI Bahram
Gender: male
Judge of an ordinary court of northern Tehran. Former Supervisor of Public Prosecution Office in Tehran. Deputy Head of the Office of Prison Affairs of Tehran Province. Former Deputy Prosecutor in Tehran until 2013. He ran Evin prosecution centre. Was responsible for the denial of rights, including visits and other prisoner's rights, to human rights defenders and political prisoners.
74.
RASHIDI AGHDAM Ali Ashraf
Gender: male
Deputy Director of Health, Correction and Education of Tehran Prisons. Former head of Evin Prison (2012-2015). During his tenure, conditions in the prison deteriorated and reports referenced intensified ill-treatment of prisoners. In October 2012, nine female prisoners went on hunger strike in protest of the violation of their rights and violent treatment by prison guards.
75.
KIASATI Morteza
Gender: male
Judge of branch 54 of the Revolutionary Court of Tehran and of the Ahwaz Revolutionary Court, Branch 4; imposed death sentences on four Arab political prisoners, Taha Heidarian, Abbas Heidarian, Abd al-Rahman Heidarian (three brothers) and Ali Sharifi. They were arrested, tortured and hanged without due process. These cases and the lack of due process were referenced in a report dated 13 September 2012 by the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Iran, the UN Secretary General’s report on Iran of 22 August 2012.
76.
MOUSSAVI Seyed Mohammad Bagher (a.k.a. MOUSAVI Sayed Mohammed Baqir)
Gender: male
Ahwaz Revolutionary Court judge, Branch 2 (2011-2015), imposed death sentences on a number of people, including five Ahwazi Arabs, Mohammad Ali Amouri, Hashem Sha’bani Amouri, Hadi Rashedi, Sayed Jaber Alboshoka, Sayed Mokhtar Alboshoka, on 17 March 2012 for "activities against national security" and "enmity against God". The sentences were upheld by Iran’s Supreme Court on 9 January 2013. The five were arrested without charge for over a year, tortured and sentenced without due process. Hadi Rashedi and Hashem Sha'bani Amouri were executed in 2014.
77.
Aufgehoben
 
 
78.
JAFARI Asadollah
Gender: male
Currently Attorney General in Isfahan. In this position, he ordered violent reactions against protesters who took to the streets in November 2021 to protest against water shortages. According to some reports, Asadollah Jafari has announced the formation of a special office to investigate the arrested protesters.
From 2017 to 2021, he held the position of Attorney General in North Khorasan Province.
As former Prosecutor of Mazandaran Province (2006-2017), Jafari recommended the imposition of the death penalty in cases he prosecuted, which has resulted in many executions including public executions, and in circumstances where the imposition of the death penalty is contrary to international human rights, including by being disproportionate and excessive punishment. Jafari has also been responsible for illegal arrests and violations of the rights of Baha’i detainees from initial arrest to keeping them in solitary confinement in the Intelligence Detention Centre.
79.
EMADI Hamid Reza (a.k.a. Hamidreza Emadi)
POB: Hamedan (Iran)
DOB: circa 1973
Place of residence: Tehran
Place of work: Press TV HQ, Tehran
Gender: male
Former Press TV Newsroom Director. Former Press TV Senior Producer.
Responsible for producing and broadcasting the forced confessions of detainees, including journalists, political activists and persons belonging to Kurdish and Arab minorities, violating internationally recognised rights to a fair trial and due process. Independent broadcast regulator OFCOM fined Press TV in the UK GBP 100 000 for broadcasting the forced confession of Iranian-Canadian journalist and film-maker Maziar Bahari in 2011, which was filmed in prison whilst Bahari was under duress. NGOs have reported further instances of forced televised confessions by Press TV. Emadi is therefore associated with violating the right to due process and fair trial.
In 2016, he underwent disciplinary proceedings for sexual harassment against his colleague Sheena Shirani, which led to his suspension from the service.
80.
HAMLBAR Rahim
Gender: male
Judge of Branch 1 of Tabriz Revolutionary Court. Responsible for heavy sentences against Azeri ethnic minority and workers' rights activists, accusing them of spying, acts against national security, propaganda against the Iranian regime and insulting the leader of Iran. A high profile case involved 20 volunteer earthquake relief workers (following an earthquake in Iran in August 2012) to whom he gave prison sentences for their attempts to assist earthquake victims. The court found the workers guilty of "collaboration in assembly and collusion to commit crimes against national security."
81.
MUSAVI-TABAR Seyyed Reza
POB: Jahrom (Iran)
DOB: 1964
Gender: male
Former head of the Revolutionary Prosecution of Shiraz. Responsible for illegal arrests and ill treatment of political activists, journalists, human rights defenders, Baha’is and prisoners of conscience, who were harassed, tortured, interrogated and denied access to lawyers and due process. Musavi-Tabar signed judicial orders in the notorious No 100 Detention Centre (a male prison), including an order to detain female Baha’i prisoner Raha Sabet for three years in solitary confinement.
82.
KHORAMABADI Abdolsamad
Gender: male
Deputy Director for Judicial Oversight (since 13 October 2018). Former head of the ‘Commission to Determine the Instances of Criminal Content’, a governmental organisation in charge of online censorship and cyber crime. Under his leadership, the Commission defined ‘cyber crime’ by a number of vague categories that criminalise creation and publication of content deemed inappropriate by the regime. He was responsible for repression and the blocking of numerous opposition sites, electronic newspapers, blogs, sites of human rights NGOs and of Google and Gmail since September 2012. He and the Commission actively contributed to the death in detention of the blogger Sattar Beheshti in November 2012. Thus the Commission he was heading is directly responsible for systemic violations of human rights, in particular by banning and filtering websites to the general public, and occasionally disabling internet access altogether.
83.
SOLEIMANI Gholamreza
POB: Farsan (Iran)
DOB: 1343
(Iranian Hijri calendar), 1964 or 1965
(Gregorian
calendar)
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Position: Head of the Basij
Organisation of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Gholamreza Soleimani is the Head of the Basij Organisation. The Basij Organisation used lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests in Iran, causing the deaths of and injuries to unarmed protesters and other civilians in many cities across the country. As Head of the Basij Organisation, Gholamreza Soleimani bears responsibility for the violent suppression of the protests and serious human rights violations in Iran.
84.
SALAMI Hossein (a.k.a. SALAMI Hussain)
POB: Vaneshan, Golpayegan (Iran)
DOB: 1339
(Iranian Hijri calendar) 1960 or 1961 (Gregorian calendar)
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Position:
Commander in Chief of the
Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Rank: Major General
Hossein Salami has been the Commander in Chief of the IRGC since April 2019, which includes the Basij militia, and is a member of the National Security Council. The IRGC’s regular forces and the Basij militia used lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests in Iran, causing the deaths of and injuries to unarmed protesters and other civilians in many cities across the country. As a member of the National Security Council, Hossein Salami took part in the sessions that resulted in the orders to use lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests. Hossein Salami therefore bears responsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran.
85.
KARAMI Hassan
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Position:
Commander of the Special Units of the Iranian police force
Hassan Karami is the Commander of the Special Units of the Iranian police force. The Special Units used lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests in Iran, causing the deaths of and injuries to unarmed protesters and other civilians in many cities across the country. As the Commander of the Special Units, which have caused the deaths of and injuries to unarmed protesters and other civilians, Hassan Karami bears responsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran.
86.
PAKPOUR
Mohammad (a.k.a. PAKPUR
Mohammad)
POB: Arak (Iran)
DOB: 1340
(Iranian Hijri calendar), 1961 (Gregorian
calendar)
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Position:
Commander in Chief of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces
Rank: Brigadier General
Mohammad Pakpour has been Commander in Chief of the IRGC Ground Forces since March 2010. The IRGC’s Ground Forces used lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests in Iran, causing the deaths of and injuries to unarmed protesters and other civilians in many cities across the country. As Commander in Chief of the IRGC’s Ground Forces, which have used lethal force against unarmed protesters and other civilians, Mohammad Pakpour bears responsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran.
87.
ASHTARI Hossein
POB: Isfahan (a.k.a. Esfahan, Ispahan)
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Position: Commander in Chief of the Iranian police force
Hossein Ashtari was Commander in Chief of the Iranian police force from March 2015 to January 2023 and is a member of the National Security Council. The police force includes the Emdad Units and the Special Units. Iran’s ordinary police force, the Emdad Units and the Special Units used lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests in Iran, causing the deaths of and injuries to unarmed protesters and other civilians in many cities across the country. As a member of the National Security Council, Ashtari took part in the sessions that resulted in the orders to use lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests. Ashtari therefore bears responsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran.
88.
ZIAEI Gholamreza
Gender: male
Position: Former Director of Evin Prison; former Director of other detention centres
Between July 2019 and June 2020, Gholamreza Ziaei was the Director of Evin Prison, where already harsh conditions for detainees further deteriorated during his tenure. Female prisoners were denied phone contact with their children. Political prisoners were denied weekly visits by relatives, which were only allowed every two months. During the 2009 protests, Ziaei was in charge of the Kahrizak Detention Center, where at least five detainees, who had been arrested in connection with Tehran’s 2009 mass street protests, died after being tortured. From 2017 to 2019, before taking charge of Evin Prison in Tehran, Ziaei was the director of Rajaee Shahr Prison in Karaj, west of Tehran, where there have been numerous protests by political prisoners against abuse and inhumane living conditions.
89.
SHAHVARPOUR Hassan
POB: Safi Abad, south of Dezful, Khuzestan (Iran)
Gender: male
Passport number: 2001624001 (national ID number)
Position: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander of Khuzestan Province Vali Asr Corps
Rank: Brigadier General
As the Commander of the IRGC in Khuzestan since 2009, Hassan Shahvarpour is responsible for commanding the forces which used machine guns against protesters and other civilians in the city of Mahshahr during the November 2019 protests. Under his command, 148 people were killed by the IRGC by heavy machine gun fire from armoured vehicles encircling fleeing protesters hiding in nearby marshes.
90.
VASEGHI Leyla (a.k.a. VASEQI Layla, VASEGHI Leila, VASEGHI Layla)
POB: Sari,
Mazandaran Province (Iran)
DOB: 1352
(Iranian Hijri calendar), 1972 or 1973 (Gregorian calendar)
Gender: female
Position: Former governor of Shahr-e Qods and Head of the City Security Council
As the governor of Shahr-e Qods and Head of the City Security Council from September 2019 until November 2021, Leyla Vaseghi ordered the police and other armed forces to use lethal means during the November 2019 protests, causing the deaths of and injuries to unarmed protesters and other civilians. As the governor of Shahr-e Qods and Head of the City Security Council, Vaseghi bears responsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran. In the context of the 2022/2023 protests, she is still remembered by Iranians as having one of the leading roles in violent repression, with a parallel made between her public words and the current repression.
91.
ROSTAMI CHESHMEH GACHI Mohammed (a.k.a. ROSTAMI
Mohammad)
POB: Kermanshah (Iran)
DOB: 1976 or 1977
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
National ID No.: 111936 (Iran)
Identification No.: 13821 (Iran)
Position: Head of Iran’s Morality Police
Mohammad Rostami Cheshmeh Gachi is the head of Iran’s Morality Police. He was head of the Kermanshah Public Security Police from early 2014 until early 2019 and held senior positions in the Iranian intelligence police.
The Morality Police is part of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) and is a special police unit which enforces the strict dress rules for women, including compulsory wearing of a headscarf. The Morality Police has used unlawful force against women for not complying with Iranian hijab laws, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary arrests and detentions, excessive violence and torture.
On 13 September 2022, the Morality Police arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police’s headquarters for an ‘educational and orientation class’. According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and to her death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police’s abusive behaviour is not confined to that incident and has been widely documented.
As head of Iran’s Morality Police, Rostami is responsible for the Morality Police’s actions. He therefore bears responsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran.
92.
RAHIMI Hossein
POB: Dodhak village, Mahalat, Central province (Iran)
DOB: 1964
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Position: Head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Tehran
Brigadier General Hossein Rahimi has been the head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Tehran since 7 August 2017.
The LEF’s response to the September 2022 protests in Tehran was particularly harsh. The LEF’s excessive use of violence to repress those protests resulted in the deaths of multiple people.
As head of the LEF in Tehran, Rahimi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
93.
ABDI Abbas
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Colonel
Position: Head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Divandarreh
Colonel Abbas Abdi is the head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the district of Divandarreh.
The LEF’s response to the September 2022 protests in Divandarreh was particularly harsh. The LEF’s excessive use of violence to repress those protests resulted in the deaths of multiple people.
As head of the LEF in Divandarreh, Abdi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
94.
MIRZAEI Haj Ahmad (a.k.a. MIRZAEI Hajahmad; MIRZAYI Hajj Ahmad)
POB: Tehran (Iran)
DOB: 9 February 1957
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Identification No.: 4268935215 (Iran)
Rank: Colonel
Position: Head of Iran’s Morality Police in
Tehran
Colonel Haj Ahmed Mirzaei has been the head of the Tehran branch of Iran’s Morality Police since 2018.
The Morality Police is part of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) and is a special police unit which enforces the strict dress rules for women, including compulsory wearing of a headscarf. The Morality Police has used unlawful force against women for not complying with Iranian hijab laws, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary arrests and detentions, excessive violence and torture.
On 13 September 2022, the Morality Police arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police’s headquarters for an ‘educational and orientation class’. According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and to her death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police’s abusive behaviour is not confined to that incident and has been widely documented.
As head of the Morality Police in Tehran, Mirzaei is responsible for the Morality Police’s actions in Tehran, including in its headquarters where Amini was beaten and mistreated. He therefore bears responsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran.
95.
ZAREPOUR Issa
POB: Eslamabad-e Gharb, Kermanshah Province (Iran)
DOB: 1980
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Position:
Minister of
Information and Communications Technology
Issa Zarepour has been the Iranian Minister of Information and Communications Technology since 25 August 2021.
In his position, he played a key role in the Iranian government’s decision to systematically violate the Iranian people’s freedom of opinion and expression by imposing restrictions on internet access during the protests that followed the death of 22-year old Mahsa Amini on 16 September 2022.
That action further diminished the already very limited space for civil society actors in Iran, including human rights defenders, to gather objective information and communicate, both amongst themselves and with the outside world.
The internet blackout had negative consequences for the enjoyment of human rights in Iran, both directly (namely the impact on freedom of opinion and expression and availability of objective information) and indirectly (namely the increased chance of human rights violations not being documented thereby negatively impacting accountability for human rights violations).
As Minister of Information and Communications Technology, Zarepour is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
96.
SEPEHR Mohammad-Hossein
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Position: Commander of the Iranian Central Training Base of the General Staff of the Armed Forces
Mohammad-Hossein Sepehr is the Commander of the Central Training Base of the General Staff of the Armed Forces in Tehran. He is a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij Resistance Force (a volunteer paramilitary organisation operating under the IRGC with branches throughout Iran).
Sepehr oversees anti-protest training for Iranian security forces and supports a repressive line towards protesters.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
97.
SAFARI Sayd Ali
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Colonel
Position: Head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Saqqez
Colonel Sayd Ali Safari is the head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Saqqez.
The LEF’s response to the September 2022 protests in Saqqez was particularly harsh. The LEF’s excessive use of violence to repress the protests resulted in the deaths of multiple people.
As head of the LEF in Saqqez, Safari is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
98.
ADYANI Seyed
Alireza (a.k.a. ADIANI Hojjat al-Islam Seyyed Alireza)
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Position: Head of the ideological-political office of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF)
Seyed Alireza Adyani is the head of the ideological-political office of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF).
Adyani is responsible for defining and implementing rules of engagement for police forces. He stated that the LEF needs to be ‘practical’ and ‘effective’ when dealing with adversaries and cheered the Morality Police for doing its job ‘intensely’.
The LEF has used massive brutality against protesters, including those protesting after Mahsa Amini’s death.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
99.
AZADI Ali
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Second Brigadier
General
Function: Head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Kurdistan
Second Brigadier General Ali Azadi has been the head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Kurdistan since 2019.
During the repression of the September 2022 protests, forces under his command in Kurdistan shot protesters and killed and injured multiple people.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
100.
SHALIKAR
Mohammed Zaman
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Colonel
Function: Head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Babol, Mazandaran
Colonel Mohammed Zaman Shalikar has been the head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Babol, Mazandaran since 2021.
During demonstrations following the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022, forces under his command shot, injured and killed protesters in Babol, Mazandaran.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
101.
HEIDARI Salman
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Colonel
Function: Head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Bukan
Colonel Salman Heidari is the head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Bukan.
The LEF’s response to the September 2022 protests in Bukan was particularly harsh. The LEF’s excessive use of violence to repress the protests resulted in the death of at least one child and in injuries to multiple people.
As head of the LEF in Bukan, Heidari is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
102.
VAHIDI Ahmad
POB: Shiraz (Iran)
DOB: 27 July 1958
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Position:
Minister of
Interior
Ahmad Vahidi has been the Iranian Minister of Interior since 25 August 2021. As such, he is responsible for Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF).
Since he took office, an unprecedented number of military and security officials have been appointed to provincial governorships who play key roles in coordinating crowd-control activities by police special forces, the Basij militia and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Blatant and severe human rights violations by the LEF, such as the indiscriminate shooting with live ammunition at peaceful protesters, including children, have been widely documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini started in mid-September 2022. Over 70 protesters died and hundreds were seriously injured, including children. Since the beginning of the demonstrations, police forces have also arbitrarily detained numerous human rights defenders and journalists. Vahidi has also publicly advocated for a harsh approach towards persons participating in the demonstrations.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
103.
ABNOUSH Salar
DOB: 2.5.1962
POB: Hamedan, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function:
Deputy
Commander of the Basij
Resistance Force
Salar Abnoush is the Deputy Commander of the Basij Resistance Force (EU-listed).
The Basij is a volunteer paramilitary organisation operating under the IRGC with branches throughout Iran. It is charged with channelling popular support for the Iranian regime.
The Basij is notorious for its recruitment of volunteers, many of them teenage children, and for human wave attacks during the Iran-Iraq war. After the contested 2009 Iranian presidential elections, the Basij brutally quashed protests and attacked student dormitories. The Basij has two missions: to provide defensive military training to protect the regime against foreign invasion, and to suppress domestic anti-regime activity through street violence and intimidation.
The Basij is one of the forces ordered by the government to quell the September/October 2022 protests. It injured and killed several protesters. Sources indicate that Basij members under Salar Abnoush’s command have committed serious human rights violations in Iran. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
104.
REZAEI Qasem (a.k.a. REZAEI Ghasem)
DOB: 27.9.1961
POB: Abhar, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
National ID No: D10005996 (Iran)
Function:
Deputy
Commander of the Law
Enforcement Forces of the
Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF)
Qasem Rezaei is the Deputy Commander of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF).
He directly supervised acts of violence against detainees, including torture and beatings. He justified the actions of the security forces in the wake of the deadly use of force against Iranian protesters and called for continued violence against protesters in May 2022.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
105.
AMANOLLAHI Manouchehr (a.k.a. AMANOLLAHI BAHARVAND Manouchehr)
DOB: March 1965 or 1966
POB:
Khorramabad, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function:
Commander of the Law
Enforcement Forces of the
Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) in the province of Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari
Manouchehr Amanollahi is the Commander of the EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) in the province of Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari.
During his tenure, the LEF suppressed protests in 2021 in the province in response to a lack of water, and in 2022 in response to food rationing. LEF units under Amanollahi’s command used live ammunition against protestors when suppressing the protests, resulting in multiple deaths. As an advisor to LEF leadership, Amanollahi was also involved in the LEF’s response to nationwide protests in November 2019, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of protestors.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
106.
HEIDARI Kiyumars (a.k.a. HEYDARI Kioumars, HEYDARI Amir Kyomarth)
DOB: 1964
POB:
Kermanshah, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier-General
Function:
Commander of the Iranian Army Ground Forces
Brigadier-General Kiyumars Heidari is the Commander of the Iranian Army’s Ground Forces and directly reports to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
He has publicly admitted to his and his force’s involvement in the violent response to the November 2019 protests, which led to the death of hundreds of protesters. Blatant and severe human rights violations by the forces, such as indiscriminate shooting with live ammunition at peaceful protesters - including children - have been widely documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini started mid-September 2022. Over 70 protesters died and hundreds were seriously injured. Army Ground Forces, which are under the control of Heidari, have been involved in suppressing the protests and have killed at least one person. Heidari himself stated that his forces have been used to deal with the 2022 protests.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
107.
MAJID Vahid
Mohammad Naser
DOB: 15.8.1964
POB: Isfahan, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
National ID No: 3874409929 (Iran)
Function: Head of the Iranian Cyber Police
Vahid Mohammad Naser Majid is head of the Iranian Cyber Police (EU-listed).
The Iranian Cyber Police influences and restricts internet access in Iran and arbitrarily arrests people for expressing online criticism of the Iranian regime. The Cyber Police is engaged in a nationwide series of arrests and prosecutions. It lends support to the Iranian regime in its violent response to nationwide protests against people who speak up in defence of their legitimate rights.
In his function as Head of the Iranian Cyber Police, Vahid Mohammad Naser Majid is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
108.
NEJAT Hossein (a.k.a. ZIBAYINEJAD
Mohammad-Hossein)
DOB: 1955
POB: Shiraz, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier-General
Function:
Deputy
Commander of Sarallah (a.k.a. Tharullah,
Thar-Allah, Tharallah, Tharallollah)
Brigadier-General Hossein Nejat has been the Deputy Commander of Sarallah, an IRGC-linked, Tehran-based dedicated security apparatus of the Iranian state since 21 June 2020.
Sarallah is essential to Tehran’s security, as the headquarters is responsible for protecting the capital and governmental institutions against any threats such as coups or anti-government protests.
Sarallah troops under the direct command of Nejat are tasked with quelling anti-government protests, including the violent suppressing of peaceful protests in 2022.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
109.
MAROUFI Hossein
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: General
Function:
Deputy Head of Mobilisation of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in the Sistan and
Baluchestan province
General Sardar Hossein Maroufi is the Deputy Head of Mobilisation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in the Sistan and Baluchestan province. As such, he is a leading IRGC member in this province.
The Sistan and Baluchestan province has seen some of the most violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including IRGC forces, during the 2022 protest wave. On 30 September 2022, the province capital Zahedan witnessed "bloody Friday", when security forces opened fire on a protest forming around Friday prayer. It is estimated that at least 70 protestors were shot and killed. Since then, violence against participants in later protests has continued.
Sardar Hossein Maroufi is among those responsible for the IRGC’s violence against protestors in Sistan and Baluchestan province, in particular around "bloody Friday".
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
110.
ABSALAN Parviz
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: General
Function:
Deputy Head of the IRGC in
Sistan and
Baluchestan province
General Parviz Absalan is the Deputy Head of the IRGC in Sistan and Baluchestan province. The IRGC is a central element of the Iranian security forces in that province, where it is also called the "Salman army".
The security forces in Sistan and Baluchestan province have been using brutal violence against peaceful protestors in the round of protests in the autumn of 2022, including against children.
As Deputy Head of the IRGC in Sistan and Baluchestan province, Parviz Absalan is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
111.
SHAFAHI Ahmad (a.k.a. SHAFAI
Ahmad)
DOB: 21.5.1968
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Function:
commander and public relations officer of the IRGC in Sistan and Baluchestan province
Brigadier General Ahmad Shafahi is a commander of the IRGC in Sistan and Baluchestan province, and is responsible for public relations. The IRGC is a central element of the Iranian security forces in that province, where it is also called the "Salman army".
The security forces in Sistan and Baluchestan province have been using brutal violence against peaceful protestors in the round of protests in the autumn of 2022, including against children.
As commander of the IRGC in the Sistan and Baluchestan Province, Sardar Ahmed Shafahi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
112.
KOCHZAEI Ebrahim (a.k.a. KOCHZAI Ebrahim, KOUCHAKZAEI Ebrahim)
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Colonel
Function: head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the city of Chabahar in
Sistan and Baluchestan province
Colonel Ebrahim Kochzaei is the head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the city of Chabahar in Sistan and Baluchestan province.
The security forces in Sistan and Baluchestan province, including in Chabahar, have been using brutal violence against peaceful protestors in the round of protests in the autumn of 2022, including against children.
Kochzaei is also named as the perpetrator of the rape of a 15-year old girl in September 2022, who was held in police custody in Chabahar.
Ebrahim Kochzaei is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
113.
TAHERI Ahmad
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier-General
Function: head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Sistan and
Baluchestan province
Brigadier-General Ahmed Taheri is the head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the Sistan and Baluchestan province of Iran.
The security forces in Sistan and Baluchestan province have been using brutal violence against peaceful protestors in the round of protests in the autumn of 2022, including against children.
As the head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Sistan and Baluchestan province, Ahmed Taheri is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
114.
HOSSEINI Seyed Sadegh
DOB: 1963 or 1964
POB: Dehloran, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: General
Function: head of the IRGC in Kurdistan
province
General Seyed Sadegh Hosseini is the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Kurdistan province.
Kurdistan province has seen severe violence by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, against the 2022 protest wave. Moreover, the IRGC uses Kurdistan province as a base to conduct military operations against Iraqi Kurdistan, which led to the death of more than a dozen non-combatants.
Seyed Sadegh Hosseini is among those responsible for the IRGC violence against protestors in Kurdistan province. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
115.
RAJABPOUR Sereng Hossein
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Colonel
Function:
commander of the Beit al-Maqdis force (IRGC in Kurdistan) in the city of Sanandaj
Colonel Sereng Hossein Rajabpour is the commander of the Beit al-Maqdis force (IRGC in Kurdistan) in the city of Sanandaj in the province of Kurdistan.
Kurdistan province has seen severe violence by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, against the 2022 protest wave, especially in the city of Sanandaj.
Sereng Hossein Rajabpour is among those responsible for the violence against protestors in Kurdistan province. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
116.
ASL Gholamhossein Mohammadi
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: head of the IRGC in Ardabil province
Gholamhossein Mohammadi Asl is the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Ardabil province - a province with an Azeri ethnic minority.
Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, committed serious human rights violations in Ardabil province during the 2022 protests. Reports show that an Iranian schoolgirl named Asra Panahi was beaten to death by security forces for refusing to sing the pro-regime anthem.
Gholamhossein Mohammadi Asl is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
117.
ABDI Shakar
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Colonel
Function: deputy head of the IRGC in Ardabil province
Colonel Shakar Abdi is the deputy head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Ardabil province - a province with an Azeri ethnic minority.
Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, committed serious human rights violations in Ardabil province during the 2022 protests. Reports show that an Iranian schoolgirl named Asra Panahi was beaten to death by security forces for refusing to sing the pro-regime anthem.
Shakar Abdi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
118.
HASSANZADEH Hasan
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Function: head of the IRGC in Tehran province
Brigadier General Hasan Hassanzadeh is the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Tehran province.
Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, committed serious human rights violations in Tehran province during the 2022 protests.
Hasan Hassanzadeh is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
119.
AGHAEI Morteza Mir (a.k.a. MIRAGHAEI
Morteza)
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Colonel
Function: head of the Basij in the city of Sanandaj
Colonel Morteza Mir Aghaei is the head of the Basij in the city of Sanandaj in the province of Kurdistan.
Iranian security forces, including the IRGC and its Basij, committed serious human rights violations in Sanandaj during the 2022 protests.
Morteza Mir Aghaei is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
120.
MOHAMMADIAN Abbas-Ali
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Alborz (Karaj) province
Abbas-Ali Mohammadian has been the head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Alborz (Karaj) province since 2017.
Alborz (Karaj) is a province where major demonstrations have been taking place since September 2022 that have been met with excessive police violence. Security forces have frequently shot directly at peaceful protestors, leading to many deaths, including of children.
As head of the LEF in Alborz (Karaj) province, Abbas-Ali Mohammadian is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
121.
JAHANBAKHSH Rahim
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier-General
Function: head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in West Azerbaijan province
Brigadier-General Rahim Jahanbakhsh is the head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in West Azerbaijan province.
West Azerbaijan is a province where major demonstrations have been taking place since September 2022 that have been met with excessive police violence.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
122.
SHEIKHNEJAD Hassan
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Colonel
Function: head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Urumeh (a.k.a. Ouroumieh), the capital of West Azerbaijan
province.
Colonel Hassan Sheikhnejad is the head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Urumeh, the capital of West Azerbaijan province.
In Urumeh, Iranian security forces committed serious human rights violations during the 2022 protests.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
123.
SAADATI Mahmoud
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Colonel
Function: head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the city of Zahedan in
Sistan and
Baluchestan province
Colonel Mahmoud Saadati is the head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the city of Zahedan in Sistan and Baluchestan province.
In Zahedan, Iranian security forces committed serious human rights violations during the 2022 protests.
Mahmoud Saadati is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
124.
MIRZAI Morteza
POB: Khorram Abad, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier-General
Function: head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Mazandaran province.
Brigadier-General Morteza Mirzai is the head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Mazandaran province.
In Mazandaran province, Iranian security forces committed serious human rights violations during the 2022 protests.
Morteza Mirzai is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
125.
MALIKI Azizullah
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: General
Function: head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Gilan province
General Azizullah Maliki is the head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Gilan province.
In 2022, Azizullah Maliki directed the violent crackdown against the protests in Gilan province. He was vocal in the media, vehemently defending the violent reaction of the security forces to the protests in September and October 2022.
As head of the LEF in Gilan province, Azizullah Maliki is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
126.
MORADI Ali-Reza
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the city of Sanandaj
Ali-Reza Moradi has been the head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the city of Sanandaj in Kurdistan province since December 2018.
In that position, Ali-Reza Moradi reports to the general staff of the armed forces in Iran, directly under the authority of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Moradi has been responsible for the mass arrest of protesters and ordered the use of lethal weapons against unarmed protesters during the November 2019 nationwide protests in Sanandaj, which resulted in the death of at least two protesters.
Blatant and severe human rights violations by the police forces in Sanandaj, such as the indiscriminate shooting with live ammunition at peaceful protesters -including children, have been documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini started mid-September 2022.
Moradi has also publicly advocated a harsh approach towards persons participating in the demonstrations. Since the beginning of the 2022 demonstrations, police forces have arbitrarily detained numerous human rights defenders and journalists.
Ali-Reza Moradi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
127.
RAFIEI Enayatollah
DOB: 1970
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Captain
Function:
commander of the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini
Captain Enayatollah Rafiei is a member of the Morality Police (EU-listed), an Islamic religious police that is part of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). He is the commander of the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini.
On 13 September 2022, Rafiei and three other members of his squad arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police’s headquarters for an "educational and orientation class". According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police’s abusive behaviour is not confined to this incident and has been widely documented.
As commander of the squad, Captain Enayatollah Rafiei is responsible for Amini’s death and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
128.
KHOSHNAMVAND Ali
DOB: 1995
POB:
Khoshnamvand, (Khushnamvand) in the Kouhdasht district of Lorestan
province in western Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Sergeant
Function:
Member of the squad that
arrested Mahsa Amini
Sergeant Ali Khoshnamvand is a member of the Morality Police (EU-listed), an Islamic religious police that is part of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). He is one of the officers in the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini.
On 13 September 2022, Khoshnamvand and three other members of a squad arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police’s headquarters for an "educational and orientation class". According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police’s abusive behaviour is not confined to this incident and has been widely documented.
As one of the officers who arrested Amini, Sergeant Ali Khoshnamvand is responsible for Amini’s death and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
129.
GHORBAN-HOSSEINI Fatemeh
DOB: 1995
POB: Teheran, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: female
Function:
Member of the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini
Fatemeh Ghorban-Hosseini is a member of the Morality Police (EU-listed), an Islamic religious police that is part of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). She is one of the officers in the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini.
On 13 September 2022, Ghorban-Hosseini and three other members of a squad arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police’s headquarters for an "educational and orientation class". According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police’s abusive behaviour is not confined to this incident and has been widely documented.
As one of the officers who arrested Amini, Fatemeh Ghorban-Hosseini is responsible for Amini’s death and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
130.
SAFARI Parastou
DOB: 1986
POB:
Kermanshah, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: female
Function:
Member of the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini
Parastou Safari is a member of the Morality Police (EU-listed), an Islamic religious police that is part of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). She is one of the officers in the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini.
On 13 September 2022, Safari and three other members of a squad arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police’s headquarters for an "educational and orientation class". According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police’s abusive behaviour is not confined to this incident and has been widely documented.
As one of the officers who arrested Amini, Parastou Safari is responsible for Amini’s death and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
131.
JEBELLI Peyman
DOB: 25.1.1967
POB: Tehran, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function:
Director of
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB)
Peyman Jebelli is the Director of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), which is notorious for being a regime mouthpiece.
IRIB severely restricts and denies the free flow of information to the Iranian people. Furthermore, IRIB is actively involved in organising and broadcasting forced "confessions" of regime critics, obtained through intimidation and severe violence. These "confessions" are often aired following public protests, or prior to an execution as a means of reducing public backlash. As Director of IRIB, Jebelli is responsible for IRIB’s actions and news content.
Whereas several high-profile state broadcasting personnel have resigned recently and disavowed the Iranian regime’s violent response to the 2022 protests, Jebelli continues to act in his position. His appointment as director of Iran’s main official news source was authorised by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and indicates ideological proximity to the regime.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
132.
REZVANI Ali (a.k.a REZWANI Ali)
DOB: 1984
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) reporter and news anchor/presenter on political and security affairs
Ali Rezvani is a reporter for Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and news anchor/presenter on IRIB’s nightly 20.30 news programme.
IRIB is a state-controlled Iranian media organisation and tasked with spreading government information. IRIB’s nightly 20.30 news broadcast, which airs on Channel 2, is the country’s leading news programme and considered to be IRIB’s primary platform for implementing the agendas of security forces, including the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Documented cases show that the 20.30 news airs forced confessions.
In his capacity as IRIB reporter, Ali Rezvani participates in interrogations leading to forced confessions, thereby directly engaging in and facilitating serious human rights violations. In his capacity as news anchor of the 20.30 news, Rezvani promotes the Iranian security forces’ agenda, which condones serious human rights violations such as torture and arbitrary arrests and detention. Rezvani also peddles propaganda against critics in order to intimidate them and to justify and encourage their ill-treatment, thereby violating their right to free expression.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
133.
ZABIHPOUR
Ameneh Sadat
DOB: 7.8.1984
POB: Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: female
Function: Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) reporter and head of the foreign Persian-language media group at IRIB
Passport no: 09324611
Ameneh Sadat Zabihpour is the head of the foreign Persian-language media group at IRIB, which is notorious for being a regime mouthpiece.
IRIB severely restricts and denies the free flow of information to the Iranian people. Furthermore, IRIB is actively involved in organising and broadcasting forced "confessions" of regime critics, obtained through intimidation and severe violence. These "confessions" are often aired following public protests, or prior to an execution as a means of reducing public backlash.
Whereas several high-profile state broadcasting personnel have resigned recently and disavowed the Iranian regime’s violent response to the 2022 protests, Zabihpour continues to act in her position. She has interrogated critics of the regime and produced forced confession videos.
She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
134.
KHATAMI Seyyed Ahmad
DOB: 8.5.1960
POB: Semnan, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function:
Friday-prayer imam, member of the Assembly of Experts for the Leadership
Seyyed Ahmad Khatami is a hard-line cleric and an influential Friday-prayer imam in Tehran. Khatami is also a member of the Assembly of Experts for the Leadership, an Iranian entity that is itself implicated in human rights violations for its neglect in upholding constitutional provisions.
As a cleric close to the state authorities and with a large audience, he leverages his position to verbally attack and incite violence against protesters. He not only defends the repressive actions of the security forces of Iran but has also on several occasions urged for even harsher treatment of protesters, including the death sentence.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
135.
MIRAHMADI
Seyyed Majid
POB: Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Function:
Deputy Minister of Interior of Iran
Brigadier General Seyyed Majid Mirahmadi is Iran’s Deputy Minister of Interior, responsible for overseeing Iran’s security and police forces, actors that are involved in serious human rights violations in Iran.
Iran’s security and police forces are violently clamping down on protests, shooting directly at peaceful protesters and arbitrarily arresting people with total disregard for their human rights.
In his statements, Mirahmadi refers to the protests as riots that have to end, and criminalises and threatens those participating in peaceful protests. He is also personally whitewashing the serious human rights violations committed by forces under his authority, - for example, by claiming that 16-year-old protester Nika Shakrami committed suicide. Reports indicate that it is very likely that she died at the hands of security forces.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
136.
MOUSAVI Sayyed Abdolrahim
DOB: 1959/1960
POB: Qom, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Major General
Function: Commander-in-chief of the Iranian Army
Major General Sayyed Abdolrahim Mousavi is the Commander-in-Chief of Iran’s Army. In this capacity, he bears responsibility for the Iranian Army’s involvement in the regime’s violent response to the 2022 protests.
On several occasions, Mousavi described the protests in Iran as riots organised and planned by the enemies of Iran, thereby framing the protests as a national security threat. He used threatening language directed at participants in the protest movement. He also praised the Iranian security forces’ violent response to protesters, describing it as an effective way to neutralise Iran’s enemies.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
137.
BORMAHANI Mohsen (a.ka. BARMAHANI Mohsen)
DOB: 24.5.1979
POB: Neishabur, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Passport no: A54062245 (Iran), expires 12.7.2026
National ID no: 1063893488 (Iran)
Function: Deputy Director of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB)
Mohsen Bormahani is the Deputy Director of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), which acts as a regime mouthpiece.
In his position, Bormahani holds responsibility for IRIB content. IRIB severely restricts and denies the free flow of information to the Iranian people. Furthermore, IRIB is actively involved in organising and broadcasting forced "confessions" of regime critics, obtained through intimidation and severe violence. These "confessions" are often aired following public protests, or prior to an execution as a means of reducing public backlash.
Whereas several high-profile state broadcasting personnel have resigned recently and disavowed the Iranian regime’s violent response to the 2022 protests in Iran, Bormahani continues to act in his position as Deputy Director and in recent statements has defended the regime.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
138.
JOKAR Morteza
(a.k.a. JOWKAR
Morteza)
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Colonel
Function: deputy head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Sistan and Baluchestan province
Colonel Morteza Jokar is the deputy head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Sistan and Baluchestan province.
In this function, he is responsible for directing the violent crackdown on civilian protesters in Sistan and Baluchestan province following the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022. Forces under his command are responsible for firing live ammunition at protesters during the 30 September 2022 massacre in Zahedan and the 4 November 2022 massacre in Khash, in which dozens of people were killed and wounded. Other violent crackdowns on protests in other provincial cities (Saravan, Chabahar, Iranshahr, Rask, Sarbaz and others) also took place under his control during the autumn of 2022.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
139.
SOURI Majid
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Colonel
Function: Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Lorestan province
Colonel Majid Souri is the Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Lorestan province.
He is responsible for the security forces’ violent repression of protests in 2022, especially in the city of Khorramabad, where people gathered to mourn the death of Nika Shakrami, an Iranian teenager who disappeared soon after Mahsa Amini’s death.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
140.
KARIMI Mohsen
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Function: Commander of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Markazi province
Brigadier General Mohsen Karimi is the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Markazi province.
He is responsible for the security forces’ violent repression of protests in 2022, which also led to the death of 19-year-old Mehrshad Shahidi in an IRGC detention centre in Arak.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
141.
HEYDARNIA
Alireza
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Function: Commander of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Alborz province
Brigadier General Alireza Heydarnia is the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Alborz province.
The IRGC is responsible for the violent repression of protesters, in particular in the city of Karaj, Alborz, in 2022. In that city, security forces cracked down on protesters on the occasion of rallies to honour the victims of the protests on the 40th day after their death. On 17 October 2022, security forces in Karaj abducted from hospital and repeatedly raped Armita Abbasi, a 20-year-old girl.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
142.
GARSHASBI
Amanollah
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Function: Deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Sistan and Baluchestan province
Brigadier General Amanollah Garshasbi is the deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Sistan and Baluchestan province. The Salaman provincial corps is under his command.
Sistan and Baluchestan province have seen some of the most violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, during the 2022 protests. On 30 September 2022, the province capital Zahedan witnessed "bloody Friday", when security forces opened fire on a protest forming in Zahedan around Friday prayer. It is estimated that at least 70 protestors were shot and killed. Since then, violence against participants in protests has continued.
Garshasbi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
143.
REYHANI Bahman
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Function: Deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the West of Iran,
responsible for Kermanshah province.
Brigadier General Bahman Reyhani is the deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the West of Iran, responsible for Kermanshah province. The Hazrat Nabi Akram provincial corps is under his command.
Kermanshah province has seen violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, during the 2022 protests. Reyhani is among those responsible for the IRGC violence against protestors in Kermanshah province.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
144.
SHAHSAVARI Habib
DOB: 1963/1964
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Function: Commander of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Shohada provincial corps in West Azerbaijan province
Brigadier General Habib Shahsavari is the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Shohada ground troops corps for the province of West Azerbaijan.
IRGC troops under his command conducted operations against protesters in the Kurdish regions of Iran. In particular, from 15 November 2022, such operations were conducted against protesters in the West Azerbaijan towns of Piranshahr, Mahabad and Bukan. IRGC troops have used disproportionate force in these operations. According to NGO estimates, IRGC operations in the towns of Mahabad and Bukan killed four and 12 people respectively.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
145.
ABDOLLAHPOUR Mohammad
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Function: Commander of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds provincial corps in Gilan province
Brigadier General Mohammad Abdollahpour is the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds provincial corps in Gilan province.
Gilan province has seen violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including by IRGC forces under Abdollahpour’s command, during the 2022 protests.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
146.
MOSLEMI Siavash
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Function: Commander of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Karbala provincial corps in
Mazandaran province
Brigadier General Siavash Moslemi has been the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Karbala provincial corps in Mazandaran province since June 2020.
In 2022, IRGC troops under his command conducted operations against protesters and in those operations used disproportionate force. As commander of the troops engaged, Moslemi is among those responsible for violence against protesters.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
147.
ZULQADR Ahmad
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Function: Commander of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Seyyed al-Shohada provincial corps in Tehran province
Brigadier General Ahmad Zulqadr has been the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Seyyed al-Shohada provincial corps in Tehran province since November 2020. He is also the deputy commander of the IRGC corps in Tehran city.
According to media reports, Zulqadr was chosen for the post especially because of his expertise in suppressing protests. In 2022, repression against protesters in Tehran was particularly violent.
As commander of IRGC troops engaged in said violence against protesters, he is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
148.
KASHKOULI
Morteza
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Function: Commander of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Hazrat Abulfazl provincial corps in Lorestan province
Brigadier General Morteza Kashkouli is the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Hazrat Abulfazl provincial corps in Lorestan province.
In 2022, IRGC troops under his command conducted operations against protesters in the Kurdish regions of Iran. In particular, operations were conducted in the town of Khorramabad in Lorestan. IRGC troops used disproportionate force in these operations, using live ammunition against protesters.
As commander of those IRGC forces, Kashkouli is among those responsible for said violence. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
149.
BAYAT Isa
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Colonel
Function: Commander of the 364th Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) brigade (Shahid Nasirzadeh) in Mahabad, West Azerbaijan province
Colonel Isa Bayat has been the commander of the 364th Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) brigade (Shahid Nasirzadeh) in Mahabad, West Azerbaijan province, since June 2022.
In 2022, IRGC troops under his command conducted military operations against protesters in the Kurdish regions of Iran. In particular, from 15 November 2022, such operations were conducted against protesters in Mahabad, using disproportionate force and leading to the killing of four people.
As commander of an IRGC unit conducting said operations, Bayat is responsible for violence against protesters. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
150.
ASANLOO
Mohammad Taghi
POB: Zanjan province, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Function: Commander of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Hamzeh Seyed Al-Shohada regional headquarters in Northwest Iran
Brigadier General Mohammad Taghi Asanloo is the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Hamzeh Seyed Al-Shohada regional headquarters in Northwest Iran, responsible for the provinces of Kordestan and West Azerbaijan.
Hamzeh Seyed Al-Shohada headquarters has the specific mission of suppressing unrest in the Kurdish regions in Northwest Iran. In 2022, under Asanloo’s command, IRGC troops in this area conducted military operations against protesters in the Kurdish region of Iran. In particular, from 15 November 2022, IRGC troops under Asanloo’s command conducted such operations against protesters in the towns of Piranshahr, Mahabad and Bukan.
IRGC troops have used disproportionate force in these operations. According to NGO estimates, IRGC operations against protesters in the Kurdish regions have led to the killing of 42 people since 15 November 2022.
As commander of IRGC troops in the region, Asanloo is responsible for violence against protesters conducted by his troops. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
151.
SAJJADI Seyed Hamid Hazaveh
DOB: 21.3.1969
POB: Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function:
Iranian Minister of Sports and Youth
Hamid Sajjadi is Iran’s Minister of Sports and Youth.
He is responsible for pressuring Iran’s athletes into silence and for preventing them from speaking out internationally against repression in Iran. He was personally involved in the case of Elnaz Rekabi, an Iranian athlete climber who competed without hijab at the Asian Championship rock climbing competition in Seoul in the autumn of 2022. After her competition, Rekabi was tricked into entering the Iranian embassy building in Seoul, where her passport and mobile phone were confiscated on the orders of the authorities in Tehran. Upon her likely forced arrival in Tehran, she was interrogated by two of Iran’s political and sports institutions and met with Sajjadi. In this meeting, she was coerced into making a statement apologising for competing without a hijab and was threatened with the confiscation of family land. In December 2022, it became clear that Elnaz Rekabi’s family home in Zanjan had been demolished.
Hamid Sajjadi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
152.
GOLPAYEGANI Seyyed Mohammed Saleh Hashemi
DOB: 1967
POB: Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function:
Head of the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil (Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice)
Associated
entities: Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil (Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice),
Morality Police
Seyyed Mohammed Saleh Hashemi Golpayegani has been the head of the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil (also known as the Office or Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice) since 25 August 2021. The Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil is a government institution which is responsible for determining and enforcing excessively strict behavioural models in society.
In 2022, the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil was instrumental in setting new and stricter morality codes for women that are in clear violation of their human rights. Additionally, the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil plays a central role in setting up the monitoring and often brutal sanctioning of women and men who do not respect these codes. These strict codes are subsequently brutally enforced by the EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (and specifically its Morality Police).
As the head of the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil, Seyyed Mohammed Saleh Hashemi Golpayegani is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
153.
ASGARI Hassan
(a.k.a. ASKARI
Hassan)
POB: Bijar, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function:
governor of Sanandaj, Kurdistan province
Associated entities:
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Hassan Asgari is the governor of the city of Sanandaj in Iran’s Kurdistan province and a former Commander of the local Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) forces.
As governor of Sanandaj, he is responsible for the violent and brutal response in that city to the protests following the death of the young Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini in September 2022. When a 16-year-old protester was reportedly killed by security forces in Sanandaj, Asgari and other officials stated that she died of a drug overdose, potentially by suicide. Providing false alternative causes of death for protesters killed by security forces is a common tactic used by Iranian officials to evade accountability for their human rights abuses.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
154.
KHIABANI Hossein Modarres
DOB: March 1968/1969
POB: Tehran, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function:
former governor of Sistan and
Baluchestan province
Hossein Modarres Khiabani was the governor of Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan province from September 2021 to December 2022 and was responsible for overseeing Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the province.
During his time as governor, the LEF and other security forces cracked down on various protests and used excessive violence against protesters. There is wide evidence of the use of disproportionate force that led to the killing of at least 66 people in the city of Zahedan in Sistan and Baluchestan province on 30 September 2022.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
155.
KOUSHA Esmaeil Zarei
(a.k.a. KOSHA Ismail)
DOB: 1978
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function:
governor of Kurdistan province
Esmaeil Zarei Kousha is the governor of Iran’s Kurdistan province and responsible for overseeing Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the province.
As such, he is responsible for the brutal response and excessive use of violence by the LEF and security forces to the protests held in Kurdistan following the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in September 2022.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
156.
KOWSARI Mohammad Esmail
DOB: 3.5.1955
POB: Tehran, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Function:
member of the Iranian Parliament
Mohammad Esmail Kowsari has been a member of the Iranian Parliament ("MP") since 2020. He is a hard-line lawmaker and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) member. Before becoming an MP, Kowsari was the commander of the IRGC’s Sarallah headquarters in Tehran from 2017 to 2020.
During the 2022/2023 protests, he has repeatedly threatened security forces with consequences if they do not fulfil their duty and crack down on protests. He has also called for more military action against peaceful protests. As an MP, he has urged the Iranian judiciary to sentence protestors to death.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
157.
MIRSALIM Mostafa
(a.k.a. MIR-SALIM Mostafa; MIRSALIM Sayyid Mostafa Agha)
DOB: 9.6.1947
POB: Tehran, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Passport no: Q5956077 (Iran)
Function:
member of the Iranian Parliament
Mostafa Mirsalim is a member of the Iranian Parliament.
During the 2022/2023 protests, he has been particularly vocal in his support for the death penalty for arrested protesters, using the parliament as a platform to vehemently promote and call for their executions. He has called for protestors to be executed in a matter of days after their arrest. He also frequently attacks the free press and is in favour of restricting social media.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
158.
NAGHDALI
Mohammad Taghi
DOB: 6.6.1972
POB: Khomeinishahr- Isfahan, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function:
member of the Iranian Parliament
Mohammad Taghi Naghdali is a member of the Iranian Parliament and member of the Parliament’s legal commission.
During the 2022/2023 protests, he has been particularly vocal in his support for the death penalty for arrested protesters, using the parliament as a platform to vehemently promote and call for their executions. He also frequently attacks the free press and is involved in drafting laws to restrict the free flow of information.
He is therefore responsible for serious human right violations in Iran.
159.
GHAZANFARABADI Mousa
DOB: 1966
POB: Iran
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Function: member of the Iranian Parliament; head of the Parliament’s legal and judicial commission
Mousa Ghazanfarabadi is a member of the Iranian Parliament and the head of the Parliament’s legal and judicial commission. As such, he is responsible for the judicial and legal review of the proposed ministerial plans in Parliament, the review and approval of plans related to criminal law as well as investigating the performance of the country's officials and managers from a judicial and legal point of view.
He has not condemned the serious human rights violations of Iranian officials during the 2022/2023 protests. On the contrary, he has personally stated that women who violate hijab rules should be deprived of social rights and has argued for the use of force when dealing with them. He is also whitewashing the crimes committed by Iranian forces by defending the government’s version of events surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini.
He is therefore responsible for serious human right violations in Iran.
160.
NOROOZI Ahmad (a.k.a. NOROUZI Ahmad; NEWROUZI Ahmad; NAWROUZI Ahmad)
DOB: 1988
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: head of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) World Service; CEO of Press TV
Associated entities: Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB); Press TV
Ahmad Noroozi is the head of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) World Service and the CEO of Press TV, the main pro-government English language channel that oversees IRIB’s foreign-language outlets.
IRIB is the Iranian state-run media corporation and has broadcast hundreds of forced confessions by Iranian, dual-national and international detainees in Iran. IRIB and its subsidiaries act as a critical tool in the Iranian government’s mass suppression and censorship campaign against its own people. IRIB has produced and recently broadcast interviews of individuals being forced to confess that their relatives were not killed by Iranian authorities during nationwide protests but died due to accidental, unrelated causes.
Press TV is responsible for producing and broadcasting the forced confessions of detainees, including journalists, political activists and persons belonging to the Kurdish and Arab minorities, violating internationally recognised rights to a fair trial and due process.
In his capacity as head of IRIB and as CEO of Press TV, Ahmad Noroozi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
161.
POURANVARI Youssef
(a.k.a. POURANVARI Youssuf)
DOB: 26.5.1983
POB: Tehran, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
National ID no: 0492699836 (Iran)
Function:
director of the Programs and Scheduling Department at the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) foreign-language flagship channel
Associated entities: Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB)
Youssef Pouranvari is the director of the Programs and Scheduling Department at the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) foreign-language flagship channel.
As the Government of Iran’s state-run media conglomerate, IRIB has a monopoly on television and radio services in Iran and plays a central role in restricting the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and impeding the free flow of information in Iran through censorship activities. IRIB produces, sponsors, and spreads government propaganda both in Iran and internationally. Furthermore, IRIB regularly broadcasts false and baseless accusations against Iranian citizens, dual nationals, and foreigners, and uses falsified news to misinform and falsely incriminate perceived enemies of the regime. IRIB also cooperates extensively with security and intelligence agencies, including Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to obtain and publicly disseminate forced confessions from Iranians, dual-nationals and foreign detainees. Testimonies and other evidence point to the use of torture, both physical and psychological; threats against family members; and degrading treatment to extract forced confessions. Since 2009, IRIB programmes have broadcast hundreds of forced confessions as well as defamatory content against hundreds more. IRIB uses forced confessions in particular to frame dual nationals and foreigners as spies, demonise human rights activists, and legitimise repression against religious minority groups such as the Baha’i community.
In his capacity as director of the Programs and Scheduling Department at the IRIB foreign-language flagship channel, Youssef Pouranvari contributes to the repression of peaceful demonstrators, journalists, human rights defenders, students or other persons who speak up in defence of their legitimate rights.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
162.
KADEM Ahmad
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Function: head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) regional headquarters Karbala
Brigadier General Ahmad Kadem is the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Operational Base (regional headquarters) Karbala, which commands IRGC troops in the provinces of Khusestan, Lorestan and Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad.
During the 2022 protests, IRGC troops under his command conducted operations against protesters, in particular in the Khusestan and Lorestan regions, including in the towns of Khorramabad (Lorestan) and Izeh (Khusestan). IRGC troops used disproportionate force in these operations, using live ammunition against protesters. As overall commander of the IRGC troops in these regions, Kadem is responsible for violence against protesters conducted by those troops.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
163.
AZIMI Mohammad Nazar
(a.k.a. AZIMI Mohammadnazar)
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Function:
commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) headquarters Najaf Al-Ashraf
Brigadier General Mohammad Nazar Azimi is the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) headquarters Najaf Al-Ashraf, which commands IRGC troops in the provinces of Kermanshah, Hamedan and Ilam.
During the 2022 protests, Kermanshah province has seen violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC. As commander of the regional IRGC headquarters for the IRGC troops engaged in this region, he is responsible for the IRGC violence against protestors in Kermanshah province.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
164.
NILFRUSHAN Abbas Mortaza
(a.k.a. NILFOROUSHAN Abbas; NILFOROUSHAN DARDASHTI Abbas; NILFOROUSHAN DARDASHTI Abbas; NILFOROUSHAN Abbas; NILFRUSHAN DARDASHTI Abbas Mortaza)
DOB: 23.8.1966
POB: Isfahan, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Passport no: P46631463 (Iran)
Function: deputy commander for operations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Abbas Nilfrushan is the deputy commander for operations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and responsible for the IRGC Operations Command, one of the security organisations directly in charge of protest suppression.
In this capacity, he has framed the 2022 civil grassroots protest movement as a terrorist movement and a direct security threat to Iran, thereby legitimising the harsh response to the peaceful protests.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
165.
MOEIN Moslem
DOB: 22.9.1985
POB: Eslamabad, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
National ID no: 3341588477 (Iran)
Address: Part 7, Block 25, Ground Floor, 16th Street, Sarvestan Street, Chaghamirza Phase 2 Shahid Mehrabi, Kermanshah, Iran
Function: head of the Basji Resistance Force (Basij) Cyberspace Headquarters
Moslem Moein is a senior official in the EU-listed Basij Resistance Force (Basij), the infamous volunteer paramilitary organisation operating under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) with branches throughout Iran.
The Basij has played a key role in the regime’s deadly crackdown on the protests that have swept the country since September 2022. As chief of the Basij Cyberspace Headquarters, Moein oversees efforts to control and censor Iranians’ online activities. He has spoken publicly about the Basij’s priority of monitoring Iranians’ use of the internet. Additionally, Moein has advocated for the development of Iran’s national intranet, which could allow the regime to disconnect Iran from the global internet. The Iranian government continues to filter and block the free flow of information in Iran.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
166.
KARAMI Mohammad
DOB: 27.1.1966
POB: Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Passport no: K50849392 (Iran), expires 23.9.2024
Function:
Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) headquarters Quds for Sistan and Baluchestan province and Kerman province
Brigadier General Mohammad Karami is the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) headquarters Quds, which commands IRGC troops in Sistan and Baluchestan province and Kerman province.
Sistan and Baluchestan province has seen some of the most violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, during the 2022 protests. On 30 September 2022, the provincial capital Zahedan witnessed "bloody Friday”, when security forces opened fire on a protest forming in Zahedan around Friday prayer, using live ammunition. At least 70 protestors were shot and killed. Since then, violence against participants in later protests has continued. As commander of the regional IRGC headquarters for the IRGC troops engaged in this region, Karami is responsible for the IRGC’s violence against protestors in Sistan and Baluchestan province, in particular around "bloody Friday”.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
167.
JAVIDAN Ali Akbar
DOB: 21.3.1967
POB: Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function:
commander of the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) in Kermanshah province
Ali Akbar Javidan has been the commander of the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) in Kermanshah province since June 2019.
In this capacity, he is responsible for ordering the violent reaction of the LEF to the 2022 protests in Kermanshah. He is also responsible for ensuring the LEF’s strict implementation of morality policies that severely violate human rights, including through the active repression of women who do not comply with headscarf codes. He is also responsible for the LEF’s arrests of women during the July 2022 protests. He is responsible for violence, discrimination, cruel and degrading behaviour, and arbitrary detention of women.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
168.
AZARPENDAR
Abbas
POB: Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: CEO of Radis Vira Tejarat Co; regional manager in Iran for Tiandy Technologies
Abbas Azarpendar is the CEO of Radis Vira Tejarat Co, which is a key intermediary in Iran, providing some of the most advanced surveillance equipment to the Iranian government.
During the protests following the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody in mid-September 2022, Radis Vira Tejarat Co’s equipment has been used by the Iranian security forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its Basij and the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF), to brutally suppress the nationwide protests, leading to the torture or death of at least 516 protestors, including at least 70 children.
Azarpendar is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
169.
ESMAEILI Mohammad Mehdi
DOB: 1975
POB: Kabudarahang,
Hamedan, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance
Associated
entity: Ministry of Culture and Islamic
Guidance;
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Mohammad Mehdi Esmaeili is the Iranian Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance.
Under his authority, the Ministry has threatened artists/musicians who do not follow the government line with travel and work bans. He has personally and publicly threatened filmmakers who had published a statement asking the security forces to show restraint against peaceful protesters with arrest and work bans. An important number of artists and journalists have been arrested under trumped up charges since he became Minister, indicating that the repressive threats were followed by repressive acts. Esmaeili also works on curtailing freedom of expression even further by currently pushing a bill through Parliament that will criminalise the sharing of any information deemed critical of the regime or any reporting deemed critical of the regime. Under Mohammad Mehdi Esmaeili’s authority and with his stated approval, numerous Iranian artists, musicians, filmmakers and journalists were threatened, arrested and prosecuted on trumped charges and their freedom of expression was further significantly curtailed.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
170.
NOURI Yousef
DOB: 1961
POB: Ilam, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Minister of Education
Associated entities: Ministry of Education Iran; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Yousef Nouri has been Iran`s Minister of Education since November 2021.
Under his responsibility, Iranian students’ education is continuously aligned to the government’s opinions and Ayatollah Chamenei’s teachings. In September and October 2022, security forces were seen taking Iranian school pupils into custody for allegedly being involved in anti-Hijab-protests. As Education Minister, Nouri is responsible for the detention of students in correctional facilities. Nouri confirmed that some school students had already been arrested. He said they were sent to "psychological institutions" which hold students to "reform and re-educate" them to prevent "anti-social" behaviour. He added that students could only return to school after being "reformed."
By being responsible for students’ arbitrary detention in order to reverse anti-government opinions, Nouri violates the basic human right to education by which education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
171.
KARIMI Farzin
(a.k.a. KARIMI MAZLGHANCHAY Farzin)
DOB: 07.12.1992
POB: Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
ID number: 0440273961
Function:
Member of Iran’s Ministry of
Intelligence and Security (MOIS); co-founder of Ravin Academy
Farzin Karimi is a member of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and co-founder of EU-listed Ravin Academy, an entity that trains individuals in cyber security and hacking, and recruits from among these trainees for the MOIS.
The MOIS is widely involved in infiltrating internal opposition groups, monitoring domestic threats and expatriate dissents and arresting alleged spies and dissidents.
Farzin Karimi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
172.
MOSTAFAVI Seyed Mojtaba
(a.k.a. MORTAZAVI, Mojtaba; MOSTAF, Mojtaba)
DOB: 02.04.1987
POB: Tehran, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
National ID: No 0080467741 (Iran)
Function: member of Iran’s Ministry of
Intelligence and Security (MOIS); co-founder of Ravin Academy
Seyed Mojtaba Mostafavi is a member of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and co-founder of EU-listed Ravin Academy, an entity that trains individuals in cyber security and hacking, and recruits from among these trainees for the MOIS.
The MOIS is widely involved in infiltrating internal opposition groups, monitoring domestic threats and expatriate dissents and arresting alleged spies and dissidents.
Seyed Mojtaba Mostafavi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
173.
ESMAELI Vali
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: head of the parliament’s Social Commission
Vali Esmaeli is a lawmaker and hardliner, as well as head of the Iranian parliament’s Social Commission.
He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as "Muharebeh", or "enmity against God". Esmaeli called protestors "foreign agents" and justified human rights violations committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. As a member of the Iranian parliament, Esmaeli has supported the killing, detention, and torture of people during the nationwide protests in 2022.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
174.
NADERI Ahmad
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Member of the Iranian Parliament’s presidium
Ahmad Naderi is a lawmaker and hardliner, as well as a member of the Iranian parliament’s presidium/board of directors.
He is one of the 227 members of parliament (MP) who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as "Muharebeh", or "enmity against God".
Reading out a statement of 233 MPs in the public session of the parliament on 2 October 2022, he praised and supported the performance of the security and law enforcement forces in suppressing the protesters. As a member of the Iranian parliament, Naderi has supported the killing, detention, and torture of people during the nationwide protests in 2022.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
175.
ELAHIAN Zohreh
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: female
Function: Member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Iranian Parliament
Zohreh Elahian is a lawmaker and hardliner, as well as a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Iranian parliament.
She is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as "Muharebeh", or "enmity against God". As a member of the Iranian parliament, Elahian supported the killing, detention, and torture of people during the 2022 nationwide protests in Iran.
She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
176.
FARAHANI Ahmad Amirabadi
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Member of the Iranian parliament’s presidium
Amirabadi Farahani is a lawmaker and hardliner, as well as a member of the Iranian parliament’s presidium/board of directors. He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as "Muharebeh", or "enmity against God". As a member of the Iranian parliament, Farahani has supported the killing, detention, and torture of people during the nationwide protests in 2022.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
177.
DELKHOSH-ABATARI Seyyed Kazem
POB: Someh, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Spokesman of the Judiciary and Legal Commission of the Iranian parliament
Seyyed Kazem Delkhosh-Abatari is the spokesman of the Judiciary and Legal Commission of the Iranian parliament.
During the 2022/2023 protests, he helped develop a plan to prosecute journalists and media outlets that publish news not conforming to the official narrative of the Islamic Republic. The repression of journalists in Iran has intensified since the early days of the 2022 protests as nearly 70 journalists have been arrested so far. As the spokesman of the Judiciary and Legal Commission of the Iranian Parliament, Delkhosh-Abatari has been involved in suppressing the media and journalists following the eruption of protests across Iran in 2022.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
178.
JALALI Hossein
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Member of parliament
Hossein Jalali is a lawmaker and hardliner, as well as a member of the Iranian parliament.
He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a letter praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as "Muharebeh", or "enmity against God". He personally confirmed the existence of the respective letter and has reaffirmed its demands. As a member of the Iranian parliament, Jalali has personally called for the execution of protestors.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
179.
MOUSAVI Seyyed Nezamoldin
(a.k.a MOUSAVI Nezam)
POB: Khorramabad, Iran
Gender: male
Function: Spokesman of the Iranian Parliament’s board of directors
Seyyed Nezamoldin Mousavi is the spokesman of the Iranian Parliament’s presidium/board of directors.
During the 2022/2023 protests, he held a meeting with judicial authorities and legislators with the aim of accelerating the execution of the sentences handed down to arrested protesters. As the spokesman of the Iranian parliament’s presidium/board of directors, Mousavi has urged the judiciary to speed up trials and accelerate the executions of sentences handed down to protestors, thereby defying their right to a fair trial and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
Mousavi is also one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as "Muharebeh", or "enmity against God". He called protestors "foreign agents" and justified human rights violations committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Mousavi has supported the killing, detention, and torture of people during the nationwide protests in 2022.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
180.
NESARI Habibollah Jan
POB: Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: deputy of training and education of the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF)
Habibollah Jan Nesari is currently the deputy of training and education of the EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF).
Between 2016 and 30 December 2019, he served as a deputy commander of the Special Units of the LEF.
In his capacity as deputy commander, he was responsible for supervising the forces in using lethal and non-lethal weapons during the nationwide protests in November 2019, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of protestors. He was found guilty of crimes against humanity by the International People’s Tribunal on Iran’s Atrocities for his role in the crackdown on protesters in his capacity as deputy commander. As part of the security forces, the police forces are found to have designed and implemented a plan to commit crimes against humanity as well as murder, imprisonment, enforced disappearances, torture and sexual violence in order to quell the protests and conceal the crimes committed during the November 2019 protests.
As deputy commander, Nesari is personally responsible for the human rights violations carried out by the LEF. The LEF, who he is currently training, is part of the violent crackdown on protestors during the protests that erupted in September 2022, including by the deadly use of force against Iranian protesters.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
181.
BABAEI Hassan
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Head of the State
Organization for Registration of Deeds and Properties
Hassan Babaei is the is the Head of the State Organization for Registration of Deeds and Properties and a senior figure in the Iranian judiciary.
In this functions, Hassan Babaei is responsible for numerous violations of the right to fair trial during the 2022/2023 protests in Iran.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
182.
GHANNAD Qazi
(a.k.a. QANAD Qazi)
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Revolutionary Court prosecutor and judge
Qazi Ghannad is a Revolutionary Court prosecutor and judge.
During the 2022/2023 protests, he violated the right to fair trial and sentenced protestors to death who were later executed by the Iranian regime. As prosecutor, he handed down the death sentence in the case of Majid Rahnavard in 2022.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
183.
MANSOURI Seyed Hadi
POB: Mashhad, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: head of the fourth branch of the Revolutionary Court of Mashhad
Seyed Hadi Mansouri has been a judge and head of the fourth branch of the Revolutionary Court of Mashhad since December 2017.
During the 2022/2023 protests, he participated in the campaign of death sentences pronounced against protesters, thereby also violating their right to a fair trial.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
184.
HOSSEINI Hojjat
al-Eslam Hossein
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Head of the Judiciary for the Kurdistan province
Hojjat al-Eslam Hossein Hosseini is the Head of the Judiciary in the Kurdistan region.
During the 2022/2023 protests, he participated in the repression of the demonstrations and is responsible for implementing grave human rights violations in the repression of peaceful demonstrators. He is complicit in implementing those violations, including torture, cruel and inhuman and degrading treatment.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
185.
JABARI Mohammad
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Prosecutor of Kurdistan province
Mohammad Jabari is the prosecutor for the Kurdistan province.
In this function, he is responsible for several human rights violations since the 2019 protests, including death sentences and repression of demonstrations.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
186.
MOSTAFAVINIA Hojjat al-Eslam Ali
(a.k.a. MOSTAFAVI (Hojjatoleslam) Ali)
POB: Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: cleric; General Prosecutor of Sistan and Baluchestan province
Address: Zahedan
Hojjat-al-Eslam Ali Mostafavinia is a cleric and the Chief Prosecutor for Sistan and Baluchestan province. He previously served as a prosecutor in Sistan andBaluchestan, as well as in South Khorasan.
In his capacity, he was in charge of prosecuting demonstrators who were arbitrarily detained during the Zahedan protests, which took place in October 2022 and were bloodily repressed by police forces causing deaths and casualties.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
187.
SHAMSABAD Mehdi
(a.k.a. SHAMSABAD Mahdi)
POB: Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Prosecutor of Sistan and Baluchestan province
Mehdi Shamsabad is the prosecutor of Zahedan in Sistan and Baluchestan province.
In this capacity, he is responsible for serious human rights violations during the 2022/2023 protests, including death sentences and repression of demonstrations, and issuing degrading punishment including death penalty by flogging.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
188.
HARIKANDI
Hossein Fazeli
POB: Babol,
Mazandaran province
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: general prosecutor of Alborz province
Hossein Fazeli Harikandi is the general prosecutor of Alborz province.
In this function, he responsible for condemning several hundreds of demonstrators to the crime of "corruption on earth" during the 2022/2023 protests, putting them at risk of death penalty.
He also corroborated the government’s thesis of the death of M. Sarina Ismailzadeh in 2022. She died as a result of police violence. However, the state issued a statement saying she committed suicide and therefore did not die as a result of the violent repression of demonstrations in the Alborz province.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
189.
MADADI Hassan
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: acting prosecutor in Alborz province
Hassan Madadi has been the acting prosecutor in Alborz province since at least 2020.
In this capacity, he is responsible for several serious human rights violations, most notably that of the denial of the right to a fair trial during the 2022/2023 protests.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
190.
TAGHANAKI Soghra Khodadadi
DOB: 27.03.1971
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: female
Function: Director of Qarchak Women’s Prison
Passport number: B50799950 (Iran) (individual)
Address:
Varamin, Tehran, Iran
Soghra Khodadadi Taghanaki is the director/warden in the Qarchak Women’s Prison.
The prison is known for inhumane detention conditions, including poor health and sanitary conditions, refusal of medical care, food shortages, excessive use of force against prisoners, torture, sexual assault and extrajudicial killings.
Qarchak prison is one of the main places where women arrested during the peaceful 2022/2023 protests following the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran’s Morality Police are being held.
Soghra Khodadadi Taghanaki is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
191.
PASANDIDEH
Heidar
POB: Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: warden of Sanandaj prison
Heidar Pasandideh has been the warden of Sanandaj Central Prison in the Kurdistan province of Iran since 2020.
Under his administration, prisoners have been arbitrarily executed in Sanandaj Central Prison. As a warden, he has overseen and therefore bears responsibility for the detention and torture of prisoners arrested during 2022/2023 protests following the death of Mahsa Amini.
Therefore he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
192.
PIRI Morteza
DOB: 05.07.1977
POB: Zabol,
Sistan and
Baluchestan province, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: warden of Zahedan Central Prison
ID number: 4072307122
Address: Zahedan, Iran
Morteza Piri is the warden of Zahedan Central Prison in the province of Sistan and Baluchestan.
The prison is known for inhumane detention conditions, including poor health and sanitary conditions, refusal of medical care, excessive use of force against prisoners and extrajudicial killings. Under his administration, Zahedan Prison has conducted numerous executions with a disproportionate number of them targeting Iran’s Baluchi minority. In his capacity, he has been involved in the crackdown of 2022/2023 protests following the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran’s Morality Police.
Morteza Piri is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
193.
AZIZI Allah-Karam
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: head of the Rajai Shahr Prison
Address:
Moazzen Blvd, Gohardasht,
Karaj City,
Alborz Province, Iran
Associated entities: Rajai Shahr Prison
Allah-Karam Azizi is the head of EU-listed Rajaee Shahr Prison (a.k.a. Rajai Shahr Prison, Rajaishahr, Raja’i Shahr, Reja’i Shahr, Rajayi Shahr, Gorhardasht Prison, Gohar Dasht Prison) in Iran.
In his position, he is responsible for committing serious human rights violations in Iran, namely torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as well as mistreatment and torture of prisoners.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
194.
KHOSRAVI
Mohammad Hossein
DOB: 23.09.1974
POB: Birjand, South Khorasan province, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Director-General of Sistan and
Baluchestan Province Prisons, Former Warden of Zahedan Central Prison
ID number: 0653027761
Address: Sistan and Baluchestan Province, Iran
As Director-General of Sistan and BaluchestanProvince Prisons, Mohammad Hossein Khosravi oversees prisons in the province of Sistan and Baluchestan.
Prisons in the province, including Zahedan Central Prison are known for inhumane detention conditions, including poor health and sanitary conditions, refusal of medical care, excessive use of force against prisoners and extrajudicial killings. Under his administration, Zahedan prison alone has conducted numerous executions with a disproportionate number of them targeting Iran’s Baluchi minority and has been involved in the crackdown of 2022/2023 protests following the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran’s Morality Police.
Mohammad Hossein Khosravi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
195.
CHEHARMAHALI Ali
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: director general of
Alborz prisons
Address: Alvand Building, Below Mader Square, Karaj, Mehravila, Iran
Ali Cheharmahali is the director general of prisons in the province of Alborz and former Director of EU-listed Evin Prison.
In his position, he is responsible for committing serious human rights violations in Iran including torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment during the 2022/2023 protests.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
196.
FADAVI Ali
DOB: 1961
POB: Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: deputy commander of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Ali Fadavi is the deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
The IRGC has been heavily involved in the active and violent suppression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations.
In his role, Fadavi is steering, facilitating and condoning serious human rights violations committed by the IRGC.
Therefore, Ali Fadavi is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
197.
SHARIF Ramezan
POB: Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) spokesman
Ramezan Sharif is a spokesman of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
The IRGC has been heavily involved in the active and violent suppression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations.
In his role, Sharif is covering up and condoning serious human rights violations committed by the IRGC.
Therefore, Ramezan Sharif is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
198.
JOMEIRI Fathollah
POB: Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Head of Intelligence Protection
Organization of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)/Security Unit of the IRGC
Fathollah Jomeiri is the head of the Intelligence Protection Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also called the Security Unit of the IRGC.
This unit is responsible for protecting vital infrastructure and key areas of the country, important individuals, such as regime VIPs, but above all protecting the regime.
The IRGC has been heavily involved in the active and violent suppression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations.
In his role, Jomeiri is steering, facilitating and condoning serious human rights violations committed by the IRGC.
Therefore, Fathollah Jomeiri is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
199.
KAAMFAR Behdad
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: prosecutor at the
Karaj Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office
Behdad Kaamfar is a prosecutor at the Karaj Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office which prosecutes cases in the Karaj Revolutionary Court.
In that function, he is responsible for exercising repression against protesters through severe penalties, including the death penalty. The Iranian judicial authorities in particular use the criminal charge of "Muharebeh", or "enmity against God" which allows for the death penalty for opposing state organs and that is frequently used for repression against protesters.
In particular, Kaamfar represented the prosecution in a case in November/December 2022, in which a number of protesters were convicted ostensibly of attacks against the Basij. In that trial, Kaamfar led the prosecution to a number of death penalties for "Muharebeh", in particular against Mohammad Mehdi Karimi, Amid Mehdi Shokrollahi, Reza Aria Farzaneh Gharehassanlou, Hamid Gharehassanlou, Ali Moazzami Goudarzi and Hossein Mehdi Mohammadi.
In leading such prosecutions and employing such criminal offences contrary to principles of justice, and thus causing the death of individuals opposing the Iranian states, Behdad Kaamfar is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
200.
FATHI Murad
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Director of prisons for the province of West Azerbaijan
Murad Fathi has been the Director of prisons of West Azerbaijan province since 22 November 2022.
He has previously held the same position in Kordestan province. In prisons under his control, cases of torture of prisoners have taken place during the 2022/2023 protests, leading in some instances to the death of detainees from torture and/or lack of medical care. Those detained and tortured include protesters arrested in both those provinces.
In participating in the repression of protesters and overseeing torture in prison facilities under his command, in some cases leading to the death of prisoners, Murad Fathi is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
201.
KHOSROU PANAH Abdol Hossein
a.k.a. KHOSROW PANAH Abdul
Hossein; KHOSROPANAH Abdolhossein
DOB: 21.3.1966
POB: Dezful, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: chairman and secretary of the
Supreme Council of Cultural
Revolution
Associated
entity: Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution
Abdol Hossein Khosrou Panah is a conservative cleric and has been the chairman and secretary of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution since January 2023.
The Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution promoted several projects undermining the freedom of girls and women, setting limits on their clothing and education. Its laws have also discriminated minorities, such as the Baha’i. It is a vehicle for promoting the current regime’s policies and Islamist opinions.
As chairman and secretary of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, Khosrou Panah is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
202.
ALAM-AL HODA Ahmad
DOB: 31.8.1944
POB: Mashhad, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Friday imam of
Mashhad and representative of Khorasan Razavi province in the Assembly of
Experts
Ahmad Alam-Al Hoda is the Friday imam of Mashhad and representative of Khorasan Razavi province in the Assembly of Experts.
In his speeches and in the media, he participates in the propagation of hate against women, demonstrators and religious minorities.
Alam-Al Hoda is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
203.
RASTINEH Ahmad
DOB: 1980
POB: province of Bakhtiari, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Member of Parliament and spokesman for the Parliament’s cultural commission.
Ahmad Rastineh is a Member of the Iranian Parliament (Madjles) and its spokesman for the cultural commission. The cultural commission has a supervisory position to control and supervise the institutions in charge of ‘spreading the culture of chastity and hijab’.
Rastineh promotes a hard-line version of the Islamic revolution’s cultural principles, particularly concerning women, and the wearing of the veil/hijab. During the 2022/2023 protests in Iran, he called for an affirmation of the law imposing the veil on Iranian women. He also supported the government’s control over the internet and internet-cuts.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
204.
KHAN MOHAMMADI Hodjatoleslam Ali
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: spokesman of the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil
Hodjatoleslam Ali Khan Mohammadi is the spokesman of the EU-listed Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil.
In 2022 and 2023, in his position as spokesman of the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil, he qualified the non-wearing of the hijab as a crime and promoted a hard-line version of the Islamic revolution’s cultural principles, particularly concerning women, and the wearing of the veil/hijab. Acting in his position, he expressed his support for and contributed to legitimising the repression of anti-hijab activists, undermining women and girls’ rights and freedoms.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
205.
AKBARI Mohammad Sadegh
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: chief justice of
Mazandaran province
Mohammad Sadegh Akbari is the chief justice of Mazandaran province.
In this position, he is responsible for handing down death sentences in unfair trials (absence of lawyers, coerced confessions) and for the torturing of convicts. During the 2022/2023 protests, he was responsible for shutting down shops that did not respect the hijab laws and for sentencing to death a 35-year old mentally ill protester who allegedly burned the Quran.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
206.
BARATI Morteza
a.k.a. BARATI Qazi
DOB: 30.11.1962
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function:
presiding judge of branch 1 of the Revolutionary Courts of
Isfahan
Morteza Barati is the presiding judge of branch 1 of the Revolutionary Courts of Isfahan.
In January 2023, he sentenced to death by hanging at least three protestors, denying them the right to a fair trial.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
207.
AL HOSSEINI Musa Asif
a.k.a AL-HOSSEINI Asef
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: head judge of branch 1 of the Revolutionary Courts of Karaj, Alborz province
Musa Asif Al Hosseini is the head judge of branch 1 of the Revolutionary Courts of Karaj, Alborz province.
Trials under his supervision have been conducted summarily, without adherence to basic rights of the accused and with reliance on confessions extracted under pressure and torture. During the 2022/2023 protests, he presided over the trials of protestors and issued several death sentences, two of which were carried out against Mohammed Karami and Mohammed Hosseini.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
208.
JALILI Vahid
DOB: 1973
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: chief for cultural affairs and policy evolution at
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB)
Vahid Jalili is the chief for cultural affairs and policy evolution at the EU-listed Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB).
During the 2022/2023 protests, IRIB broadcasted forced confessions from foreign hostages. Due to his senior position at IRIB, Jalili is directly involved in undermining the human rights of foreign hostages and in their inhuman treatment. He is also responsible for sharing propaganda confessions supporting the regime.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
209.
NOBAVEH VATAN Bijan
DOB: 1959/1960
POB: Tehran, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Member of the Iranian Parliament; First Deputy Chairman of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament
Bijan Nobaveh Vatan is an Iranian lawmaker and hardliner as well as the First Deputy Chairman of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament.
He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as "Muharebeh", or "enmity against God".
Moreover, he is a driving force behind legislation enforcing restrictive clothing rules on women by enacting penalties for institutions, businesses and individuals that interact with non-compliant women, thus creating a boycott against them.
As a Member of the Iranian Parliament, Nobaveh Vatan supported the killing, detention and torture of people during the 2022/2023 nationwide protests in Iran. He further supports legislation that substantially revokes the social and economic rights of women in Iran.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
210.
YAZDIKHAH Ali
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Member of the Iranian Parliament; Member of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament
Ali Yazdikhah is an Iranian lawmaker and hardliner as well as a member of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament.
He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as "Muharebeh", or "enmity against God".
Moreover, he is a driving force behind legislation enforcing restrictive clothing rules on women by enacting penalties for institutions, businesses and individuals that interact with non-compliant women, thus creating a boycott against them.
As a Member of the Iranian Parliament, Yazdikhah supported the killing, detention and torture of people during the 2022/2023 nationwide protests in Iran. He further supports legislation that substantially revokes the social and economic rights of women in Iran.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
211.
ALIBABAEI Mehdi
(a.k.a. ALI BABAEI Mehdi, BABAEI Ali Mehdi)
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Major
Function: provincial deputy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Qom
Major Mehdi Alibabaei is the provincial deputy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Qom. He directs IRGC and Basij forces in the city of Qom.
Following the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022, some of the most intense protests have been seen in the city of Qom. Security forces, including the IRGC and the Basij militia were deployed to violently crack down on these protests. Since March 2023, the IRGC and Basij militia have also been instructed to enforce the mandatory hijab law by new methods of oppression.
Alibabaei revealed a new scheme to deploy members of the Basij militia in each Qom neighbourhood to enforce the hijab law. The new scheme includes installing programs such as "Be a famous leader in our neighbourhood", ordering IRGC/Basij forces to conduct neighbourhood patrols, the use of intelligence, intimidation, and enforcing accountability of regular citizens (for example by appealing to the responsibility of building and residence managers for "badly veiled" residents). This scheme represents a new level of denunciation and information gathering by the general population to oppress women.
Under the command of Alibabaei, the local IRGC and Basij forces in Qom are ordered to enforce certain selected laws, by means and methods that intimidate citizens and violate their fundamental rights.
As provincial deputy of the IRGC in Qom, Major Mehdi Alibabaei is responsible for the acts of oppression committed by the local IRGC and Basij forces and their violations of the rights of freedom of expression and privacy.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
212.
NOUROUZI Ali
Asghar
(a.k.a. NOROUZI Ali Asghar)
DOB: 11.11.1962
POB: Dashtestan, Bushehr province, Iran
Address: Unit 29, 5th Floor, Talaieh Block- B1, Elahiyeh Complex 1, Number 0, Alley 2-Shahid Sajjad Rushanai, Rabbaninejad Street, Zein Aldin Municipality, Qom 3739144673, Iran
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Passport no: Y53914915 (Iran) expires 11.5.2026
Iranian national ID no: 4591967573
Function: chairman of the board of directors of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation
Associated individuals: Seyyed Aminollah; Emami Tabatabai; Yahya Alaoddini; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi
Associated entities: Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah
IRGC
Ali Asghar Nourouzi is the chairman of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.
The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.
The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.
As chairman of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Ali Asghar Nourouzi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
213.
TABATABAI Seyyed Amin Ala Emami
(a.k.a. TABATBAYI Aminallah Imami)
DOB: 26.8.1963
POB: Meybod, Iran
Address: Tehran, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Iranian national ID no: 4489260229
Function: vice-chairman of the board of directors of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation; managing director of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation
Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Yahya Alaoddini; Jamal
Babamoradi;
Ahmad Karimi
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah
IRGC
Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai is the vice-chairman of the board of directors as well as the managing director of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.
The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.
The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.
As vice-chairman of the board of directors and managing director of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
214.
ALAODDINI Yahya
(a.k.a. ALA’ODDINI Yahya; ALAEDDINI Yahya)
DOB: 21.5.1965
POB: Tehran, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Passport no: K47201906 (Iran) expires 19.10.2023
Iranian national ID no: 0036732958
Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation
Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Jamal Babamoradi;
Ahmad Karimi;; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai
Associated entities: Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah
IRGC
Yahya Alaoddini is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.
The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.
The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.
As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Yahya Alaoddini is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
215.
BABAMORADI
Jamal Ali
DOB: 24.5.1960
POB: Tehran, Iran
Address: Tehran, Iran
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: male
Iranian national ID no: 0036824240
Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation
Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Ahmad Karimi; Yahya Alaoddini; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah
IRGC
Jamal Ali Babamoradi is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.
The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.
The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.
As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Jamal Ali Babamoradi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
216.
KARIMI Ahmad
Hasan
DOB: 11.12.1962
POB: Qom, Iran
Address: Tehran, Iran
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Iranian national ID no: 0382947983
Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation
Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Yahya Alaoddini; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai; Jamal Ali Babamoradi
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah
IRGC
Ahmad Hasan Karimi is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.
The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.
The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.
As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Ahmad Hasan Karimi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
217.
ADINEHVAND
Salman
Function: Commander of the Tehran Police Relief Unit of Iran’s Law
Enforcement Forces (LEF)
Nationality:
Iranian
DOB: 20 May 1980
POB: Tehran, Iran
Gender: male
Salman Adinehvand has been the Commander of the Tehran Police Relief Unit of Iran’s LEF, the primary security organisation in charge of crowd control and protest suppression, since January 2021. Adinehvand’s unit was directly responsible for the violent suppression of protests in Tehran in September and October 2022, during which dozens of protestors were killed by security forces using live ammunition.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
218.
AGHAMIRI Seyyed Mohammad Amin
Function:
secretary of Iran’s Supreme Council of
Cyberspace (SCC)
Nationality:
Iranian
DOB: 21 September 1986
POB: Iran
Gender: male
Seyyed Mohammad Amin Aghamiri is the secretary of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace of Iran (SCC), the centralised authority for policymaking in the realm of cyberspace. The SCC is responsible for Iran’s blockage of popular online news and communications platforms and has also used digital technology to spy on and harass journalists and regime dissidents.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
219.
NIKVARZ Mohsen
Function: public prosecutor of Sirjan
Nationality:
Iranian
POB: Iran
Gender: male
As the public prosecutor of Sirjan, Mohsen Nikvarz was responsible for several arbitrary arrests of lawyers and death sentences in Sirjan during the 2019 protests.
In the context of the protests that erupted in September 2022, Nikvarz was also involved in the Maryam Arvin case, where he prosecuted her for her activities as a defence lawyer for protesters. Following her arrest, for which Nikvarz carries personal responsibility, she was brutally tortured in prison.
Nikvarz is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
220.
MORADI Nader
Function:
Deputy Supervisor of Public Spaces of the Public Security Police
Military rank: Colonel
Nationality:
Iranian
POB: Iran
Gender: male
In his current function as Deputy Supervisor of Public Spaces of the Public Security Police, Colonel Nader Moradi is responsible for the enforcement of hijab laws. Those laws have been used by the Iranian authorities to crack down on peaceful protesters.
Moradi is responsible for the persecution and arrest of women for non-compliance with hijab rules. He is also responsible for the closure of businesses, restaurants and other public spaces in relation to non-enforcement of hijab rules, signing the letters informing them of their closure.
During the protests that started in September 2022 and lasted for many months, Moradi was also responsible for the persecution and arrest of shop owners who closed their businesses and were planning on striking in protest of the death of Mahsa Amini.
Moradi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
221.
MONTAZER
AL-MAHDI Saeed
(a.k.a MONTAZER AL-MAHDI Said)
Function: police spokesman
Military rank: Brigadier General
Nationality:
Iranian
DOB: 8 November 1971
POB: Tehran, Iran
Gender: male
Saeed Montazer Al-Mahdi is the spokesman of the Iranian police (EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) of Iran).
In April 2023, he announced the current strict enforcement of hijab laws, which have been used by the Iranian authorities to crack down on peaceful protesters. Acting in his function, he defends and promotes the repressive actions of the police.
His intimidating statements on monitoring, the closure of businesses and other public spaces, and the warning texts that are being sent by the authorities have a very significant repressive impact. Furthermore, in his role as police spokesperson, he has repeatedly downplayed the widely reported schoolgirl poisonings, by claiming that the "majority" were "not real", thereby denying the victims protection through the police and undermining their right to safety.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
222.
Seyyed Mohammad MOUSVIAN
a.k.a. Seyed
Mohammad MOUSAVIYAN
Function: Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor, Isfahan (Isfahan Province)
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: Male
Mousvian is the Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Isfahan Province, Iran. As such he is responsible for the trials against the protestors Saleh Mirhashmi, Majid Kazemi and Saeid Yaqoubi, who have since been sentenced to death and subsequently been executed in May 2023.
Mousvian further issued the indictment against Iranian music artist Toomaj Salehi on charges of "corruption on earth" for his participation in anti-government protests and public activism against the Iranian government in October 2022, who has since been held in Dastgerd Prison under cruel conditions while awaiting his trial. In November 2022, state media published a video showing a blindfolded Salehi confessing to his alleged crimes and apologizing for his words.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
223.
Ali Zare NOURI
Function:
Deputy Judge of and advisor to the Provincial Criminal Court, Isfahan
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: Male
Nouri is the Deputy Judge of and advisor to the Provincial Criminal Court of Isfahan Province, Iran. As such he is responsible for the trials against the protestors Saleh Mirhashmi, Majid Kazemi and Saeid Yaqoubi, who have since been sentenced to death and subsequently been executed in May 2023. In a video published by Iranian state media, Nouri can be seen questioning the three defendants in court.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
224.
Seyyed Nader SAFAVI MIRMAHALLEH
a.k.a Seyed Nader SAFAVI MIRMAHALLEH
a.k.a Nader SAFAVI
Function: Governor and head of Rezvanshahr Security Council in Gilan Province
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: Male
Address:
Rezvanshahr, Gilan Province
Seyyed Nader Safavi Mirmahalleh is the governor and head of Rezvanshahr Security Council in Gilan Province. As such, he is responsible for ordering officers to open fire on protesters during Iran’s 2022-2023 nationwide protests, which resulted in numerous deaths and injuries, including to children.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
225.
Seyyed Khalil SAFAVI
a.k.a Seyed Khalil SAFAVI
Function: Police Commander Rezvanshahr, Gilan Province
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: Male
Address:
Rezvanshahr, Gilan Province
Seyyed Khalil Safavi is the Police Commander of Rezvanshahr in Gilan Province and held this position also at the time of the protest. As such, he is responsible for police officers in Rezvanshahr opening fire on protesters during protests in the city that took place in late September 2022, which resulted in numerous deaths and injuries, including to children.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
226.
Seyyed Abbas HOSSEINI
Function: Governor, Amol (Mazandaran Province)
Nationality:
Iranian
Gender: Male
In January 2022, Hosseini was appointed as governor of the city of Amol, Mazandaran Province. As such, he is responsible for the killing of at least two young Iranian protesters, Ghazaleh Chalabi and Erfan Rezaei, who were both killed in September 2022 by government forces in the city of Amol. Further, security forces in Amol have continued to harass peaceful protesters and families of the deceased.
In June 2023, Hosseini was replaced as Governor of Amol, but was appointed Special Governor of the city of Amol. In his new position, Hosseini still has an active role as government representative.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
227.
Mojtaba FADA
Function: IRGC Commander in Isfahan Province (Second Brigadier General) and member of the provincial security council
Nationality:
Iranian
Date of birth: 21 March 1963
Place of birth: Harsin, Iran
Gender: Male
Passport number: F49973222 expires 27 August 2024 (issued by Iran)
Fada is the commander of IRGC forces in Isfahan province and currently serves as a member of the Provincial Security Council. As such, he oversaw the actions of IRGC troops and other security forces in response to anti-government protests in fall of 2022, which resulted in the death of several protesters, including that of 18-year-old Mahsa Mougouyi.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
228.
Rashid KABOUDVANDI
a.k.a Rashid KABUDONDI
Function: Commander of the Imam Hossein Guards Corps of Karaj, Alborz Province
Gender: Male
Kaboudvandi is since May 2022 the commander of the Imam Hossein Guards Corps of Karaj, Alborz Province. As such he is responsible for the detention and killing of Mohammad Reza Ghorbani and the detention and rape of Amrita Abbassi by the Karaj security forces.
Blatant and severe human rights violations by police forces have been widely documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini started mid-September 2022.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
229.
PARVAR Gholamhossein Gheib
Function:
Deputy to the Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Imam Ali Central Security Headquarters
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Gholamhossein Gheib Parvar is the Deputy to the Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Imam Ali Central Security Headquarters. In this capacity at the Imam Ali Central Security Headquarters, which was formed with the aim of suppressing popular protests, he was responsible for killing and suppressing protesters during the November 2019 nationwide protests. In his previous function, as head of the Basij Organisation, he was responsible for the killing and brutal suppression of protesters by forces under his command during the nationwide protests in Iran from December 2017 to January 2018.
Gholamhossein Gheib Parvar is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
230.
SHAHRESTANI Hassan Mofakhami
(a.k.a. MOFAKHAMI-SHAHRESTANI Hassan; MOFAKHAMISHAHRESRANI Hassan)
Function: Police Commander of Mazandaran Province
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Hassan Mofakhami Shahrestani is the police commander of the Mazandaran Province. He has a long track record of functions related to violently suppressing peaceful protests. In June 2023, he explicitly ordered people to break the neck of anyone seeking to defy hijab norms.
Hassan Mofakhami Shahrestani is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
231.
HABIBI Roham Bakhsh
(a.k.a. HABIBI Roham-Bakhsh; HABIBI Rohambakhsh)
Function: Police Commander of Fars Province
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Roham Bakhsh Habibi is the police commander of the Fars Province and has a track record related to violently suppressing peaceful protests. As police commander of the Fars province, he is responsible for the mass arrest of protesters and ordering the use of deadly weapons against unarmed protesters in this province during the nationwide protests of November 2019. It is reported that forces under his command in the Fars Province violently suppressed protests in November 2019 and killed people.
Roham Bakhsh Habibi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
232.
TAHAMI Seyyed Javad
(a.k.a. TAHAMI Seyed Javad)
Function: Prison Official of Fardis prison/Kachui Prison
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Seyyed Javad Tahami is the head of Kachui Prison, also known as Fardis Prison, and, in this capacity, he oversees all activities within the prison. Kachui prison is an institution controlled by the Prison Division of the Judiciary and is frequently used to detain political prisoners and house them in inadequate conditions which violate their human rights. Furthermore, the evidence confirms that executions have occurred within the penitentiary.
Seyyed Javad Tahami is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
B. Unternehmen und Organisationen
 
Name
Identifizierungsinformation
1.
Cyber Police
Location: Tehran (Iran)
Website:http://www.cyberpolice.ir
The Iranian Cyber Police, founded in January 2011, is a unit of the Islamic Republic of Iran Police, headed by Vahid Majid. From the time of its inception until early 2015 it was headed by Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam (listed). Ahmadi-Moqaddam underlined that the Cyber Police would take on anti-revolutionary and dissident groups who used internet-based social networks in 2009 to trigger protests against the re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In January 2012, the Cyber Police issued new guidelines for internet cafés, requiring users to provide personal information that would be kept by café owners for six months, as well as a record of the websites they visited. The rules also require café owners to install closed-circuit television cameras and maintain the recordings for six months. These new rules may create a logbook that authorities can use to track down activists or whoever is deemed a threat to national security.
In June 2012, Iranian media reported that the Cyber Police would be launching a crackdown on virtual private networks (VPNs). On 30 October 2012, the Cyber Police arrested the blogger Sattar Beheshti without a warrant for ‘actions against national security on social networks and Facebook’. Beheshti had criticised the Iranian government in his blog. Beheshti was found dead in his prison cell on 3 November 2012, and is believed to have been tortured to death by the Cyber Police authorities. The Cyber Police is responsible for many arrests of Telegram Group Administrators in connection with the nationwide protests of November 2019.
2.
Evin Prison
Address: Tehran Province, Tehran, District 2, Dasht-e Behesht (Iran)
Evin Prison is a detention centre where political prisoners have been held and severe human rights abuses, including torture, have repeatedly taken place over the past years and decades.
November 2019 protesters were, and at least to some extent still are, detained in Evin Prison as political prisoners. Prisoners in Evin Prison are being deprived of basic procedural rights, and are sometimes held in solitary confinement or overcrowded cells with poor hygienic conditions. There are detailed reports of physical and psychological torture. Detainees are denied contact with family and lawyers as well as adequate health treatment.
In the context of the 2022/2023 protests, cases of torture are still being reported. The cause of the fire that led to several deaths and injuries in October 2022 has not been made public and the prison refuses any international inquiries. In the context of the fire, it also became clear that the prison uses internationally condemned landmines to prevent prison escapes. Several third-state nationals have been arbitrarily detained in Evin Prison.
3.
Fashafouyeh Prison (a.k.a. Greater Tehran Central Penitentiary, Hasanabad-e Qom Prison, Greater Tehran Prison)
Address: Tehran Province, Hasanabad, Bijin Industrial Zone, Tehran, Qom Old Road (Iran)
Telephone: +98 21 5625 8050
Fashafouyeh Prison is a detention centre designated originally to detain offenders of drug-related crimes, recently also holding political prisoners and, in some cases, forcing them to share cells with drug addicts. The living and hygienic conditions are very poor, lacking basic needs like clean drinking water.
During the November 2019 protests, several protesters were detained in Fashafouyeh Prison, including minors. Reports indicate that November 2019 protesters were subjected to torture and inhumane treatment at Fashafouyeh Prison, for example by deliberately wounding them with boiling water and through denial of medical treatment. According to an Amnesty International report on the crackdown of the November 2019 protests, children as young as 15 have been detained alongside adults in Fashafouyeh Prison. Three November 2019 protesters who are currently being held in Fashafouyeh Prison were sentenced to death by a court in Tehran.
Since the beginning of the 2022/2023 protests, it has been reported that 3 000 persons were transferred to Fashafouyeh prison and that 835 are currently still there. Several cases of torture and forced confessions have been reported.
4.
Rajaee Shahr Prison (a.k.a. Rajai Shahr
Prison, Rajaishahr, Raja’i Shahr, Reja’i Shahr, Rajayi Shahr, Gorhardasht Prison, Gohar Dasht Prison)
Address: Alborz Province, Karaj, Gohardasht, Moazzen Blvd (Iran)
Telephone: +98 26 3448 9826
Rajaee Shahr Prison has been known for the deprivation of human rights, including severe physical and psychological torture of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience as well as mass executions without fair trial, ever since the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
Hundreds of detainees, including children, were severely mistreated in Rajaee Shahr Prison in the aftermath of the November 2019 protests. There are credible reports about numerous cases of torture and other forms of cruel punishment, including cases involving minors.
Since the beginning of the 2022/2023 protests, numerous opponents have been arbitrarily jailed there in conditions that some inmate journalists have described as dangerous and hardly liveable.
5.
Iran’s Morality Police
(a.k.a. Gasht-e-Ershad; Islamic Guidance Patrol; Guidance Patrols)
Address: Vozara Street, corner of 25th Street, District 6, Tehran (Iran)
The Morality Police is part of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) and is a special police unit which enforces the strict dress rules for women, including compulsory wearing of a headscarf. The Morality Police has used unlawful force against women for not complying with Iranian hijab laws, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary arrests and detentions, excessive violence and torture.
On 13 September 2022, the Morality Police arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police’s headquarters for an ‘educational and orientation class’. According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and to her death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police’s abusive behaviour is not confined to that incident and has been widely documented.
The Morality Police is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
6.
Basij Resistance Force
(a.k.a. Basij-e
Mostazafan)
The Basij Resistance Force is a volunteer paramilitary organisation operating under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) with branches throughout Iran.
The security forces’ response to the September 2022 protests in Iran was particularly harsh, resulting in the deaths of multiple people. The Basij Resistance Force was one of the forces ordered by the government to quell those protests. It injured and killed several protesters.
The Basij Resistance Force is directly responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
7.
Cyber Defence
Command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (CDC)
Address: Tehran (Iran)
Telephone: +98 26 3448 9826
The Cyber Defence Command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (CDC) monitors websites, e-mails and online activities of individuals deemed to be political opponents.
During the September 2022 protests in Iran, the CDC took an active role in the Iranian government’s repressive policies, including by identifying and arresting protesters.
The CDC is directly responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
8.
Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (a.k.a. NAJA; FARAJA)
Address: Tehran (Iran)
The Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) is a uniformed police force.
The LEF’s blatant and severe human rights violations, such as the indiscriminate shooting with live ammunition at peaceful protesters, including children, have been widely documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini started in mid-September 2022. Over 70 protesters have died and hundreds were seriously injured, including children. Since the beginning of the demonstrations, police forces have also arbitrarily detained numerous human rights defenders and journalists.
The LEF is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
9.
The Basij Cooperative Foundation
(a.k.a. Bonyad-eh Ta’avon-eh Basij)
Address: Tehran, Iran
Type of entity: Foundation/Corporation Network
Other associated entities: IRGC, Basij Resistance Force
The Basij Cooperative Foundation (BCF) is one of the affiliates of the Basij Resistance Force (EU-listed).
The BCF was established in 1996 and its mission includes promoting and supporting the Basij. The activities of the BCF include the funding of the Basij Resistance Force (EU-listed).
Therefore, the BCF is associated with the Basij Resistance Force, an entity responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
10.
Press TV
Address: 4 East 2nd St., Farhang Blvd., Saadat Abad, 19977-66411 Tehran, Iran
Telephone number: Tel. +98 21 230 66 660
Email: Presstv@presstv.ir
Type of entity: State Television Broadcaster
Press TV is responsible for producing and broadcasting the forced confessions of detainees, including journalists, political activists, persons belonging to Kurdish and Arab minorities, violating internationally recognised rights to a fair trial and due process.
Therefore, Press TV is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
11.
Arvan Cloud (a.k.a. Abr Arvan; Noyan Abr
Arvan Co.; Arwan Company; Arvancloud)
Address: Zafar St. Africa Blvd., Tehran, Iran
Type of entity: Private Company
Other associated entities: IRGC, Iranian Ministry of Information and Communications Technology
Arvan Cloud is an Iranian IT company supporting the Iranian government’s efforts to control access to the Iranian intranet. Since 2020, it is a major partner in the project of the Iranian government, in general, and the Iranian Minister of Information and Communications Technology, in particular, to set up a separate, Iranian version of the internet. Such a national intranet with connecting points to the global internet will help to control the flow of information between the Iranian intranet and the global internet.
As such, Arvan Cloud is involved in censorship and efforts of the Iranian government to shut down the internet in response to recent protests in Iran. Arvan Cloud is also associated with persons responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran, notably the EU-listed Iranian Minister of Information and Communications Technology.
12.
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB)
Address: Jamejam Street, Valiasr Avenue, 19395- 3333 Tehran, Iran
Type of entity: state-owned broadcasting company
Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) is a state-owned broadcasting company notorious for being a regime mouthpiece.
IRIB is responsible for producing and broadcasting the forced confessions of detainees, including journalists, political activists, and persons belonging to Kurdish and Arab minorities, thereby violating internationally recognised rights to a fair trial and due process.
IRIB is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
13.
Ravin Academy
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
Date of registration: 2019
Registration number: 49135
Principal place of business: Second Floor, No. 36, Naqdi Street, North Sohrevardi Street, Shahid Ghandi-Niloufar Neighborhood, Tehran, Iran
Ravin Academy is an Iran-based cyber security company which provides cyber security education and training in both defensive and offensive fields as well as hacker training.
In addition, Ravin Academy operates on behalf of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and supports them in recruiting hackers.
Hackers trained at the Ravin Academy have been involved in directly disrupting the communication of those protesting against the Iranian regime, thereby repressing the protests.
Therefore, Ravin Academy is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
14.
Samane Gostar Sahab Pardaz Private Limited Company
(a.k.a Sahab Pardaz)
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
Principal place of business:
Tehran, No. 22, Khorramshahr Street
Tehran, North Shohvardi Street, Korramshahr Street, Number 24, Floor 1
Samane Gostar Sahab Pardaz Private Limited Company is an Iran-based company providing social-media filtering services.
It is engaged in censorship and surveillance activities for the Government of Iran, including during the 2022 protests, that prohibit, limit or penalise the exercise of freedom of expression or assembly by citizens of Iran, or that limit access to print or broadcast media.
Samane Gostar Sahab Pardaz Private Limited Company is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
15.
Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA)
(a.k.a. Communication Regulation Authority (CRA))
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
Associated entity: Iranian Ministry for Information and Communications Technology (ICT)
The Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA) is under the authority of the Iranian Ministry for Information and Communications Technology (ICT). The CRA enforces the Iranian government’s requirements to filter internet content through a spyware called SIAM.
During the 2022 protests, the CRA used its control of internet access and mobile phones to track protestors and create a detailed picture of dissidents’ and protesters’ activities for the authorities to use at their will. The CRA is therefore responsible for supporting the repression of peaceful demonstrators, journalists, human rights defenders, students or other persons who speak up in defence of their legitimate rights.
The CRA is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
16.
Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil
(a.k.a. Office for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil; Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice; Setad-PV)
Type of entity: government institution
Place of registration: Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated individuals: GOLPAYEGANI Seyyed Mohammed Saleh Hashemi, head of the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil
Other associated entities: Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF)
The Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil is a government institution, responsible for determining and enforcing excessively strict behavioural models in society.
In 2022, the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil was instrumental in setting new and stricter morality codes for women that are in clear violation of their human rights. Additionally, the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil plays a central role in setting up the monitoring and often brutal sanctioning of women and men who do not respect these codes. These strict codes are subsequently brutally enforced by the EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (and specifically its Morality Police).
The Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
17.
Imen Sanat Zaman Fara Company
Address: Shahrak-e-Jafar Abad-e-Jangal Rd, Naseriyeh, Tehran, Iran;
Number 16, Kolezar alley, Farsian Street, Shahid Rezaiee Street, Azadegan Autobahn, Tehran, Iran;
Number 16, Gholshan 14, Golestan Boulevard, Negarestan Boulevard, Sham Abad, Tehran, Iran
Type of entity: private company
Place of registration: Iran
Date of registration: 2010
National ID no: 103201991293 (Iran)
Business registration no: 369541 (Iran)
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated individuals: Mohammad Zandi Aliabadi, chairman of the Board of directors;
Hossein Zandi Aliabadi, Vice chairman of the Board of directors;
Fatemeh Haghshenas, CEO
Other associated entities: Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF)
Imen Sanat Zaman Fara Company is an Iranian company manufacturing and importing security equipment for Iranian security forces.
Its equipment is used by Iranian security forces to violently suppress peaceful protests, including the protests following the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in 2022, leading to the torture or death of at least 516 protestors, including at least 70 children.
Imen Sanat Zaman Fara Company is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
18.
Iranian Special Police Forces
(a.k.a. NOPO; Iran’s Counter-Terror Special Forces; Niroo-ye Vizhe Pasdar-e Velayat; Supreme Leader's Guardian Special Forces; Provincial Special Forces; Special Counter-Terrorism Force)
Address: Iran
Type of entity: police force
Place of registration: Iran
Principal place of activity: Iran
Associated individuals: Mohsen Ebrahimi (Commander)
Other associated entities: Iran’s Special Unit Forces, Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF)
The Iranian Special Police Forces (NOPO) are a subdivision of Iran’s Special Unit Forces and the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF). NOPO is a highly trained, specialised unit often called upon to dissolve protests.
During the 2022 protests following the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, NOPO used excessive violence and lethal force against unarmed protestors, including women and children, e.g. by firing automatic weapons at protestors.
The Iranian Special Police Forces (NOPO) are therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
19.
Radis Vira Tejarat Co
Address: Tehran, Pasdaran St., West Gilan St., No. 5, Unit 1, Corner of Mohed Dou Alley
Type of entity: physical security provider, private enterprise
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated individuals: Abbas Azarpendar, CEO of Radis Vira Tejarat Co and regional manager in Iran for Tiandy Technologies
Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (customers), Pars Ertebat Afzar Co (distributor)
Radis Vira Tejarat Co is the Iranian representative of the company Tiandy Technologies. The close ties between the companies are illustrated by the fact that the CEO of Radis Vira Tejarat Co, Abbas Azarpendar, is also regional manager in Iran for Tiandy Technologies. Radis Vira Tejarat Co is a key intermediary in Iran providing some of the most advanced surveillance equipment to the Iranian government.
During the protests following the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody in mid-September 2022, its equipment has been used by the Iranian security forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its Basij and the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF), to brutally suppress the nationwide protests, leading to the torture or death of at least 516 protestors, including at least 70 children.
Radis Vira Tejarat Co is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
20.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Shohada in West Azerbaijan
Address: West Azerbaijan, Iran
Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit
Place of registration: West Azerbaijan, Iran
Principal place of activity: Iran
Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Shohada operates in the province of West-Azerbaijan.
EU-listed Brigadier General Habib Shahsavari is the commander of this entity.
During the 2022 protests, the IRGC Regional Corps Shohada conducted operations against protesters in the Kurdish regions of Iran. In particular, commencing 15 November 2022, such operations were conducted against protesters in the West Azerbaijan towns of Piranshahr, Mahabad and Bukan. IRGC troops have used disproportionate force in these operations. IRGC operations in the towns of Mahabad and Bukan have killed at least four and 12 people, respectively, since 15 November 2022.
The IRGC Regional Corps Shohada is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
21.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Hazrat Nabi Akram in Kermanshah
Address: Kermanshah, Iran
Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit
Place of registration: Kermanshah, Iran
Principal place of activity: Iran
Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Hazrat Nabi Akram operates in the province of Kermanshah.
EU-listed Brigadier General Bahman Reyhani is the commander of this entity.
During the 2022 protests, Kermanshah province has seen violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC.
The IRGC Regional Corps Hazrat Nabi Akram is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
22.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Quds in Gilan
Address: Gilan, Iran
Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit
Place of registration: Gilan, Iran
Principal place of activity: Iran
Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Quds operates in the province of Gilan.
EU-listed Brigadier General Mohammad Abdollahpour is the commander of this entity.
During the 2022 protests, Gilan province has seen violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC.
The IRGC Regional Corps Quds is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
23.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Karbala in Mazandaran
Address: Mazandaran, Iran
Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit
Place of registration: Mazandaran, Iran
Principal place of activity: Iran
Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Karbala operates in the province of Mazandaran.
EU-listed Brigadier General Siavash Moslemi is the commander of this entity.
During the 2022 protests, the entity conducted operations against protesters in Mazandaran province. In those operations, it used disproportionate force and violence against protesters.
The IRGC Regional Corps Karbala is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
24.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Seyyed al-Shohada in Tehran province
Address: Tehran, Iran
Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
Principal place of activity: Iran
Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Seyyed al-Shohada operates in the province of Tehran.
EU-listed Brigadier General Ahmad Zulqadr is the commander of this entity.
During the 2022 protests, the violent repression of protests in Tehran province by Iranian security forces, including by the IRGC, has been particularly strong and excessive.
The IRGC Regional Corps Seyyed al-Shohada is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
25.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Operational Base Karbala
Address: Southwest Iran (provinces of Khusestan, Lorestan, and Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad)
Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit
Principal place of activity: Iran
Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Operational Base (regional headquarters) Karbala operates in Southwest Iran, covering the provinces of Khusestan, Lorestan, and Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad.
EU-listed Brigadier General Ahmad Kadem is the commander of this entity.
During the 2022 protests, the entity conducted operations against protesters, in particular in the provinces of Khusestan and Lorestan, including in the town of Khorramabad in Lorestan. During those operations, IRGC troops used disproportionate force, using live ammunition against protesters.
The IRGC Operational Base Karbala is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
26.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Operational Base Quds
Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit
Principal place of activity: Iran
Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Operational Base Quds is the IRGC’s regional headquarters in the southeast of Iran and oversees Kerman province and Sistan and Baluchestan province.
EU-listed Brigadier General Mohammad Karami is the commander of this entity.
Sistan and Baluchestan province has seen some of the most violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, during the 2022 protests. On 30 September 2022, the provincial capital Zahedan witnessed "bloody Friday”, when security forces opened fire on a protest forming in Zahedan around Friday prayer, using live ammunition. At least 70 protestors were shot and killed. Since then, violence against participants in later protests has continued.
The IRGC Operational Base Quds is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
27.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Operational Base
Najaf-e-Ashraf
Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit
Principal place of activity: Iran
Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Operational Base (regional headquarters) Najaf-e-Ashraf oversees the provinces of Kermanshah, Hamedan and Ilam.
EU-listed Brigadier General Mohammad Nazar Azimi is the commander of this entity.
During the 2022 protests, Kermanshah province has seen violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC.
The IRGC Operational Base Najaf-e-Ashraf is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
28.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Valiasr in Khuzestan
Address: Khuzestan, Iran
Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit
Place of registration: Khuzestan, Iran
Principal place of activity: Iran
Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Valiasr operates in the province of Khuzestan.
EU-listed Brigadier General Hassan Shahvarpour is the commander of this entity.
The IRGC Regional Corps Valiasr is responsible for massacres of protesters in Khuzestan in November 2020. In addition, in the course of the 2022 protests in Iran, it has conducted operations against protesters in particular in the town of Izeh. IRGC troops have used disproportionate force in these operations, leading to the killing of protesters.
The IRGC Regional Corps Valiasr is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
29.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Hazrat Abufazl in Lorestan
Address: Lorestan, Iran
Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit
Place of registration: Lorestan, Iran
Principal place of activity: Iran
Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Hazrat Abufazl operates in the province of Lorestan.
During the 2022 protests, it conducted operations against protesters in the Kurdish regions of Iran. In particular, operations were conducted in the town of Khorramabad in Lorestan. IRGC troops used disproportionate force in these operations, using live ammunition against protesters.
The IRGC Regional Corps Hazrat Abufazl is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
30.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Beit-al-Moqadas in Kurdistan
Address: Kurdistan, Iran
Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit
Place of registration: Kurdistan, Iran
Principal place of activity: Iran
Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Beit-al-Moqadas operates in the province of Kurdistan.
EU-listed Brigadier General Sadegh Hosseini is the commander of this entity.
During the 2022 protests, this entity conducted operations against protesters in the Kurdish regions of Iran. In particular, commencing 15 November 2022, such operations were conducted against protesters in the Kurdistan towns and West Azerbaijan towns of Sanandaj, Kamyaran and Saqqez. IRGC troops used disproportionate force in these operations. IRGC operations in the towns of Sanandaj, Kamyaran and Saqqez have killed at least seven, two and two people, respectively, since 15 November 2022.
The IRGC Regional Corps Beit-al-Moqadas is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
31.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Salaman in Sistan and Baluchestan
Address: Sistan and Baluchestan, Iran
Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit
Place of registration: Sistan and Baluchestan, Iran
Principal place of activity: Iran
Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Salaman oversees the province of Sistan and Baluchestan.
EU-listed Brigadier General Amanollah Garshasbi is the commander of this entity.
Sistan and Baluchestan has seen some of the most violent crackdown by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, during the 2022 protests. On 30 September 2022, the provincial capital Zahedan witnessed "bloody Friday”, when security forces opened fire on a protest forming in Zahedan around Friday prayer, using live ammunition. At least 70 protestors were shot and killed. Since then, violence against protesters has continued.
The IRGC Regional Corps Salaman is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
32.
Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) Cooperation Foundation
(a.k.a. NAJA Cooperation Foundation)
Address: Marzdaran Blvd, Teheran, Tehran, Iran
Type of entity: Cooperation Foundation associated with the Law Enforcement Force of the Islamic Republic
Associated entities: Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (a.k.a. NAJA; FARAJA)
Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) Cooperation Foundation is an economic collaborative controlled by the EU-listed LEF (also known as NAJA) and is active in Iran’s energy, construction, services, technology, and banking industries.
The LEF Cooperation Foundation is an important financing arm of the LEF, consists de facto of a financial holding that provides and channels funds and is used to circumvent sanctions. Additionally the Cooperation Foundation with its subsidiaries is one of the few suppliers exclusively involved in manufacturing and importing equipment that is used to suppress protests in Iran.
The LEF Cooperation Foundation therefore provides financial resources and equipment for repression to the LEF which uses the support to commit serious human rights violations.
The LEF Cooperation Foundation is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
33.
Police Science and Social Studies Institute
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
Address: QCC3+HPP District 3, Tehran, Tehran Province, Iran
Type of entity: Institute associated with the Law Enforcement Force of the Islamic Republic (LEF)
Associated entities: Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (a.k.a. NAJA; FARAJA)
The Police Science and Social Studies Institute, affiliated with the EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (also known as NAJA) produces "anti-riot drones" that are used by law enforcement forces in suppressing peaceful protesters. Additionally, the institute promotes and conducts research on the use of drones for police forces.
The Police Science and Social Studies Institute is associated to the Law Enforcement Forces of Iran and provides equipment that is used to commit serious human rights violations.
It is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
34.
Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution
Associated individual: KHOSROU PANAH Abdol Hossein (chairman and secretary)
The Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution is a regime policy body responsible for preparing and formulating strategic policies and plans in the fields of science, education, religion and research.
It promoted several projects undermining the freedom of girls and women, setting limits on their clothing and education. Its decisions have also discriminated against minorities, such as the Baha’i. It is a vehicle for promoting the current regime’s policies.
The Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
35.
Ariantel
Address: Ariantel Head Office, No 15, 15th alley, South Gandhi Street, Tehran, Iran
Website: http://www.ariantel.ir
Type of entity: private company
Ariantel has actively sought, and makes use of, cyberware products used to monitor, geolocate and intercept calls and other mobile communications activities of its users at the request of the Iranian Government. This information has subsequently been used to quash and disrupt protests and to identify, target and arrest peaceful protesters and activists.
Therefore, Ariantel is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
36.
Student Basij Organisation (SBO)
(a.k.a Student and Talabeh Basij)
Type of entity: branch of the Basij Organisation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Place of registration: Iran
Date of registration: November 1989
Associated individuals: Issa Zarepour
Other associated entities: IRGC; IRGC Basij Organisation
The Student Basij Organisation (SBO) is a branch within the Basij Organisation that acts as the IRGC’s violent enforcers on university campuses. The SBO consists of the youngest and most radical members of the Basij, who were particularly active in making university campuses where students staged protests some of the main theatres of repression in autumn 2022. During raids on a number of university campuses, including at Sharif University, Shahid Beheshti University and Amirkabir University security forces, including the SBO, used live ammunition and opened fire on students.
This, alongside multiple reports of student abductions and torture linked to these raids, confirms that the SBO is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
37.
IRGC Cooperative Foundation
(a.k.a IRGC Cooperation Bonyad; Bonyad Taavon Sepah; Bonyad-e Ta’avon-e; Sepah Cooperative Foundation)
Address: Niayes Highway, Seoul Street, Tehran, Iran
Type of entity: foundation
Place of registration: Iran
Date of registration: 1989
Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi;
Seyyed Amin Ala; Emami Tabatabai;
Ahmad Hasan Karimi;
Yahya Alaoddini
Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
The IRGC has been at the forefront of the crackdown on protests in Iran since September 2022, which according to independent sources has resulted in over 520 deaths, including the deaths of over 70 minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments.
The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and is thus responsible for financing the regime’s brutal repression. It is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
38.
Tasnim Cultural Institution Organization
(a.k.a. Tasnim News Agency)
Type of entity: Media outlet
Place of registration: Iran
Date of registration: June 30, 2012
Tasnim News agency is the largest Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) affiliated media outlet and serves as a propaganda machine for the Iranian regime whose coverage frequently reflects hard-line Iranian views. The news outlet is responsible for publishing false confessions by protesters on its website and social media accounts as well as for posting pictures of protestors on social media and asking readers to help identify them.
Tasnim News is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
39.
Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC)
The Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC) is responsible for restricting access to the internet for the Iranian population in order to prevent or oppress protests and limit access to open and free information, thereby violating the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
The SCC is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
40.
Sanandaj Central Prison
Type of entity: Prison
Place of registration: Kordestan, north-western Iran
Sanandaj Central Prison is an institution controlled by the Prison Division of the Judiciary that is frequently used to detain political prisoners and house them in inadequate conditions which violate their human rights. Further, the evidence confirms that multiple executions have occurred within the penitentiary.
Sanandaj Central Prison is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
41.
Zahedan Prison
Zahedan Prison is an institution controlled by the Prison Division of the Judiciary that is frequently used to detain political prisoners and house them in inadequate conditions which violate their human rights. Further, the evidence confirms that mass executions have occurred within the penitentiary.
Zahedan Prison is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
42.
Isfahan Central Prison
(a.k.a. Dastgerd Prison; Prison of Isfahan; Esfahan Prison; Isfahan Prison)
Type of entity: Prison
Place of registration: Isfahan, Iran
Isfahan Central Prison is an institution controlled by the Prison Division of the Judiciary that is frequently used to detain political prisoners and house them in inadequate conditions which violate their human rights. Further, the evidence confirms that multiple executions have occurred within the penitentiary.
Isfahan Central Prison is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
43.
Kachui Prison
(a.k.a. Kachouii Prison; Kechoui Prison; Kachuyi Prison; Fardis Prison)
Kachui prison is an institution controlled by the Prison Division of the Judiciary that is frequently used to detain political prisoners and house them in inadequate conditions which violate their human rights. Further, the evidence confirms that executions have occurred within the penitentiary.
Kachui Prison is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
1   Der Text dieser Resolutionen ist unter www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0 in englischer Sprache abrufbar.
2   Ingress abgeändert durch LGBl. 2023 Nr. 376.
3   Art. 3a eingefügt durch LGBl. 2023 Nr. 376.
4   Der Text des Gemeinsamen umfassenden Aktionsplans ist in Anhang A der UN-Resolution 2231 (2015) enthalten.
5   Art. 4 Abs. 3 abgeändert durch LGBl. 2016 Nr. 206.
6   Art. 4 Abs. 3 Einleitungssatz abgeändert durch LGBl. 2023 Nr. 376.
7   Die Richtlinien der Gruppe der Nuklearlieferländer sind im Internet unter folgender Adresse einsehbar: www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org > Richtlinien.
8   Art. 4 Abs. 4 abgeändert durch LGBl. 2016 Nr. 206.
9   Art. 4 Abs. 5 abgeändert durch LGBl. 2016 Nr. 206.
10   Art. 4 Abs. 6 abgeändert durch LGBl. 2016 Nr. 206.
11   Art. 4 Abs. 7 eingefügt durch LGBl. 2016 Nr. 206.
12   Art. 4 Abs. 8 abgeändert durch LGBl. 2023 Nr. 376.
13   Art. 5 Abs. 6 Einleitungssatz abgeändert durch LGBl. 2016 Nr. 206.
14   Art. 5 Abs. 7 abgeändert durch LGBl. 2023 Nr. 376.
15   Art. 6 Abs. 4 abgeändert durch LGBl. 2023 Nr. 376.
16   Überschrift vor Art. 8 abgeändert durch LGBl. 2023 Nr. 198.
17   Art. 8 Abs. 2a eingefügt durch LGBl. 2023 Nr. 198.
18   Art. 8 Abs. 2b eingefügt durch LGBl. 2023 Nr. 376.
19   Art. 8 Abs. 3 Bst. e abgeändert durch LGBl. 2016 Nr. 24.
20   Art. 8 Abs. 3 Bst. f abgeändert durch LGBl. 2016 Nr. 24.
21   Art. 8 Abs. 3 Bst. g eingefügt durch LGBl. 2016 Nr. 24.
22   Art. 8 Abs. 3 Bst. h eingefügt durch LGBl. 2016 Nr. 24.
23   Art. 8 Abs. 3a eingefügt durch LGBl. 2023 Nr. 376.
24   Art. 11 Abs. 3 Einleitungssatz abgeändert durch LGBl. 2023 Nr. 376.
25   Art. 14a eingefügt durch LGBl. 2017 Nr. 259.
26   Art. 14b eingefügt durch LGBl. 2021 Nr. 248.
27   Die Weisung ist im Internet unter folgender Adresse abrufbar: https://www.llv.li/inhalt/118924/amtsstellen/internationale-und-eu-sanktionen.
28   Art. 15a eingefügt durch LGBl. 2023 Nr. 376.
29   Anhang 1 abgeändert durch LGBl. 2023 Nr. 376.
30   Anhang 1a eingefügt durch LGBl. 2023 Nr. 376.
31   Anhang 5 abgeändert durch LGBl. 2020 Nr. 209 und LGBl. 2021 Nr. 248.
32   Die Liste ist im Internet unter folgender Adresse abrufbar: https://scsanctions.un.org/fop/fop?xml=htdocs/resources/xml/en/consolidated.xml&xslt=htdocs/resources/xsl/en/iran.xsl (sollte richtigerweise lauten: https://scsanctions.un.org/en/?keywords=iran).
33   Anhang 6 abgeändert durch LGBl. 2016 Nr. 24, LGBl. 2016 Nr. 70, LGBl. 2016. Nr. 179, LGBl. 2016 Nr. 369, LGBl. 2017 Nr. 14, LGBl. 2019 Nr. 154, LGBl. 2020 Nr. 209, LGBl. 2020 Nr. 353, LGBl. 2021 Nr. 250, LGBl. 2022 Nr. 201, LGBl. 2023 Nr. 183 und LGBl. 2023 Nr. 391.
34   Anhang 6a eingefügt durch LGBl. 2023 Nr. 376.
35   Dieser Anhang enthält derzeit keine Einträge.
36   Anhang 7 abgeändert durch LGBl. 2016 Nr. 141, LGBl. 2017 Nr. 109, LGBl. 2018 Nr. 76, LGBl. 2019 Nr. 92, LGBl. 2020 Nr. 146, LGBl. 2021 Nr. 137, LGBl. 2022 Nr. 127, LGBl. 2022 Nr. 286, LGBl. 2022 Nr. 323, LGBl. 2022 Nr. 394, LGBl. 2023 Nr. 26, LGBl. 2023 Nr. 69, LGBl. 2023 Nr. 121, LGBl. 2023 Nr. 132, LGBl. 2023 Nr. 183, LGBl. 2023 Nr. 205, LGBl. 2023 Nr. 255 und LGBl. 2023 Nr. 366.